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This thesis uses the Selous-Niassa wildlife corridor as a lens through which the 
process of constructing bioregions can be understood and the effects of that process 
on society properly evaluated. It specifically investigates the corridor as a cog in the 
creation of a bioregion in southeastern Tanzania, namely, the Selous-Niassa 
transfrontier conservation area. The study was motivated by claims that the creation 
of bioregions across international borders places the protection and conservation of 
biodiversity at the appropriate scale, and that bioregions of this type are beneficial for 
nature conservation and society. Though the study appreciates the ecological 
rationales for trans-border conservation, its focus is on the social side of the process. 
The main social claims for bioregions in general, and transfrontier conservation in 
particular, are that the establishment of cross-border protected areas, including 
transfrontier conservation areas, leads to the removal of colonial borders which 
disrupt ecological systems and local communities. Social science research has 
challenged transfrontier conservation areas for their negative consequences on 
states and local communities such as economic inequalities, loss of communal lands 
and state sovereignty. Yet, the process that created conditions for these 
consequences have not been adequately investigated hence the need for this study. 
The premise of this study is that an adequate understanding of the process leading 
to the establishment of transfrontier conservation areas is a precondition for a proper 
analysis of the effects that these areas have on society.  
 
The study draws on conceptual insights from bodies of work on scale and borders, 
which are central to the social narratives of transfrontier conservation and to the 
broader process of the construction of space. As literature has shown, scale 
construction alters the geometry of power - strengthening the power and control of 
some actors while disempowering others. As such, scale construction is a 
fundamental part of the activities that produce space and the creation of space, in 
turn, implies setting of new borders. Border studies support further that when space 
and borders are created across frontiers, governance functions associated with them 
change thus reorganizing border communities. Literature on scale and borders is 
used in this study to facilitate the investigation of the process that creates the 
Selous-Niassa transfrontier conservation area and the implications of that process 












Methodologically, the study adopts the realist approach for its appropriateness to 
research seeking to understand and explain complex processes of the social world. 
It explores three methodological avenues, namely, the use of iterative abstraction, 
triangulation and the grounded theory. Iterative abstraction allowed the identification 
of bioregional processes, real essence, power and mechanisms of that process. 
Triangulation was used to differentiate between intensive methods by which the 
operation of the causal processes can be understood and extensive methods that 
establish empirical regularities between issues. Grounded theory was used as both a 
method for doing research and as a mode of data analysis. As a research method, 
grounded theory was to complement iterative abstraction in search for causal 
processes. As a data analysis model, grounded theory was used on the basis that in 
searching for causal process and effect, the gathered information should be refined 
to determine the type of information to be collected in different stages of the 
research. Thus through the grounded theory data collection and analysis were 
interwoven throughout the research process.  
 
The significant findings of the study are that Wildlife Management Areas play a 
pivotal role in the creation of the ecological corridor on which the bioregion is 
anchored. They are the scale at which there is a high concentration of activities, and 
are the place where the social consequences of the Selous-Niassa transfrontier 
conservation area are mostly felt. They demonstrate the significance of the local 
scale in the network of scales since these areas are directly linked with trans-border 
plans, which have the backing of non-governmental organizations, governments, 
donors, scientists and the private sector. Supported by new maps that describe new 
wildlife areas and the qualitative data collected during fieldwork, this thesis argues 
that, contrary to the transfrontier conservation idiom of removing borders, the 
creation of the Selous-Niassa transfrontier conservation area has created more 
borders in southeastern Tanzania. These borders reflect the emerging forms of 
nature protected areas in communal land and have resulted into the reallocation of 
rights and powers over wildlife. This way, the WMA process in Tanzania has 
empowered the central government and private sector actors while disempowering 
indigenous people by denying them access and use of land and wildlife resources in 
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This chapter provides the background for this study and specifically focuses on the 
theoretical orientation of the study and the methodologies that were used. The 
research is informed by discussions on conservation ideas underpinning bioregional 
planning. The chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section introduces 
bioregional planning perspectives and how they are adopted to support transfrontier 
conservation areas (TFCAs), especially in southern Africa. The second section 
presents the statement of the research problem, the main aim and objectives of the 
study and the research questions. The section also highlights the contribution of the 
study to knowledge. Section three introduces the study area while section four 
presents the general research methodology and the summary of chapters.  
 
1.1 Background to the research 
Over the past decade vast tracts of land throughout the world have been brought 
under the sway of large-scale regional planning and investment initiatives following 
the need to sustain society and biodiversity (Noss, 1983, Miller, 1996, Brunckhorst, 
2002). The main objective behind large-scale regional planning is to protect 
biodiversity wherever it is found, from parks to farms, commercial forests, coastal 
zones, fishing areas as well as in people‟s backyards (Batisse, 1993, Breckwoldt, 
1995). In order to do so, scientists and natural resource managers have suggested a 
redefinition of the scale at which biodiversity would appropriately be protected and 
managed. They promote the use of regions as the scale at which planning for 
biodiversity can take place and bioregions established. There are two contrasting 
views on how these bioregions should be established and what their areal extent 
might be.  
 
On the one hand, bioregions are conceived as areas of land or water whose limits 
are set by the geographical distribution of biophysical attributes, ecological systems 
and human communities (Brunckhorst, 2000). This definition supports bioregions 
that cut across scales, international borders, and necessitate collaboration between 












1994, United Nations Educational Scienti fic and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 
1996, Brunckhorst, 2000). Accordingly, bioregional planning emphasizes the 
integration of social, economic and ecological factors thereby allowing for variously 
defined and tenured areas of land or sea to be nested together. This notion leads to 
the development of bioregions, which support the idea that „bigger is better’. On the 
other hand, calls have been made that bioregions should be defined by local 
residents who have knowledge of local conditions that enable them to manage their 
natural resources successfully (Miller, 1996, Aberly, 1999). This view suggests also 
that bioregional borders should be defined by nature (life forms, topography and 
biota) rather than legislature (human dictates). It favours the notion of „small is 
beautiful‟. The two types of scalar narratives are, therefore, associated with the 
notion of bioregions.  
 
Bioregional planning as applied in TFCAs focuses on harmonizing the management 
of protected areas that are in close proximity and yet separated by international 
borders (De Villiers, 1999, Van der Linde et al., 2001, Tarner, 2004). In the 
contemporary practices, planning tends to be scaled up by linking conservation 
areas and other land use types across the borders of two or more countries to create 
a higher order collage of protected areas variously known as transfrontier nature 
reserves (Thorsell, 1990), trans-border parks (Kenney, 1990), cross-border parks 
(McNeely, 1993), TFCAs and Peace Parks (Peace Parks Foundation (PPF), 2002, 
Ali, 2007). In this way, bioregional planning constructs new conservation scales and 
governance in their wake, which hold potential impacts on state sovereignty, local 
people and their environment.  
 
1.2 Bioregional planning in the southern African context 
Different perspectives have been used to explain the emergence of large-scale 
conservation in Africa. Most of these are informed by theories of environmentalism, 
globalization and glocalization (Zbicz and Green, 1997, Westing, 1998, Duffy, 2006, 
McAfee, 1999, Vreugdenhill et al., 2003, Adams and Mulligan, 2003, Ramutsindela, 
2004a). In particular, the concept of market environmentalism is used to emphasize 
the ways in which the commodification of nature is a practical means for generating 
funds for protected areas while, at the same time, contributing to poverty alleviation. 












development and nature conservation are enhanced. However, there are opposing 
views that markets empower transnational networks of technocrats and 
professionals who maintain influence over environmental protection and utilization 
thereby affecting human rights, development and food security (Levi-Faur, 2005, 
Bakker, 2005, Ingham, 2008, Harvey, 2001, Shleifer, 2005, Shivji, 2006, Castree, 
2008, Adams et al., 2004, McAfee, 1999). Nevertheless, tourism market expansions 
in developing countries where states lack the resources have become the focus of 
business that sells across state borders. Thus, tourism has largely accounted for the 
growing support for cross-border conservation. Against this background, theories of 
globalization and environmentalism use economic development as a common 
reference point. 
 
Environmentalists have used the notion of bioregions to advance TFCAs as a 
panacea for socio-economic, political and ecological problems in southern Africa. It 
is argued that TFCAs hold the potential to restore ecological connectivity which was 
previously disrupted by colonial borders and fences;  foster economic integration; 
and promote peace and cooperation through the encouragement of inter-state 
collaboration (De Villiers, 1999, Tarner, 2004, Hall-Martin and Modise, 2002, PPF, 
1997). It is also suggested that TFCAs constitute a means of re-establishing cultural 
integrity and the unity of divided ethnic groups (Van der Linde et al., 2001, Baldus et 
al., 2003). These arguments raise questions about colonial borders and the claim 
that these borders should be removed through TFCAs. Indeed, TFCAs have been 
promoted as a means of re-establishing socio-economic and ecological links (Van 
der Linde et al., 2001, Peace Parks Foundation (PPF), 1997, Smith, 2003, Westing, 
1998). This way, TFCAs have become an appropriate way of acquiring land for the 
expansion of protected areas with the help of states, the private sector and local 
communities (Wolmer, 2003a, Spierenburg and Wels, 2006, Ramutsindela, 2004b).  
 
Cross-border protected areas are not new in Africa. The first was the Albert National 
Park, which was established in 1925 across the Rwanda-Burundi international 
border. The Albert National Park was established by the Belgian colonial regime for 
the purpose of conserving cross-border natural resources (Tarner, 2004, Van der 
Linde et al., 2001). Following the independence of the two countries in the early 












portion Virunga National Park (Wilkie, 2001). These attempts were renewed with 
vigour in the early 1990‟s, with South Africa taking the lead in the establishment of 
TFCAs in the African continent. The resurgence of interest in TFCAs in southern 
Africa can be ascribed to dramatic political changes in the region. Firstly, South 
Africa was emerging from apartheid rule, and the government was looking for a 
popular movement to improve its international image (Draper et al., 2004, 
Ramutsindela, 2004a). Secondly, Mozambique‟s civil war was an obstacle which 
came to an end in 1992 following the signing of Peace Accord with South Africa. 
Thirdly, Zimbabwe‟s government, like South Africa‟s, needed a means of regaining 
its international image due to its conflict over land use and ownership (Wolmer, 
2003a). Finally, the South African National Parks (SANParks) management was 
struggling to deal with environmental challenges related to elephant over -population, 
especially in the Kruger National Park (Wolmer, 2003a, Ramutsindela, 2004a, 
Draper et al., 2004). Since South Africa is a signatory to the United Nations 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Flora and Fauna (CITES) which 
observes rules on the ban of ivory trade, culling was not an ecological tool for 
managing elephant populations. The TFCAs was thus to help alleviate the problem 
of elephant over-population.  
 
In 1999, the establishment of Kgalagadi transfrontier park (TFP) between Botswana 
and South Africa marked the first successful experiment on TFCAs. The Kgalagadi 
TFP brought together the Kalahari Gemsbok National Park of South Africa and the 
Gemsbok National Park of Botswana. It was followed by the establishment of the 
Great Limpopo TFP (GLTFP) in 2002, comprising of the Kruger National Park (South 
Africa), Limpopo National Park (Mozambique) and the Gonarezhou National Park 
(Zimbabwe). However, the process is underway to develop a far larger area to 
include Zinave and Banhine National Parks in Mozambique (South African National 
Parks (SANParks), 2006). Since the establishment of the Kgalagadi and GTFPs, 
major TFCA projects have been implemented in southern Africa (Table 1.1). In 
addition, processes are underway for the establishment of fifteen other TFCAs in the 
region (Appendix 1) (Van der Linde et al., 2001, Hall-Martin and Modise, 2002). 
Once the identified TFCAs are fully established, they will cover an area of over 120 












international borders (Figure 1.1) (www.peaceparks.org). This study investigates the 
Selous-Niassa TFCA.  
 
Table 1.1 Transfrontier Conservation Areas in Southern Africa 
No. Name Countries involved Status 
1 Kgalagadi TFP South Africa and 
Botswana 
Treaty signed May 2000 
2 Great Limpopo TFP South Africa, Zimbabwe 
and Mozambique 
Treaty signed in 9  
December 2002 
3 Lubombo TFCA South Africa,  
Mozambique and 
Swaziland 
Trilateral Protocol signed 
on 22  June 2000 
4 Ai/Ais-Richtersveld TFP South Africa and Namibia Treaty signed on 1  





South Africa and Lesotho Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) 
signed on 11  June 2001 
6 Limpopo-Shashe  TFCA South Africa, Botswana 
and Zimbabwe 
MoU signed on 22  June 
2006 




8 Selous-Niassa TFCA Tanzania and 
Mozambique 
MoU signed on 29 March 
2007 





Angola, Botswana,  
Namibia, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe 
MoU on 7 December 
2006 
11 Chimanimani Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe 
MoU signed in June 
2001 






13 Liuwa plain-Mussuma Angola and Zambia Conceptual phase 
14 Lower Zambezi-Mana 
pools  


















1.3 Research problem 
The contested relationship between large-scale conservation areas and ecological 
integrity, economic development, political cooperation and cultural reunification 
underpins contemporary environmental debates. Although the debates are informed 
by different theoretical orientations - ranging from globalization, environmentalism, 
regionalism and developmentalism – the mismatch between theory, practice and 
effects remains inconclusive and under-theorised. On the one hand, the 
establishment of TFCAs has been supported by technocratic approaches mostly 
based on consultancy work. On the other hand, research in social science has 
questioned the motives for TFCAs and is concerned with the negative consequences 
of TFCAs on states and local communities as exemplified by economic inequalities, 
loss of communal lands and state sovereignty (Ramutsindela, 2004b, Wolmer, 












2006, Ferreira, 2006). This critical literature is nevertheless thin on the processes 
conditioning the negative consequences of TFCAs at both the theoretical and 
empirical levels. This study attempts to fi ll these gaps. It proceeds from the premise 
that appreciating the ways in which bioregions are created is a useful starting point 
for understanding conditions that create inequalities in TFCAs. The study draws on 
conceptual insights from bodies of work on scale and borders, which are central to 
the social narratives of transfrontier conservation and to the broader process of the 
construction of space. As literature has shown, scale construction alters the 
geometry of power - strengthening the power and control of some actors while 
disempowering others. As such, scale construction is a fundamental part of the 
activities that produce space and the creation of space, in turn, implies the setting of 
new borders. Border studies support further that when space and borders are 
created across frontiers, governance functions associated with them change thus  
reorganizing border communities. Understanding issues of power, control and 
access to cross-border areas and related resources is thus central to the research 
seeking to explain inequalities in such areas. 
 
The Selous-Niassa TFCA aims to incorporate Selous Game Reserve (SGR) in 
southeastern Tanzania and the Niassa Game Reserve (NGR) in northern 
Mozambique into a bioregion of some sort. This plan depends on the establishment 
of the wildlife corridor that extends over 8,000 km2 of communal land  (Baldus and 
Hahn, 2004, Baldus et al., 2003), which is currently settled by twenty nine villages 
with „approximately 70,000 people‟ (Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung 
(InWent) and Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 2007: 
18). Since the Selous-Niassa is the first terrestrial TFCA initiative that involves 
Tanzania, less is known about what the process of its establishment entails and how 
local communities in the area of the corridor are treated. This knowledge is crucial 
for understanding the effects of TFCAs in general, and in Tanzania, in particular.  
 
1.4 Aim of the study  
The study investigates the process by which bioregions are constructed, the 
manifestation of that process in Selous-Niassa TFCA in southeastern Tanzania and 













1.4.1 Research objectives 
The study has two specific objectives. These are; firstly, to identify actors and 
analyze their interests and roles in the creation of bioregions and, secondly, to 
explain the implications of the establishment of the Selous-Niassa TFCA on the state 
and local residents.  
1.4.2 Research questions 
In order to achieve the objectives of the study the following questions guided the 
entire research for this thesis; why and how are bioregions created? How is the 
process of creating bioregions adapted to support the establishment of the Selous-
Niassa TFCA? Who is involved in the creation of the Selous-Niassa TFCA and why? 
And, what are the consequences of the Selous-Niassa TFCA on the state and local 
communities in Tanzania? 
 
1.5 Significance of the study 
Theoretically, the study presents scale and border narratives as alternative 
perspectives for analyzing TFCAs and their outcomes. Although there is 
considerable discussion about the relevance of scale to political ecology and the 
contemporary scale debate in human geography, only a few studies on TFCAs have 
paid attention to the issue of scale and borders (See for instance, Ramutsindela, 
(2007) and Fall, (2003) respectively. A large portion of the literature has neglected 
how scale construction relates directly to the establishment and impacts of TFCAs. 
To date, no empirical work has been done to demonstrate how the construction of 
bioregional scale is accomplished by different actors engaged in environmental 
conservation agendas. Yet, it is in the tradition of any geographical research to 
describe the spatial pattern of events, and explain that pattern by way of the actual 
mechanisms which have generated it (Harvey, 1968). Thus this study contributes to 
this knowledge by demonstrating how the construction of a bioregional scale is 
accomplished by the rearrangement of spatial borders thereby creating new power 
geometries. At the practical level, the study is useful for planners and decision 
makers who are responsible for the establishment of TFCAs and for state 
governments, which are entrusted as guardians of natural resources and people‟s 













1.6 The selection of the study area  
The Selous-Niassa TFCA was selected for this study due to its significance as the 
first bioregional experiment in Tanzania. As Figure 1.2 indicates, the Selous-Niassa 
TFCA is found in Tanzania‟s southern region in Tunduru and Namtumbo districts, 
and the Niassa province in northern Mozambique. The SGR was first established as 
a hunting reserve in 1905 (Baldus, 2001). In 1922 the status of the area was 
upgraded to that of a game reserve. Thereafter it was designated a World Heritage 
Site in 1982 on UNESCO‟s criteria ix and x (representing significant natural habitats 
for in-situ conservation of biological diversity) (IUCN, 1982). Currently, the SGR 
forms the largest protected area in Tanzania covering about six percent of the total 
land mass and is said to contain the largest elephant population in Africa (Baldus 
and Hahn, 2004). As it is for Selous, the NGR is acknowledged for its large animal 
concentration and representation of pristine wilderness of Africa (Baldus and Hahn, 
2004). The NGR was first established in 1954. However, the reserve was abandoned 
during the civil wars in the 1970s and 1980s resulting in the areas opening up for the 
re-establishment of settlements. After the Nkomati Peace Accord was signed in 
1992, the Mozambican government entered into an arrangement with the Sociedade 
para a Gestão e Desenvolvimento da Reserva do Niassa (SRN) to manage NGR as 
















Figure 1.2 The location of the study area  
 
Source: Modified from TANAPA (2009: 34) 
 
The establishment of the link between the two game reserves is set to create the 
largest cross-border conservation area in Africa (Schuerholz and Baldus, 2007). 
Thus, the area separating SGR and NGR is currently the main focus of the TFCA 
activities. Subsequently, the Selous-Niassa Wildlife Corridor (SNWC) project was 
launched in early 2000 in order to create a wildlife corridor that cuts across the 
districts of Namtumbo and Tunduru to the Ruvuma river (Figure 1.3). The Ruvuma 
river forms the international border between Tanzania and Mozambique and also 
marks the northern border of the NGR. This implies, then, that the SNWC is entirely 












the SNWC is classified as locally important and globally outstanding thus making its 
conservation of global significance (Burgess et al., 2004).  
 
Figure 1.3 The Selous-Niassa Wildlife Corridor 
 












Notwithstanding the biological distinctiveness described above, it  is acknowledged 
that the rate of dependency on natural resources by local communities in the SNWC 
is „very high‟ (InWent and GTZ, 2007, Schuerholz and Baldus, 2007). It is therefore 
necessary to analyze the complexities that exist when attempts are made to strike a 
balance between biodiversity and human needs. Based on the foregoing, fifteen 
villages among the twenty-nine that are located in the area of the SNWC were 
selected for a detailed investigation (see Table 1.2). Among these, four villages 
border the SGR and were involved in the establishment of buffer zones around the 
reserve. This study ascertains that the buffer zone project was the first phase of the 
SNWC project, hence the justification for the selection of the four villages. The 
twelve other villages are located southward towards the NGR and are the focus of 
the second phase of the SNWC project, which is currently underway to establish the 
actual wildlife corridor between the two reserves. 
 
Table 1.2 Study villages in Selous-Niassa wildlife corridor 
# Village name Village Population * Project phase  





2 Darajambili  1018 
3 Kilimasera 715 
4 Mchomoro 6882 








6 Lusewa 5171 
7 Msisima 2785 
8 Matepwende 1555 
9 Ligunga 3352 
10 Amani 1165 
11 Magazini  5548 
12 Likusanguse 1666 
13 Molandi 2012 
14 Marumba 3238 
15 Misiaji 2570 
* Based on 2002 national population census  
Source: Author compilation  
 
1.7 Research design and methodology  
The research was designed to facilitate the investigation of the process of 
constructing bioregions as a starting point, the conditions under which that process 












research was also designed to understand the network of key players, their roles and 
interests in Selous-Niassa TFCA. In doing so, I draw from perspectives of social 
construction of nature and critical realism. Social construction as a concept refutes 
the taken-for granted beliefs about the essential nature of things by showing that 
those things are not natural, but instead are somehow socially constructed, 
institutionalized, and made into tradition by humans (Demeritt, 2002, Bird, 1987, 
Klaus and Mark, 1996, Proctor, 1998).  
 
Social construction as refutation rhetoric has been associated with a long -standing 
tradition of speaking truth to power and is often famous to the supporters of critical 
realism (Demeritt, 2002, Proctor, 1998). According to Bhaskar (1975), critical realism 
is a philosophy of science, which makes its strongest claims that social problems are 
a combined effect of separable processes that operate at different strata or levels of 
reality. Accordingly, realist philosophy offers a research approach that helps social 
scientists to understand and explain complex processes of the social world. Critical 
realism‟s key objective is to identify real causal processes lying beneath 
appearances and then to understand their operation in time and space (Sayer, 1992, 
Brown et al., 2002, Bhaskar, 1975). The use of social construction and critical 
realism in this study helps to uncover the ways in which reality is reproduced by 
people acting on their interpretations and their knowledge of it. As Kvale (1996) and 
Wengraf (2001) supports further, the conception of knowledge as a mirror of reality 
has, by a series of turns, been replaced by a conception of the social construction of 
reality. Constructionist and critical realist views derive the main argument of the 
study that the process of constructing bioregions is supported by conditions 
produced, modified and controlled by humans; conditions that are made foundational 
concepts in the environmental conservation debate.  
  
Sayer (1992) argues that reasons given by different actors for their actions today 
may not necessarily be the real reasons. Neither structures nor conditions that result 
into related practices are given transparently; their identification is an achievement 
and must be worked for in order to explain the reality. Yeung (1997) cautions, 
however, that in the search for reality in an open social world, a single process may 
generate many outcomes, and similar outcomes may emerge from different 












explanation must include references to the necessary conditions for the existence of 
mechanisms, where they are not known. Along this line of thinking, social scientists 
are urged to always suspect that the most recent account is a fiction requiring further 
rectification (Wengraf, 2001). It is also noteworthy that social science in general and 
human geography in particular deals almost exc lusively with open systems as 
opposed to other disciplines, which assume the existence of closed systems (Sayer, 
1992). In the open system, problems are a combined effect of separable processes 
that operate at different levels of reality. In any case, patterns of events are not self 
explanatory thus they must be explained by reference to what produces them. It is 
this complexity that makes realist philosophy an appropriate theoretical underpinning 
for this study.  
 
Reality in this sense is more than mere appearances may suggest. According ly, 
realists are forced to focus on processes rather than on patterns in their research. A 
realist researcher must thus ask what a system and its constituent objects must be 
like for regularities to be produced  instead of assuming that conditions that produce 
regularities exist universally (Yeung, 1997, Sayer, 1992). In supporting the use of 
realist philosophy for the practice of geographic research, Yeung, (1997) 
acknowledges the one-to-many correspondence between cause and effect and that 
social processes operate at various scales, and so their analyses are designed to 
transcend these scales (Lawson and Staeheli, 1990, Outhwaite, 1987, Robson, 
2002). Social scientists are thus required to analyze any one process considering 
aspects of the multi-layered or stratified character of the social world through the 
operations of economic, cultural and political processes (Lawson and Staeheli, 1990) 
and to interpret material conditions and statements in different ways across scales in 
order to learn new ways of understanding social world practices (Sayer, 1992).   
 
The nature of the realist approach merits detailed examination as it provides a set of 
guidelines, which outline how to critically analyze and re-work existing conceptions of 
social processes across different scales (Allen, 1983 cited in Yeung, 1997). It is 
argued, along this line, that the relationship between causal mechanisms and their 
effects is not fixed, but contingent (Yeung, 1997). Not surprisingly then, depending 
on conditions, the operation of different mechanisms may produce the same 












patterns of empirical events. This suggests that the discovery of what a given 
mechanism can and cannot do requires considerable effort and ingenuity. The 
search for regularities is thus inadequate.  
 
In executing a realist approach, extensive and intensive research methods are 
differentiated (Sayer, 1992). Intensive methods beg the question of how some causal 
processes operate while extensive methods establish empirical regularities between 
issues. It is cautioned that the causal process cannot explain events directly without 
any need for empirical research into the contingency of the concrete (Yeung, 1997, 
Brown et al., 2002). It is argued further that, while quantitative methodology can help 
with the qualitative side in finding a representative sample, locating deviant cases 
and supplying background data, qualitative methodology can help the quantitative 
side by validating, interpreting, clarifying as well as strengthening and revising theory 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994, Neumann, 2003). Thus the study that uses both 
methodologies is considered more comprehensive because a researcher can 
observe and interpret things from different viewpoints (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, 
Babbie and Mouton, 2001, Flick, 1998, Neumann, 2003). This observation, coupled 
with the nature of realism philosophy discussed above, warranted the use of both 
quantitative and qualitative methods in this study.  
 
In particular, this research adapted Yeung‟s (1997) realist methodological guide for 
human geographical research. This guide provides three methodological avenues 
and outlines the possible trajectories of realist research in practice. These are; the 
use of iterative abstraction, triangulation and grounded theory. As argued earlier, the 
open nature of the social world and its multidimensionality has led to an emphasis on 
the process of conceptualization in research (Yeung, 1997, Lawson and Staeheli, 
1990). And, conceptualization begins with abstraction (Yeung, 1997) which is 
defined as a process of focussing on some feature (s) of some thing (s) while others 
remain in the background (Brown et al., 2002). Abstraction involves identifying the 
necessary relations by which social objects are empowered or constrained and it 
serves two purposes; at the level of actual, it allows particular aspects or moments of 
social reality to be identified while at the level of beneath appearance it uncovers the 
real essence of the social phenomena of interest (Brown et al., 2002). Sayer (1992) 












between objects and events. Abstraction as used in realist philosophy was, 
therefore, a sound step towards the conceptualization of the real essence, power 
and mechanisms for constructing bioregions.  
 
Grounded theory as used in social science in general and realism philosophy in 
particular, is both a method for doing research and a mode of doing analysis for 
generating and testing theory (Robson, 2002, Strauss and Corbin, 1998). As a 
method for doing research, grounded theory seeks to generate or validate a theory, 
which relates to the particular situation forming the focus of the study. The theory is 
grounded in the data obtained during the study, particularly in the actions, 
interactions and processes of the people involved (Robson, 2002). Overall, this study 
used the grounded theory as an integral part of the research methodology to guide 
data collection and analysis rather than developing a new theory. As it will be 
discussed below, aspects of grounded theory used in the study includes qualitative 
theoretical sampling (for the selection of first key informants, modification of interview 
guides and the addition of emergent data sources as the study progressed), data 
collection (iterative interviewing and field observations) and data analysis (coding 
and writing). These methods complemented iterative abstraction and data 
triangulation in search for causal processes. As discussed earlier in this section, a 
realist approach calls for this use of multi-methods due to the differences but 
complementary strengths. 
 
1.8 Types and sources of data 
The study used both primary and secondary sources of data. Primary data was 
collected during the fieldwork that was carried out between July 2007 and 
September 2008. The data was mainly obtained from the study vi llages and from the 
analysis of public records available as government documents and reports. Details of 
techniques used to gather information are discussed later in the forthcoming 
sections. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that primary data obtained from the field  
claims the strength to capture onsite events which can be refined daily in the field 
setting and thus helping to collect new data and gain new insights (Babbie and 
Mouton, 2001). In particular, I talked to people onsite and observed ordinary events 
as well as unusual occurrences, which helped me to acquire an insider‟s view while 












emphasis on people‟s lived experiences are fundamentally well suited for locating 
the meaning people place on their lives and for connecting these meanings to the 
social world around them (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, Miles and Huberman, 1994, 
Neumann, 2003). It is from this emphasis on people‟s lived experiences that the 
study obtained most of the primary data from the study villages. It is important to 
note that the initial plan was to collect data from twelve villages that are currently 
involved in the SNWC project (refer Table 1.1). However, after the first phase of the 
fieldwork I realised that the SNWC is not a new project but had been implemented 
under the GTZ/Selous Conservation Program (GTZ/SCP). This demanded that the 
study be extended to the villages involved in the GTZ/SCP hence the increase of the 
study villages from twelve to fifteen.   
 
Public records constitute a potential goldmine for social science investigation as they 
reveal how public and private agencies account for and legitimate their activities 
(Silverman, 1995). The analysis of these records can reveal the powers to determine 
the grounds through which agendas are set and outcomes determined. It is 
suggested also that public records are of importance for any research because the 
information provided may differ from and not be available in spoken form, and 
because texts endure and thus give historical insight (Hodder, 1994). Public records 
for this research were government policies and regulations (for wildlife, forests, land, 
tourism, local government reforms and poverty reduction), official files for different 
projects in the area (particularly the SNWC project) and consultancy reports. Other 
documents used were speeches (presented in conferences and seminars), minutes 
of meetings, maps, MoUs for related projects and other interstate and international 
agreements. In addition, the Tanzania National Archives in Dar es Salaam and 
museums in Songea and Arusha formed a source of vital historical information. The 
analysis of information obtained from these sources revealed the grounds on which 
the Selous-Niassa TFCA agenda was set, key players, their roles and interests thus 
stimulating further investigations that helped to understand the TFCA process and its 
potential outcomes.  
 
Secondary sources of data were published research materials relevant to the 
establishment of TFCAs, media broadcasts, newspapers, magazines and different 












and reorganised them to find categories of ideas that helped to answer research 
questions (see section 2.4). In particular, research was conducted in libraries at the 
universities of Cape Town and Dar es Salaam, the Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Tourism-Wildlife Division (MNRT-WD) in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania National 
Parks (TANAPA) in Arusha, GTZ and World Wild Fund (WWF) in Dar es Salaam as 
well as PPF in Stellenbosch, South Africa. It is also indisputable that internet search 
made an important source of different types of information and a tool for identifying 
individual researchers and consultants in TFCAs who were thereafter contacted and 
interviewed. 
 
1.9 Sampling design and sample size  
The nature of inquiry in this study resulted in a complex sampling frame with 
scattered, difficult-to-reach and specialized individuals. Indeed, the sampling frame 
included government officials in key decision-making positions, donors, experts and 
consultants as well as ordinary citizens in the study villages. Babbie and Mouton 
(2001) advises that non-probability sampling method is suitable for drawing a study 
sample from such complex frames. In this sampling method it is the relevance to the 
research topic which determines the way in which the respondent is selected (Flick, 
1998, Babbie and Mouton, 2001, Bryman, 2001). Thus the sample size cannot be 
determined in advance until the researcher deploys non-probability sampling 
techniques (Miles and Huberman, 1994, Flick, 1998). This study used purposive and 
snowball sampling techniques that ensured the identification of relevant informants.  
Purposive sampling technique ensures that all characteristics of importance to the 
research are represented (Babbie and Mouton, 2001, Bryman, 2001, Flick, 1998, 
Miles and Huberman, 1994). In practice, purposive stratified sample was drawn to 
get key informants from each of the category of informants identified for this study 
(government officials, donors, experts and consultants as well as villagers) for in-
depth inquiry. The selection of individual informants from these groups was based 
entirely on my prior knowledge of their involvement in TFCA activities and the 
specific roles that they play in the establishment of the Selous-Niassa TFCA. 
Furthermore, snowball-sampling technique was used throughout the data collection 
period to supplement the purposive sample. Snowball is a multistage sampling 
technique, which begins with one or a few people and spreads out on the basis of 












appropriate for this study due to the nature of the interconnected network of 
individual actors and organizations involved in facilitating TFCAs. The two sampling 
techniques resulted in the list of informants presented in Appendix 2.  
 
Due to the relevance of methodological triangulation, probability sampling method 
was also used to draw the sample for quantitative survey. In particular, random 
technique was used to get respondents from the list of residents in each study 
village. Because quantitative survey was conducted to supplement qualitative 
information, I determined a sample size of about 1.5% of the population for the 
fifteen study villages. Thus, random numbers were used to get sampling units that 
gave each registered villager an equal chance of selection. This way, the evidence 
from the fieldwork enabled me to understand the study population. In practice, there 
were variations in the actual number of people interviewed in the villages due to 
different circumstances related to their availability. However, the sample size was 
reasonably achieved, which brought the total number of administered questionnaires 













Table 1.3 Study villages, population and number of survey interviews 




% of total 
respondents 
1 Milonji  3204 37 5.6 
2 Lusewa 5171 48 7.2 
3 Ligunga 3352 46 6.9 
4 Matepwende 1555 51 7.7 
5 Msisima 2785 51 7.7 
6 Amani 1165 38 5.7 
7 Magazini  5548 63 9.5 
8 Likusanguse 1666 50 7.5 
9 Marumba 3238 51 7.7 
10 Molandi 2012 31 4.7 
11 Misiaji 2570 50 7.5 
12 Hulia 1200 51 7.7 
13 Darajambili  1018 37 5.6 
14 Kilimasela 715 32 4.8 
15 Mchomolo 6882 28 4.2 
  Total 42081 664 100 
* Based on 2002 national population census given that most villages had no records for 
internal census  
 
1.10 Data collection techniques 
Interviews (both qualitative and quantitative) constituted the main thrust of the data 
collection component of this study. As Fontana and Frey (1994) argues, interviewing 
has a wide variety of forms and a multiplicity of uses. The most common type of 
interviewing is individual, face-to-face verbal interchange, but it can also take the 
form of group interviewing, mailed or self-administered questionnaires and telephone 
surveys (Babbie and Mouton, 2001). Similarly, interviews can be structured, semi 
structured or unstructured; formal or informal, and, it can be used for understanding 
an individual or a group perspective. Therefore, interview research is considered an 
effective way of capturing the multitude of respondent‟s views of the research theme 
(Kvale, 1996). Nevertheless, it is cautioned that it matters to be explicit on how to 
obtain reliable and valid knowledge of the research theme from different groups of 
people. In the case of this study‟s theme, for instance, vi llagers, donors, 
experts/consultants and government officials were expected to have different 
understanding and ways of expressing views about the ongoing activities in Selous-












capture the diversity of views from these groups. Qualitative interviews were 
unstructured (formal and informal), semi-structured in-depth interviews and 
narratives while quantitative interviews involved questionnaire survey. The degree of 
structuring and/or formality of interview questions depended entirely on the stage of 
the project.  
 
1.11 Interviews 
a) Unstructured interviews  
Denzin and Lincoln, (1994) suggests that unstructured interviews are useful for 
gaining entry, establish rapport and build trust and confidence with the respondents. 
Indeed, different sets of unstructured questions were prepared for different groups of 
informants and they were modified throughout the course of data collection. These 
questions aimed at understanding the meanings people attach to bioregional 
processes, their perceptions, assumptions, prejudgements and for connecting these 
meanings to the ongoing process of establishing the Selous-Niassa TFCA. 
Unstructured interviews were particularly conducted with government officials in 
different levels - the Ministries (Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT), Ministry of 
Land and Ministry of Local Governments), Districts Councils (Namtumbo and 
Tunduru) and government leaders of the fifteen Village Councils participating in the 
research. At the community level, unstructured interviews were conducted with 
purposely selected individuals most of whom were identified by community members 
as Wazee wa Busara (wise men). In few cases, group interviews of up to six people 
were held and non-directional questions encouraged free and open discussion. 
These group discussions were particularly useful in establishing a general 
understanding of contradictory issues at the village level. Once a general 
understanding was established, semi-structured in-depth interviews followed to test 
the validity of the information.  
 
b) Semi-structured in-depth interviews 
As Kvale (1996) and Wengraf (2001) argue, in-depth interviews seek to get a better 
understanding of reality, which makes them highly professional. As such, in-depth 
interviews involves the interviewer in a process of both model-building and model-
testing, theory construction and theory-verification within the same session 












apparently straightforward was more complicated and how the surface appearance 
could be misleading about the depth realities. A it has been argued, if in-depth 
interviews are properly recorded and transcribed, the words spoken remain relatively 
non-controversial facts (Roulston et al., 2003, Wengraf, 2001, Kvale, 1996).  
 
In-depth interviews in this study targeted donors, consultants, experts and 
government officials who are directly involved in the establishment of TFCAs in 
general and the Selous-Niassa in particular. In preparing for the interviews, this 
research adopted procedures as outlined by Kvale (1996) and Wengraf, (2001). 
These procedures include the formulation of guiding structural questions to allow me 
to reflect and determine their relevance in answering theory questions (Appendix 3). 
As such, these questions were to clarify issues that emerged from previous 
interviews as well as to acquire new perspectives. As advised by Wengraf (2001), I 
acquired relevant information concerning the prospective informants for the purpose 
of preparing interview questions. Eight key informants were identified mainly 
because of their merits to provide additional and detailed information. This number 
was also determined by the specialised nature of in-depth interviews, time needed 
per interview and its analysis. After the identification, informants were contacted to 
confirm their availability and venue for interview.  
 
Specifically, interviews were conducted with key informants who represented 
institutions that pioneered the TFCA idea in different times and places in southern 
Africa. These informants include Dr. John Hanks – the former PPF Executive 
Director and the current Director of Conservation International (CI), Mr. Noel de 
Villiers – the Chief Director of Open Africa and Ms. Melissa de Kock - the Socio-
economic Project Coordinator for PPF. As Appendix 2 indicates, these informants 
were interviewed in Cape Town and Stellenbosch in South Africa. In Tanzania, in-
depth interviews were conducted with the Selous-Niassa TFCA donor 
representatives, project implementing/consulting agencies, technical experts and 
some government officials. Specifically, donor representatives included Dr. Alan 
Rodgers – the GEF/UNDP representative for East Africa and Dr. Axel Dorken – the 
GTZ-Tanzania Country Director. Technical experts interviewed are Mr. Rudolf Hahn 
– the GTZ Technical Advisor for the SNWC project and Mr. Wayner Lotter – the 












SNWC project. Others include Mr. Samwel Mgela - the Namtumbo District Game 
Officer (DGO). In-depth interviews were recorded to allow me to pay attention to the 
responses, ask liable questions and interpret non-verbal communication (Wengraf, 
2001, Roulston et al., 2003).  
 
In-depth interviews were also conducted with villagers who have a long history of 
issues related to land use and land use changes in the study area. These interviews 
stimulated stories about borders as understood locally, changes in borders and the 
meanings that people attached to such changes. Unlike other methods, the selection 
of respondents for border narratives based on their age, leadership role in society, 
their willingness and ability to participate. Three informants were interviewed 
iteratively and different versions of their stories were recorded. These informants are 
Mzee Swedi Sanangula – the Historian in Songea museum, Mzee Abraham Cosmas 
of Milonji village and Sheikh Mohammed Ilali Mikonga of Msisima village. 
 
d) Archival research 
Public records obtained from archives were analyzed in relation to other sources of 
data. In particular, minutes of the meetings that deliberated the changes of the 
borders of the SGR were used to interpret reserve maps, which were produced over 
time. These maps are used to analyze patterns in this thesis.  
 
e) Quantitative structured interviews 
Structured questionnaire interviews were the main quantitative techniques for 
establishing empirical regularities that informed the abstraction of the causal 
process. As acknowledged by Strauss and Corbin (1998) and Robson (2002), this 
study found questionnaire interviews useful in capturing information on human 
population and social economic activities, which supplemented data, acquired 
through other techniques. The use of structured questionnaire interviews was also 
supported by the view that they were most useful in locating deviant cases, which 
might have been difficult to reach, overlooked or left out in the use of qualitative 
techniques (Babbie and Mouton, 2001). Specifically, questionnaires were 
administered face-to-face with randomly selected villagers in the SNWC with the 












wildlife land use (Appendix 3). This data was particularly used in the analysis of the 
impacts of the establishment of WMAs and the SNWC in the communal lands.  
 
1.12 Observations  
I observed and scrutinized the physical surroundings, social settings and daily 
activities of the villagers. With the guidance of local research assistants, I observed 
issues that villagers remarked in formal and informal interviews as their main 
concerns. These included areas that were formerly farms and settlements but 
already occupied by wildlife, settlements under relocation schemes, relocated people 
and their new settlements, border areas (for villages and between Tanzania and 
Mozambique) and mineral marks that were put by prospectors in village lands. It was 
also possible for me to observe tensions in the meetings between vi llagers and 
natural resource committee members. These observations were recorded as part of 
field notes and photos, which were later analyzed with other data. The use of this 
technique was supported by the fact that observation produces great rigor when 
combined with other methods and is an alternative source of data for enhancing 
cross-checking (Babbie and Mouton, 2001, Adler and Adler, 1994) or triangulation 
against information gathered through other means (Flick, 1998). Indeed, when added 
onto other research methods, these observation materials enhanced information 
consistency.  
 
1.13 The use of maps and photographs 
Maps and photos were used as a source of information for the analysis of spatial 
interrelationships between different aspects of the research. Whereas photos 
captured onsite phenomenon, maps acquired from different sources provided 
information about the past, present and future plans for the study area. This 
information was vital in the analysis of borders and their current and future impacts 
on people and wildlife. 
 
1.14 Data analysis 
This research derived information from multiple sources and the information was in 
different forms including field notes, tape records, written documents, photographs 
and maps. Nevertheless, data collection and analysis were interwoven throughout 












of analysis. In using grounded theory method, the fieldwork was carried out in three 
phases to allow for the analysis of data between the field visits. Data analysis 
between different phases helped to determine the analytical significance of the 
gathered information and determined the type of information to be collected in the 
next field visits. The process of refining data and gaining new insight also facilitated 
iterative abstraction and made the study more of a spiral moving upwards thus 
helping me to permanently reflect on the whole research process and on particular 
steps in light of others. As such, iteration became a reflexive process (Srivastava 
and Hopwood, 2009), and key to sparking insight and developing meaning. It is 
these new insights that helped to break through technocratic assumptions. In the 
context of grounded theory method, this repeated comparison of information from the 
field and theory facilitates constant comparative analysis of data (Neumann, 2003, 
Miles and Huberman, 1994, Flick, 1998, Morse et al., 2002, Srivastava and 
Hopwood, 2009).  
 
This study borrows procedures for systematic and rigorous data analysis from Miles 
and Huberman (1994), Wengraf‟s (2001) and Morse et al., (2002). Generally, these 
sources argue for systematic and rigorous analysis as a tool for reliability and validity 
of data. Systematic analysis in this case refers to the conscious use of procedures to 
organise a mass of data methodically so that all the parts fit into a broader, 
structured whole (De Wet and Erasmus, 2005). In ensuring rigor and establishing 
reliability and validity of data, I worked in concurrent flows of activities throughout the 
research period. These activities are accurate recording, close reading, data 
reduction, data display, drawing of tentative conclusion and verification. Details of 
how I carried out these activities are provided in subsections below. It is noteworthy, 
however, that these activities were particularly guided by Miles and Herberman‟s 
(1994) data analysis model which suggests that a researcher should decide from the 
beginning which data pattern to use, which data in which form to be used for analytic 
activities and from which data regularities or patterns should the conclusions be 
drawn from. The three streams were thus interwoven before, during and after data 















a) Accurate recording  
As discussed earlier, data were recorded using various methods. These are written 
notes, digital photos and digital voice recorders. Written notes were typed and saved 
as electronic documents alongside other digital records. Backup systems for these 
records were created to minimize the risk of losing information.   
 
b) Close reading and categorization of data  
Iterative reading and updating of notes and other research documents is an 
important analytical procedure (Srivastava and Hopwood, 2009, Richards, 2005). As 
the research continued, the new information required to be read and the old records 
re-read. In fact, iterative abstraction was at the heart of visiting and revisiting the 
data and connecting them with emerging insights and understandings (Srivastava 
and Hopwood, 2009). It is, therefore, through iterative reading that meaningful 
summaries can be generated from different forms of written documents, context in 
transcripts understood and themes from secondary sources teased out (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994, Morse et al., 2002, De Wet and Erasmus, 2005, Richards, 2005, 
Poland, 1995). In practice, questions were created to guide the creation of 
conceptual categories throughout the reading of research materials. These questions 
include, for examples, what conceptual issues emerge from the data (the answer to 
this question made the first step towards creating an information category), why are 
they interesting and why are they of interest to this study (the two questions helped 
to stimulate thinking and create the second and third information categories). A table 
was generated for advanced information categories and short descriptions of 
different concepts of interest to a specific research question were recorded and 




















Table 1.4 A guide to creating conceptual information categories 




Why is it interesting? Why am I interested in it? 
Number of 
villages in the  
corridor 
- It reflects the scope of the project  
- It is the basis for analysing the 
impacts of the project  
-The establishment of the 
SNWC in village lands implies  
change of land use, local 
borders and status 
-Wildlife land use is 




- Borders (local and international) are 
not fences   
- Land use re-definition implies the 
establishment of human-wildli fe 
borders in the village lands  
- Border narratives used to 
establish claims for TFCAs are 
not supported by empirical data 
in S-N TFCA.  
Scale processes 




- Five WMAs are established in the 
area of the twenty nine villages  
-Nine  community forests are merged 
with WMAs to establish the SNWC 
- MoU signed for Selous-Niassa 
collaboration 
- Demonstrates how  CBNRM 
supports the construction of 
large-scale conservation  
 




- There has never been a wildli fe 
corridor land use  
- The SNWC is established in village 
lands  
- Land is under the t rusteeship of the 
President - The President can change 
land use based on national and/or 
global interest (world heritage) 
- Land law reforms support  
changes in land use 
- The basis of loss of land by 
local communities  
Impacts  
 
- Increased wildli fe population 
-Increased commercial hunting 
activities  
- Increased human-wildlife conflicts  
- Loss of farm plots and settlements 
- Points to practices of nature 
commodification 
- Points to possible 
displacement of local 
communities  
Actors and their 
roles 
- German government as the main 
facilitator of the SNWC 
-Points to possible links 
between colonial plans and 
TFCAs 
- Points to the existing 
institutional borders  
 
The identification of clusters and hierarchies of information clarified complex issues 
and sparked ways of relating and explaining them. Progressively, regularities in the 
data became apparent thus supporting analytical writing as opposed to making 
descriptions of the original data. Throughout this procedure, however, I remained 
open minded, sensitive and creative to linking new information to other records 
thereby avoiding drawing conclusions based on what Morse et al., (2002) refer to as 
loudest bangs that are supported by particular group of informants. It is on this basis 












c) Data transcriptions  
The audio-recorded data such as semi-structured in-depth interviews and narratives 
were transcribed. Transcription was used as a method of making data available in 
textual form for subsequent analysis. Further reading of interview transcripts 
identified information that formed useful materials for the final writing of this thesis. 
As it is acknowledged, transcription process is, by itself analytical, as it sparks off 
many theoretical memos of the interview experience and reflection on the possible 
interpretations of that interview and data generated thereafter (Poland, 1995, 
Wengraf, 2001).  
 
d) Use of Statistical Package for Social Science  
The Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) aided the analysis of 
questionnaire interviews. SPSS is a computer statistical package mostly used to 
evaluate empirical data. As the first step, questionnaire answers were transferred 
into data that could be analyzed by assigning them codes (usually in the form of 
numbers). As in qualitative data, codes assigned to questionnaire answers were 
those related to the study objectives. Coded information was then transferred to the 
computer and SPSS was used to prepare frequency tables showing the number, 
percentage, and cumulative percentage of cases for each value. Appendix 4 shows 
examples of table extracts, namely, SPSS output that were used to compare 
information within and across the study villages and to support findings from other 
sources of data.  
 
1.15 Ethical issues  
In Tanzania, all researchers are required to have research permits before conducting 
fieldwork in the villages. In adhering to this specific rule and to the research ethics in 
general, permits were processed at different levels. In particular, the University of 
Dar es Salaam provided a letter of introduction to different Ministries and non-
governmental institutions where key informants were to be interviewed. At the local 
level, District Administrative Secretaries provided letters that introduced me to the 
Village Councils (see Appendix 5). As for the individual informants, consent was 
asked for prior to their participation in the interviews. Consents for qualitative 
interviews were mostly asked in advance of the interview day while questionnaire 












time of the interview (see the attached questionnaire in Appendix 3). It should be 
emphasized that informants were also asked for their permission to use their names 
in the study. Those who did not give their approval are referred to as anonymous in 
this thesis. Consequently, not all the names of informants as provided in Appendix 2 
appear in the citations.  
 
1.16 Limitations of the study 
The study faced two types of constraints. Firstly, data for village wildlife utilization 
was difficult to compile particularly because of irregularities associated with poor 
recording and differences that exist in wildlife user rights in the villages. These 
irregularities made records for village hunting quotas inconsistent with the district 
data. Thus, the research used data for seven villages that form Mbarang‟andu WMA, 
which is comparatively advanced in fulfilling requirements for the acquisition of 
wildlife user rights. Mbarang‟andu was thus used as a case study for analysing the 
impacts of wildlife conservation in the study villages. Secondly, I experienced 
financial and time constraints that necessitated changes in the research area 
coverage. The initial plan was to investigate TFCA activities across Tanzania-
Mozambique international border. This plan was revised due to accessibility 
problems created by the absence of bridges across the Ruvuma river. Until the time 
of the fieldwork, the crossing of the river depended mainly on unofficial local boats 
which were available during the dry season when the water level is low. Even after 
crossing the river, transport within the Niassa Game Reserve where villages are 
located and to the government offices in Niassa Province was unpredictable due to 
the absence of regular public transport. The Mozambican consulate in Dar es 
Salaam advised me to process research permit and organise for transport from 
Maputo. However, the time and budget available for fieldwork could not 
accommodate this plan. It is for this reason that I focussed mainly on the SNWC on 
the Tanzanian side. Despite this limitation, conclusions from the study and the thrust 
of the thesis were not compromised since the SNWC, which is an anchor project for 
the Selous-Niassa TFCA, is entirely on the Tanzanian side and it will not cross over 
to Mozambique because of the river which is an international border between the two 
countries. The net effect of changes on the Tanzanian side provided materials on 













1.17 Summary of chapters 
This thesis is organised in seven chapters. As I indicated above, Chapter One is 
mainly concerned with the introduction of the research, the study area and the 
methodology used in data collection and analysis. Chapter Two presents the 
conceptual framework, which uses scale analysis and border literature to investigate 
bioregional processes. The main issues emerging from the scale literature include 
that scale is socially constructed as a result of struggles for power and control. The 
chapter discusses how scale re-arrangement produces new socio-physical and 
ecological scales that determine access to different kinds of nature. The chapter 
confirms therefore that the re-definition of scale alters the geometry of power. 
Furthermore, the chapter discusses how the construction of scale produces space 
and borders. Border studies show that borders are not simply lines or fences on the 
map or physical landscape but an act of power. Thus, new borders reflect the 
changing nature of sovereignty and they constitute physical and visible lines of 
separation between the social, political and economic spaces. The chapter links the 
scale and border literature as the basis for understanding bioregional processes that 
support TFCAs.  Essentially, the chapter sets the basis for the investigation of the 
Selous-Niassa TFCA, the result of which is presented throughout chapter three, four, 
five and six.  
 
Chapter Three examines how scaling process unfolds in Tanzania and the impacts 
that the process have had on the governance of natural resources. In particular, the 
chapter discusses the role of international conservation NGOs in institutionalising the 
Western view of Africa as pristine nature, how German and British colonial laws 
defined conservation agendas and determined rights and access to natural resource 
by Africans, and how these were later reproduced by post-independence policies. 
For example, relocations in Rufiji basin under colonialism restricted indigenous 
people‟s access to forest and wildlife resources in order to create the SGR as the 
first and largest protected area in Tanzania and currently one of the most famous 
hunting destination in Africa. The chapter also shows that the ideological and 
financial power of different international conservation NGOs facilitated the scaling up 
of national protected areas to the World Heritage Sites and Biosphere Reserves, 












creation of bioregions in Tanzania, however, depended fully on the establishment of 
a new local scale, which becomes the focus of chapter four. 
 
Chapter Four demonstrates that the implementation of the bioregional planning 
model in Tanzania required the creation of a new category of protected area in 
communal land herein referred to as WMAs. The creation of WMAs involved the 
rescaling of environmental governance through law and policy reforms that took 
place throughout the 1990s and 2000s, thus altering the scale and the style of 
environmental governance in the country. The chapter indicates further that key role 
players in facilitating governance reforms were international conservation NGOs, 
scientists and the business sector all of whom focused on WMAs as a conservation 
scale that could support the acquisition of communal land for the implementation of 
different bioregional projects in the country. Thus, the chapter presents WMAs as a 
new supra-village scale with a new governance structure. Furthermore, the chapter 
discusses how the scaling processes that establish WMAs are endemic to conflicts 
between different actors (conservation NGOs, the government and local 
communities) following the redefinition of power, rights and access to local natural 
resources. Notwithstanding these power issues, the chapter suggests that WMAs 
have presented a greater opportunity for the expansion and establishment of a 
network of protected areas using communal lands.  
 
Chapter Five uses empirical data from southeastern Tanzania to derive the 
argument that WMAs are used to create the SNWC which is the main thrust of the 
Selous-Niassa TFCA. Thus, the chapter provides evidence for the importance of the 
local scale in the construction of bioregions. The discussion in this chapter suggests 
that WMAs create a new space, namely, the SNWC. Thus, the SNWC override 
village and district land uses thereby creating new borders. Whereas WMAs 
establish CBOs as supra-village institutions, the SNWC has necessitated the 
creation of joint committees to oversee, among others, the cross-border conservation 
and economic activities. Based on this discussion, the chapter argues that the newly 
created supra-national space enhances wildlife welfare and opens up economic 
opportunities for private commercial activities while constraining local community use 












government is the main actor that uses WMAs for the establishment of TFCAs with 
Selous-Niassa being the first terrestrial TFCA that involves Tanzania.  
 
Chapter Six discusses in detail the impacts of the SNWC and the Selous-Niassa 
TFCA on local communities on the Tanzanian side. The discussion is based on the 
fact that land and wildlife in WMAs are protected by law leaving local communities 
with restricted access to the resources of the areas. The chapter proceeds to 
illustrate that while local communities experience loss of land, which is the basis of 
local livelihoods, customary rights to natural resources have been transformed into 
leaseholds for tourism hunting as the initial support for wildlife commercialization. 
Since these communities neither own the land and nor wildlife resources in it , they 
lack the power to negotiate for the benefits of wildlife commercialization in their 
villages. Taken as a whole, the chapter suggests that WMAs and the process that 
establishes the Selous-Niassa TFCA has resulted into rights reallocation and the 
disempowerment of local communities.  
 
Chapter Seven provides the overall conclusion of the study. The chapter reflects on 
the main aim, specific objectives and the research questions that have guided the 
study. The discussion in this chapter is divided into three broad areas: the 
conceptual issues that supported the research process, issues emerging from the 
study and the contributions of the study to the research on TFCAs. On the 
conceptual framework, the chapter concludes that the scale and border framework 
as used to investigate the Selous-Niassa TFCA offers a useful analytical tool for 
understanding people-nature relations and for explaining power struggles over 
natural resources between different actors. The main finding of the study is that 
WMAs are a scale created to support the establishment of bioregions in Tanzania. In 
the case of this study, WMAs are used to create the SNWC, which is the core of the 
Selous-Niassa TFCA. Contrary to the TFCA idiom of removing borders, the Selous-
Niassa TFCA has generally promoted new borders. Overall, new protected areas 
and their borders have empowered the government and non-state actors while 















CHAPTER TWO: THEORIZING BIOREGIONS: SCALE AND BORDERS IN 
TRANSFRONTIER CONSERVATION AREAS 
 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the conceptual framework of the study, which draws on 
insights from scale and border literature. These insights are useful for analysing the 
process of constructing the bioregional scale and how, once it is constructed, it 
supports the creation of TFCAs. The chapter adopts the view that scale construction 
is a fundamental part of the activities that produce space (Rangan and Kull, 2009). 
The creation of space in turn implies setting new borders (Perkmann, 2007, 
Haywarda and Kerley, 2009). Proceeding from this view, the chapter analyzes ways 
in which bioregional borders are defined and how they also affect governance. The 
chapter is organised in four main sections. The first section argues for the 
importance of scale and border literature in the study of TFCAs as well as in political 
ecology. The second section presents border narratives and their usefulness to the 
analysis of bioregions and their impacts. Section three situates TFCA in the scale 
and border debates while section four analyzes the roles and interest of different 
actors in the construction of the bioregional scale.  
 
2.1 Scale construction and its effects on governance  
Concerns over scale and space are neither new nor are they restricted to geography 
alone. Other disciplines such as sociology and conservation biology have shown 
interest in issues related to scale. However, the question of scale for geographers 
has been topical ever since the institutionalization of the field (Sheppard and 
McMaster, 2004, Haggett, 1965). In fact, the spatial and temporal scaling has been a 
conceptual and methodological problem for all other disciplines using geographical 
information (Harvey, 1996, Masson, 2006). Traditionally, scale has predominantly 
been a cartographic concept, where scale associates a map distance with the 
surface of the earth (Sheppard and McMaster, 2004, Marston, 2000). This 
mathematical definition of scale gained general acceptance as a means of 
representing scale and remains the focus of cartography.  
 
Further conceptualization of scale in the field of human geography associates scale 












continent - and different levels of analysis – local, regional, national and global – in 
which the investigation of political processes is set (Delaney and Leitner, 1997). The 
two notions treat scale as unproblematic, pre-given and a fixed hierarchy of bounded 
spaces (McCarthy, 2005, Marston, 2000, Howitt, 1998), the assumption that for a 
long time prevented geographers from investigating how scales are being continually 
reorganised. However, contemporary social theories emphasize that scale can better 
be understood dialectically than hierarchically. In addition to size and level, social 
science research has moved towards a relational conception, emphasizing the fact 
that scales are socially constructed through contingent political struggles (Howitt, 
1998, Jessop, 2002, Brown and Purcell, 2005, McCarthy, 2005, Sheppard and 
McMaster, 2004). Accordingly, scale is continuously treated as a social construct 
rather than a concept guided by definitive law.  
 
It is emphasized that scale is constructed through the political and economic 
processes of a societal system (Marston, 2000, Brenner, 2001, Sheppard and 
McMaster, 2004, McCarthy, 2005). Looking at capitalism, for instance, scale 
provides a vital geographical solution to the potential contradiction between 
expansion and centralization (Smith, 2004). Capitalism constructed scales and scale 
differences, and its uneven development is premised on the ability to construct and 
dismantle scales (Sheppard, 2002, Smith, 2004). Thus scale production becomes 
unquestionably a means for enabling capital accumulation (McCarthy, 2005, Brown 
and Purcell, 2005). Besides, political struggle is an ongoing process that makes 
scales and scalar arrangements strongly fluid and processual; scalar arrangements 
are being made and remade (Brown and Purcell, 2005). This supports the view that 
scale construction is a political process endemic to capitalism, the outcome of which 
is always potentially open to further transformation (Marston, 2000). Arguably, the 
intense interest in geographical scale from issues of the body to those of the globe is 
understandable a direct expression of the transformation of modern capital (Smith, 
2004).  
 
While attention must be paid to how each scale is constructed in a political struggle, 
it is important to examine how relations among scales are socially constructed 
(Brown and Purcell, 2005). Depending on the processes that produce scales and the 












down-scaling to produce a new scale that empowers a desired practice. In fact, the 
term glocalization characterises these re-scaling tendencies that change the 
importance and role of certain geographical scales, reassert the importance of others 
and sometimes create entirely a new significant scale (Perkmann and Sum, 2002, 
Swyngedouw, 2004a). In the glocalization process, new significant social and 
ecological scales become constructed while others disappear or become 
transformed. These scale re-definitions in turn alter the geometry of social power by 
strengthening the power and the control of some actors while disempowering others 
(McCarthy, 2005, Swyngedouw, 2004a). In the field of environmental science, for 
example, scalar re-configurations produce new socio-physical ecological scales that 
shape, in important ways, who will have access to what kind of nature, and the 
particular trajectories of environmental change (Swyngedouw, 2004b).  
 
Studies on scale indicates further that modern societies cannot be described without 
recognizing them as having a fibrous, thread-like, capillary character, which is never 
captured by the notions of levels, layers, territories, spheres, categories, structures 
or systems (Smith, 2004, Sheppard and McMaster, 2004). Admittedly, Smith (2004) 
suggests that networks do matter in scale analysis because they are part of the 
politics of scale and the struggles for control over diverging spaces in the neoliberal 
world. These struggles may occur between scales or may involve operating on 
several scales simultaneously (Paasi, 2004, Adger et al., 2005, Bulkeley, 2005). For 
example, a local scale cannot be analyzed as a scale in isolation, it must be 
analyzed as it relates to other scales because the nation state is embedded within 
the global and the global is made up of the various national scales. Similarly, in 
contemporary globalisation events do not occur exclusively at one particular scale 
but across various scales simultaneously, making it difficult to assign causal priority 
to one scale over the others. As such, scale becomes the effect of networked 
practices (Legg, 2009). Focusing attention on one spatial scale will rarely be 
adequate for a full understanding of any multidimensional process. As a result, scale 
analysis should examine how the relationship among scales are continually 
produced, dismantled and re-produced.  
 
Conceptually, social scientists need to understand scale and scalar relationships as 












then, address which political interests pursue which scalar arrangements. In fact, 
Smith (2004) suggests that in order to understand what outcomes a particular scalar 
arrangement will have, research must analyze the political agendas of the specific 
actors who pursue and are empowered by that scalar arrangement. The key is not 
the scalar arrangement itself, but the political, economic or ecological agenda of 
those who produce and benefit from it.  
 
2.2 Scale in political ecology 
According to Peet and Watts (1996), political ecology is a confluence between 
ecologically rooted social science and the principles of political economy. Robbins 
(2004) clarifies that although the term political economy has undergone extensive 
review from its early use in 1970s, a set of common elements remains; the 
relationship between political, economic and social factors with environment and 
changes. Accordingly, Robbins argue that political ecology is not only a body of 
knowledge but something that people do (Robbins, 2004). The discussion about 
scale in political ecology as used here relates to the question of how different actors 
use scale to make ecological change political through decisions and counter-
decisions born by bureaucratic incentives, economic pressures and changing 
powers. 
 
Rangan and Kull, (2009) demonstrates how environmentalists engage with the scale 
debate to make ecology the object of politics, policy making and political actions. 
Their common argument is that ecological and social change occurring in particular 
places should be understood as outcomes from the interactions of political and 
economic processes at local, national, and international levels (Peet and Watts, 
1996). Hence, the ecological balance and good conservation practices will be the 
function of the scale of conservation. On the basis of the foregoing, views have 
emerged that large-scale conservation areas have the potential to maintain 
ecosystem balance while at the same time supporting human communities 
associated with conservation areas. The establishment of large-scale conservation 
areas has therefore been informed by different ideologies and practices, which 
originate from diverse disciplines. These ideologies include those supported by 













Bioregionalism as a philosophy and social movement, argues for the conservation of 
small homelands. It originated primarily in North America but increasingly spread to 
Europe, Australia and other parts of the world where it has been used to find the 
balance between community livelihoods and the natural resources in their areas 
(Miller, 1996). It holds that the earth consists of contiguous but discrete organic 
bioregions where local and regional cultures are physically and symbolically rooted 
in the small units or homelands that are considered the most appropriate units for 
political organization (Aberly, 1999). As a social movement, bioregionalism is 
contingent on context and history, and on people‟s connections to place and the 
natural world. It is characterized by grassroots, „bottom up‟ initiatives led by 
communities themselves with the devolution of power to local and regional bodies 
and the establishment of governance structures around bounded places (Aberly, 
1999). It therefore rejects all forms of centralized authority (Fall, 2003, Wolmer, 
2003b) and strongly argues for political autonomy, decentralized governance, 
grassroots empowerment, social equity and self-sufficiency. According to this 
philosophy a bioregion is a place defined by its life forms, its topography and its 
biota, rather than by human dictates; a region governed by nature, not legislature 
(Sale cited in Aberly, 1999).  
 
In recent years environmentalists challenged the bioregionalism movement on the 
basis that problems such as global warming, loss of biodiversity and water resources 
cannot be handled at a small scale (Brunckhorst, 2000, Beresford and Phillips, 2000, 
Batisse, 1982). They suggest instead that bioregion should be made up of adjacent 
similar landscape ecosystems. This is on account of the fact that local human 
communities identify natural and cultural landscapes because of how they see them, 
and what these landscapes produces – whether mostly natural or through 
modifications to varying degrees (Brunckhorst, 2000). The concept presented here 
differs from the small, closed and self-sufficient community espoused in the 
grassroots bioregionalism movement (Wolmer, 2003a) and it advocates for large-
scale bioregions where human communities and their resource use forms part of the  
landscapes. Arguments in support of large-scale bioregions are heavi ly drawn from 













Conservationists argue that effective conservation of biota that has extensive home 
ranges or migrates over large territories requires a landscape scale approach for 
survival (Forman and Godron, 1986, McGinnis, 1999). By this logic, it has been 
emphasized that contiguous and unfragmented habitats support ecological 
processes and meet the habitat requirements of keystone and indicator species 
(World Resources Institute (WRI), 2000). As a result, arguments in favour of 
conservation biology have suggested the expansion of conservation areas from 
protected landscapes (where natural environment, biodiversity conservation and 
ecosystem integrity have been the primary emphasis) to include cultural landscapes 
(where human history, cultural traditions, social values and aspirations are the 
primary emphasis) (Beresford and Phillips, 2000, Buggey, 2000, UNESCO, 1996).  
 
The view advanced in the field of conservation biology on landscape conservation 
refutes the protected areas model that was meant to protect wildlife from human 
communities (Ramutsindela, 2004b). As it will be recalled, protected areas model 
created a dichotomy between natural and cultural landscapes. Nevertheless, there 
has been a twist of this ideology in the recent managerial approaches to embrace 
the view that, after all, many natural and cultural heritages are inextricably bound 
together (IUCN, 2008). Although this nature-cultural landscape concept is not new, 
the contemporary narrative has become important in supporting the elevation of the 
scale of management from protected areas only to include areas of human habitat.  
Different strategies have recently been used to bring this about. These include 
among others, the establishment and re-establishment of biodiversity corridors that 
cut across political borders. It is worth emphasising that although nature and cultural 
landscapes are unevenly distributed, efforts to unify them have mainly concentrated 
on cross-border areas. The analysis of whether bioregions must cross international 
borders to realise their potentials in conservation and economic development is 
beyond the scope of this research. It is apparent, however, that the focus on cross-
border areas has formed an important step towards linking the international 
movements that support bioregions as part of conservation and development 
agendas. Bioregional planning approaches have led to the adoption of conservation 
policies that respond to the theories of environmentalism and sustainable 
development (De Villiers, 1999, Tarner, 2004, Van der Linde et al., 2001, Sandwith 













Sustainable development is a central concept in the World Conservation Strategy 
published in 1980 (IUCN, 1980) and is also the foundation of the World Commission 
on Environment and Development that published the report on Our Common Future, 
setting out the global agenda for environmental management (Brundtland, 1987). 
These two documents underpin most contemporary thinking on sustainable 
development (Adams and Mulligan, 2003). A wide diversity of ideas have been 
supported by the concept of sustainable development including the concept of green 
developmentalism (McAfee, 1999, Adams and Mulligan, 2003, Adams, 2001) and 
the commodification of nature (Harvey, 2004 cited in Liverman, 2004).  
 
The two concepts advocate that conservation and the use of biodiversity can better 
be managed primarily by the market. It is argued, for instance, that nature‟s intrinsic 
value is a service, which can be valued in monetary terms  (McAfee, 1999, Adams, 
2001). Proponents of bioregional planning use this logic to emphasize that nature 
can be sold not only to save it but also to save human communities from poverty. 
Arguments for cross-border bioregions are strongly built on their potential to promote 
economic development (Hanks, 2003, Muruthi, 2005, Vreugdenhill et al., 2003, Van 
der Linde et al., 2001). Tourism investments are considered central to the 
achievement of this goal. In less developing countries and Africa in particular, this 
logic has gained support as it fits well into the conditions of poverty, which have 
become a common agenda for national and regional development strategies. It is on 
this basis that TFCAs have been advanced as a strategy for biodiversity 
conservation and poverty alleviation in southern Africa, calling for the harmonization 
of national and regional conservation and tourism plans (www.sadc-dfrc.org; 
Katerere et al., 2001; Ramutsindela, 2007). The implementation of these plans has 
involved activities that support, among others, the establishment of cross-border 
conservation areas. However, in the overall debate about the construction of scale, 
the space production is rarely explicitly reflected in the debate.   
 
The construction of scale is a primary means through which spatial differentiation 
occurs, so that a region is one scale in the social production of space (Smith and 
Dennis, 1987, Smith, 2004, Taylor, 1999, Rangan and Kull, 2009) . This makes the 












The scale literature and its application to conservation biology demonstrate that the 
process of constructing bioregional scale inevitably creates space and that the scale 
and space created are used to articulate relations, controls and representations of 
social and biophysical landscape (Rangan and Kull, 2009). As such, the role of the 
scale in producing space is what makes ecology „political‟ (Rangan and Kull, 2009). 
The link between scale, regions and their borders is thus crucial for understanding 
cross-border projects (Sheppard and McMaster, 2004, Newman, 2006), spaces of 
identity, inclusion and exclusion (Newman and Paasi, 1998, Marston, 2000, 
MacLeod and Jones, 2001, Newman, 2006) and schemes such as the rescaling of 
the economy and state (Brenner et al., 2003, McCarthy, 2005). In the following 
section I use border studies to demonstrate how, once constructed, bioregions 
necessitates border re-definition, which has potential impacts on power relations 
between different actors engaged in the creation and management of such areas.  
 
2.3 Border narratives and their relevance to the analysis of bioregions 
Bioregions should be understood as geographical spaces that, like any other spaces, 
have to be bounded. There are different narratives that explain bioregional borders. 
Ecologists claim that nature knows no borders. For this reason, bioregional borders 
are defined not by political jurisdictions but by the geographical distribution of 
ecological systems  (Brunckhorst, 2000, Zbicz and Green, 1997, IUCN, 1982). In 
relation to the foregoing, arguments have been raised that African borders were 
artificially imposed to serve colonial interests rendering them irrational. This narrative 
suggests that imposed colonial borders separated African communities, interfered 
with ecological systems and have been the source of political instability in the region 
(Griffiths, 1986, Baldus and Hahn, 2004, Green and Paine, 1997, McNeely, 1993). It 
is therefore suggested that removing these borders by way of transcending them 
with ecological systems will restore ecological connectivity, encourage political 
integration and reunite human communities that were separated by colonial borders. 
By referring to the border communities and support for decolonization the two border 
narratives are politically appealing and have moral justifications. Consequently, the 
view has been shared widely among politicians and Pan Africanists, ecologists, 
tourism industry and border communities (Ramutsindela, 2007), rendering bioregions 












Literature indicates, however, that various disciplines understand and treat borders 
differently. The term border has thus meant many things to different people, at 
different times. From the ecological and biogeography traditions, borders have, for a 
long time, meant physical limits inscribed in the landscape (Fall, 2003; 2005). In the 
social science perspective, borders are defined as a predominantly social 
phenomena linked to the organization of space and as constituting physical and 
invisible lines of separation between the social, political and economic spaces 
(Newman, 2006, Newman and Paasi, 1998). Accordingly, the role of borders in 
social science has been closely connected with the ideas of territory, territoriality and 
sovereignty (Fall, 2005). For example, political scientists consider borders as a 
reflection of the nature of power relations and the ability of one group to determine, 
superimpose and perpetuate lines of separation, or to remove them, and is 
contingent upon the political environment at any given time (Newman, 2006). For 
international lawyers, borders reflect the changing nature of sovereignty and the right 
of states to intervene in the affairs of neighbouring politico-legal entities (Kratochwil, 
1986, Castellino and Allen, 2003). Yet, sociologists and anthropologists consider 
borders as indicative of the binary distinctions (us/them; here/there; inside/outside) 
between groups at a variety of scales, from the national down to the personal spaces 
and territories of the individual (Nadia, 1998, Fall, 2005, Newman, 2006).  
 
The description of the meaning and role of borders as understood in social science 
suggest a consensus that all borders are socially constructed and that  the creation 
of borders is an instrument of choice for new strategies of domination (Perkmann, 
2007, Newman and Paasi, 1998, Newman, 2006). This understanding leads to the 
view that the creation of borders is not simply the drawing of lines on the map or the 
erection of fences in the physical landscape but an act of power (Newman, 2006, 
Fall, 2003, Agnew, 1994). Indeed, borders constitute institutions that enable 
legitimation, signification and domination, creating a system of order through which 
control can be excised (Blatter, 2003). It is on this basis that the attention should be 
paid to the border-producing processes. That is, the ways in which borders are 
demarcated and managed are central to the notion of a border as a process and 
institution. Therefore, the knowledge on the management of border regimes matter 
as it is the management that determines the nature of trans-border interactions. In 












other. The former (the process of demarcation) determines the way in which the 
latter (the management of borders) is put into effect (Newman and Paasi, 1998, Fall, 
2003).  
 
Proponents of bioregions advocate for the removal of imposed political borders in 
favor of natural ecosystems. It is noteworthy, however, that in the case of 
geographical borders there are no „natural borders‟ as such (Newman, 2003). All 
borders are human made, delimited and demarcated by people. Natural objects such 
as mountains and rivers are only used as criteria to pre-determine a convenient cut-
off point. This cut-off point is what falls into the trap of ecological fallacy (Newman, 
2003).  The impression created by ecologists that African borders are all marked by 
fences or objects that need to be removed to give way to natural borders is in 
contrast to the fact that borders are not necessarily physical – they can be invisible. 
In fact, African borders are not necessarily marked by fences (Ramutsindela, 2007) 
nor are bioregions without borders.  
 
Studies on African borders establish that the European partition and the 
establishment of control over Africa split well-established lines of social 
communication into two or more colonies and later independent African successor 
states (Asiwaju, 1985, Griffiths, 1986, Ramutsidela, 1999, Nugent and Asiwaju, 
1996). However, it is noted that many borders are defined in treaties and delimited 
on maps but are not demarcated on the ground. For example, Griffiths (1996) 
suggests that 45 percent of African borders follow rivers or watersheds while half of 
their lengths are straight lines, arcs of circles or are related to roads. In most cases, 
rivers and watersheds are small or seasonal and can easily be crossed on foot. 
Roads are also readily crossed. Overall, physical walls and fences are comparatively 
unusual type of borders in the modern world (Griffiths, 1996, Asiwaju, 2003). 
Therefore, African borders are permeable and border communities have tended to 
ignore the borders as dividing lines and carry on social relations across them as in 
days before the partition. From the viewpoint of border society life in many parts of 
Africa, the partition can hardly be said to have taken place (Asiwaju, 1985).  
 
Problems associated with African borders and the state of instability in the continent 












African social realities and ecological systems (Ramutsidela, 1999, Asiwaju, 2003). 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, these realities and ecological systems are used 
to support the creation of bioregions across African borders. However, the removal 
of colonial borders will not necessarily leave Africa without borders. If the African 
map was to be redrawn based on socio-cultural relations and ecological systems, for 
example, new borders would emerge which are no less arbitrary in terms of both 
their origin and consequences (Nugent and Asiwaju, 1996). Indeed, bioregions today 
are defined by new sets of borders, which are not represented as new in political 
discourse because they will have new meanings that can have far reaching political 
implications. Borders are thus perceived by people in places where no physical 
border exists. Equally, in places where physical borders exist they are ignored when 
they are perceived as being irrelevant to particular actions. It is advised, however, 
that to ignore changes in borders is, at best, to ignore the emerging meanings 
attached to the evolving cross-border spaces (Ramutsindela, 1998). It is against this 
background that borders remain inherently contradictory, problematic and their 
manipulations create power inequality. 
 
2.4 Locating transfrontier conservation agendas in bioregional planning 
The analysis of bioregions through scale and border literature is central to the focus 
of this study. As such, the harmonization of protected and cultural landscapes across 
frontiers require designing of international institutional structures to regulate 
environmental conservation and to support the cross-border flow of natural 
resources (Van der Linde et al., 2001, Sandwith et al., 2001, IUCN, 1994). In this 
regard, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) that made environmental 
agenda a global mandate stands as a general framework. In addition, global 
conservation organizations have also included in their objectives the facilitation of 
the establishment of protected area networks and the link between these areas and 
the surrounding local communities as a mechanism for promoting landscape 
conservation (Interview, De Kock, 21/6/2007; Sandwith et al., 2001; Van der Linde et 
al., 2001). Details of these organisations and their role in facilitating bioregional 
planning are provided in the subsequent section. The views of one of the founding 
members of PPF, Dr. John Hanks, confirm further that TFCAs are promoted within 













….the longer I spent time in conservation in Africa the more I realised that those 
isolated protected areas will not survive on their own….the more we link them up 
into continuum network the better. The whole idea of TFCA is therefore to open 
international borders as much as possible to encourage cross-border tourism and 
for animals to move across those borders…As the theory of biogeography 
suggests, the bigger the area and the more there is connectivity the more likely 
you are to conserve biodiversity sustainably… (Interview, Hanks, 11/5/2007). 
 
More specifically, TFCAs in southern Africa are promoted for their  potential to 
restore ecological connectivity through the re-establishment of wildlife corridors, and 
are said to foster economic development through tourism, peace and security 
through the encouragement of inter-state collaboration and also constitute a means 
of achieving the cultural unity of divided ethnic groups  (Tarner, 2004, Van der Linde 
et al., 2001, Sandwith et al., 2001, De Villiers, 1999, Hanks, 2003, PPF, 1997). In 
practice, the re-establishment of nature-culture landscapes in southern Africa is 
facilitated through different strategies including the use of political platforms and 
governments as catalysts for policy reforms and institutional restructuring. Precisely, 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been used as a 
launching pad for TFCAs in southern Africa and, in turn, TFCAs have been endorsed 
as a politically correct way of achieving the ambitious goal of African unity 
(Ramutsindela, 2007). At the grassroots level, nature-culture relationship is enforced 
through private and community-based conservation initiatives that are supportive of 
TFCAs. The later strategy advocates for among others, benefit sharing between 
protected areas and local communities. It is suggested that the involvement of the 
human component in the management of protected nature represents a win-win 
strategy between conservation and development. This builds into the wider view of 
TFCAs as an opportunity for economic development. The use of regional economic 
and political platforms has, therefore, facilitated the amalgamation of national parks, 
private and communal lands across political jurisdictions.  
 
Critical research has raised questions about the motivations for TFCAs and the 
social and economic inequalities arising from them. Critics argue that the TFCA idea 
involves the re-colonization of the African countryside (Singh and Houtum, 2002, 
Dzingirai, 2004, Spierenburg and Wels, 2006) and that it is part of the on-going 
processes of globalization (Duffy, 2006, Ramutsindela, 2004b, Wolmer, 2003a). 












developmentalism through which TFCAs are to realise their ambitions for economic 
development fall within the commodification of nature debate. Harvey (1996) defines 
commodification of nature as a strategy of accumulation by dispossession where 
states collude with capital to pillage nature and the commons. As a result, markets in 
environmental services become the dominant approach to managing and protecting 
the environment (Liverman, 2004). According to Harvey, (1996) the monetary 
valuation of nature appeals to the theory of markets, to the goal of maximizing utility 
and to the centrality of money as a common means to measure human desires and 
values of nature. Admittedly, to speak in money terms is to speak in a language, 
which the holders of social power appreciate and understand. Thus environmental 
economics becomes a pragmatic tool for getting environmental issues on the global 
monetary agenda. In essence, money as a form of social power has a certain 
asymmetry to it – those who have it can use it to force those who do not, to do their 
bidding (Harvey, 1996). 
 
The commodification of nature has also become a topic of political and intellectual 
debate in the era of globalization. The main questions have remained on who makes 
environmental decisions and who has powers to negotiate and participate in the 
market? There are views that the move to sell nature and market its services is set to 
transform the human-environment relationships to serve the self-interests of the 
conservation constituency (Adams and Mulligan, 2003, Liverman, 2004). This 
constituency recognizes that the political economy of regions and landscape 
conservation are difficult to maintain in the face of objections by local people and 
their political leaders. As Ramutsindela (2007) warns, political and economic 
arguments for TFCAs represent a strategic alliance and a powerful tool for winning 
the confidence of national states that are striving to meet development obligations 
and for silencing local community resistance. Furthermore, there are views that the 
community-based programs have not, so far, been in favour of local communities  
(Songorwa, 1999, Dzingirai, 2004, Kideghesho, 2006, Adams, 2001) but have 
nevertheless become a strategy that brings communities and their political leaders 
onboard to support the establishment of TFCAs (Ramutsindela, 2007). 
 
Experiences from the recently established TFCAs indicate that the reorganization of 












need for partnership in the management of natural resources (Fall, 2003, Fall, 2005, 
Spierenburg and Wels, 2006, Singh and Houtum, 2002). This has serious 
implications on the initial role of the state as a guardian of biodiversity and its citizens 
in the sovereign territory. Whereas political jurisdictional borders are removed, new 
borders for TFCA are assumed and effective management structures become the 
automatic consequence (Wolmer, 2003b). Far from simply requiring ecologically 
appropriate size for biodiversity conservation, TFCAs present a project that has far 
wider political implications. In other words, TFCAs are not simply protected areas for 
biodiversity conservation but territories that are out of state bounds. Issues of 
ownership of these territories and the future of local communities within and around 
them remain vague. The analysis of these issues is carried out throughout this 
research as the basis for explaining the impacts of TFCA on border communities and 
national sovereignty. 
 
2.5 Roles and   interests of different actors in bioregional planning 
The process of constructing a bioregional scale and, by implication TFCAs, is 
facilitated by a complex network of actors who use dif ferent but converging 
strategies. As discussed in the previous section, these strategies include the use of 
the economic aspects of nature as a means for achieving both conservation and 
development of local communities and states involved. Consequently, governments, 
NGOs, individuals and private companies with diverse interests have come together 
to facilitate the TFCA process. As the scale literature reveals, conservationists - 
including NGOs and social movements - invoke scale to negotiate the meaning and 
spatial extent of these areas, both among themselves and with government decision 
makers (Kurtz, 2003). In doing so, conservationists do not only create anew or align 
with variously defined scales of belonging, environmental damage or social justice, 
but they often engage with existing scalar fixes and with rescaling projects of 
dominant economic and political actors (Kurtz, 2003, Masson, 2006). Due to the 
multiplicity of actors involved in the same process, their diverse interests and 
ideologies coincide and diverge from time to time, causing contradictions and 
sometimes tensions and instabilities (McShane, 2003, Masson, 2006) but with traces 
of compromises (Delaney and Leitner, 1997). How this has taken place in the study 













While the CBD remains the general framework for biodiversity conservation 
worldwide, two major organisations have, at different times, played a significant role 
in facilitating the construction of bioregions. These are the UNESCO and IUCN. In 
1968, UNESCO held the first intergovernmental conferences to discuss biosphere 
conservation. During the same time, the IUCN developed the idea of combining 
conservation of cultural sites with those of nature. The two ideas were both 
presented to the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in 
Stockholm in 1972. Eventually, a single text was agreed upon by all parties and the 
Convention concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage was 
adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO on 16 November 1972 
(www.whc.unesco.org/en/convention). By regarding heritage as both cultural and 
natural, the Convention deliberated the expansion of international activity on 
environmental issues. The two organisations implemented the convention 
complementari ly to facilitate what represents bioregional planning today.  
 
The UNESCO worked with two main programs. These are the World Heritage and 
Man and Biosphere Reserve (MAB). These programs provide an integrative tool and 
a strategic framework for land use management across jurisdictions which give 
UNESCO the mandate to monitor sites across landscapes and globally to the 
international network of biosphere reserves (Brunckhorst, 2000, UNESCO, 1996). 
Precisely, the World Heritage program uses the Convention of 1972 as an 
international legal instrument to identify, pro tect and conserve cultural landscapes 
that are designated as World Heritage Sites (Rossler, 2000, Breymeyer, 2000). 
Three categories of landscapes are used as operational guidelines. These are; 
landscape designed and created intentionally by humans  (cultural), organically 
evolved landscapes (natural) and associative cultural landscapes (mixed). By April 
2009, the UNESCO‟s World Heritage List had 878 properties (679 cultural, 174 
natural and 25 mixed) in 186 State Parties (www.whc.unesco.org/en/convention). 
 
The MAB program provides guidelines for the establishment of Biosphere Reserves. 
The Biosphere Reserve concept is based on a geographical zoning scheme, which 
comprises clearly delineated and legally protected core areas, buffer zones and 
cooperation areas (formerly transition zones) (Legislative Assembly for the ACT, 












ecosystems that promote solutions to reconcile the conservation of biodiversity with 
its sustainable use (UNESCO, 1995). Core areas are devoted to the protection of the 
environment and its biological diversity. Each core area is surrounded by a well 
defined buffer zone where only activities compatible with the conservation objectives 
may take place. To the extent possible, buffer zones should surround core areas, 
provide connectivity in the landscape via ecological corridors and meet their function 
as stand‐alone polygons (Legislative Assembly for the ACT, 2007). Buffer zones are 
surrounded by cooperation areas where new approaches to sustainable resource 
management initiatives and practices are encouraged, with the cooperation of the 
human population (Ajathi and Krumme, 2002). Cooperation areas contain multiple 
land uses including forestry, agricultural activities, settlements and other human 
related land uses. As demonstrated in Figure 2.1, the extension of a Biosphere 
Reserve into surrounding buffer zones and cooperation areas establishes a 
biogeographical region with sufficient size to promote conservation at a bioregional 
scale. It is alleged that only in these units it is possible to implement an 
environmental management that cut across large landscapes of different jurisdictions 
(Breymeyer, 2000, Batisse, 1993, Batisse, 2001, Ajathi and Krumme, 2002). By 
2007, about 529 such reserves had been established in 105 countries and they form 
the world network of Biosphere Reserves (Legislative Assembly for the ACT, 2007). 
 
While the UNESCO made progress in establishing a bioregional model using 
Biosphere Reserves and World Heritage Sites, the IUCN developed a system of 
classifying protected areas in 1994. Protected areas were to be classified based on 
management objectives in order to redress differences in terminologies used around 
the world (Rossler, 2000, IUCN, 1994, Dudley, 2008). The IUCN World Commission 
on Protected Areas defined six categories of protected areas ranging from strict 
wilderness to managed resource protected areas. Table 2.1 presents the summary 
of these categories. The IUCN protected area categories system played a major role 
in coordinating standards, principles, practices and other recommendations for 
declaration and management of all kinds of protected landscapes. Notably, IUCN 
has retained the mandate to monitor and assess what is reserved irrespective of 
whether it is managed by the government, trusts, private individuals or institutions at 












Figure 2.1 The bioregional planning model 
 
Source: Adopted from Ajathi and Krumme, (2002: 149) 
 







Strict Nature Reserve: protected area managed mainly for 
science 
Wilderness Area: protected area managed mainly for 
wilderness protection 
Category II National Park: protected area managed mainly for 
ecosystem protection and recreation 
Category III Natural Monument: protected area managed mainly for 
conservation of specific natural features  
Category IV Habitat/Species Management Area: protected area 
managed mainly for conservation through management 
intervention 
Category V Protected Landscape/Seascape: protected area managed 
mainly for landscape/seascape conservation and recreation 
Category VI Managed Resource Protected Area: protected area 
managed mainly for the sustainable use of natural 
ecosystems 













It is important to note that the current United Nations List of Protected Areas is 
classified according to IUCN's system of management categories (Green and Paine, 
1997, Rossler, 2000). That is, in order to be listed, a site must adhere to the IUCN's 
protected area definitions. Many countries attach considerable political importance to 
the UN list. It is in the interest of the respective management agencies to ensure that 
their protected areas are listed, not least because they can qualify for financial 
assistance from international conservation agencies and avoid pressure from the 
same. This way, it has been possible for IUCN to build integrated bioregional 
management strategies that guides coordination, planning and management of 
buffer zones and other land uses around protected landscapes, which provides 
cross-jurisdictional consistency across state and international borders, private 
reserves and public lands (Brunckhorst, 2000). These management strategies have 
particularly been relevant for the establishment and management o f cross-border 
protected areas. 
 
As a strategy to reinforce the bioregional sca le, the UNESCO‟s MAB program was 
reviewed in 1995 to match with the IUCN protected area categories. In a joint 
publication (Seville Strategy), the IUCN, UNESCO and the Australian Nature 
Conservation Agency agreed that the IUCN protected areas category system is not 
only compatible with the MAB program, but it can also inform the planning, 
management and effectiveness of Biosphere Reserves (UNESCO, 1996). As a 
result, the report made recommendations that strengthened the Biosphere Reserve 
model as fundamentally concerned with the whole landscape, whether inside or 
outside of protected areas. This means that the Biosphere Reserve would combine 
the protected natural landscape (IUCN‟s categories) and cultural landscapes (World 
Heritage‟s program).  
 
Bioregional planning took advantage of multiple approaches, practices and the 
converging interests of IUCN and UNESCO. The harmonization of natural and 
cultural landscapes was a significant step in the construction of a bioregional scale 
(Breymeyer, 2000).  In this scale, Biosphere Reserves could manage land uses and 
functional ecological flows across an entire landscape, which also includes a socio-
economic dimension (Batisse, 1982, Brunckhorst, 2000, Laven et al., 2003). Today, 












extend far beyond designated protected areas, and can incorporate Biosphere 
Reserves, Cultural Heritage sites and a wide range of community-based natural 
resource management programs. Evidently, the majority of TFCAs around the world 
are both in IUCN categories I and II – the more strictly protected area categories - 
and a number of them are Biosphere Reserves and World Cultural Heritage Sites 
(Brunckhorst, 2000, Lamb, 2006). 
 
The UNESCO and IUCN are important but not the only organisations involved in the 
bioregional planning processes. Other international development and conservation 
NGOs have historically operated independently but recently their agendas have 
converged to support the establishment of bioregions. For example, USAID - the 
principal agency of the United States in extending assistance to developing countries 
- funded the Biodiversity Conservation Program from 1989 to 2001  
(www.usaid.gov/about_usaid). One of the major projects of the program was the 
development of trans-boundary natural resources management (TBNRM), which 
aimed at assessing processes, opportunities and constraints for international trans-
boundary collaboration in Africa (Ajathi and Krumme, 2002). Projects of other NGOs 
such as AWF whose main focus has been to secure land for the protection of African 
wildlife (www.awf.org) and the WWF that seeks to bui ld a future where people live in 
harmony with nature (www.wwf.org) have collectively had a direct bearing on 
bioregional planning activities.    
 
In 1999, these and other organisations initiated a strategic alliance of an umbrella 
organization of United States-based conservation NGOs with projects in Africa. 
Called an African Biodiversity Collaborative Group (ABCG), the alliance involves 
AWF, Conservation International, World Conservation Society/IUCN (WCS/IUCN), 
WWF and WRI (Ajathi and Krumme, 2002). The priority setting for conservation by 
the ABCG focuses on both regional and site-based scales. While WWF and Nature 
Conservancy works on the regional level, the AWF and WCS works on the site level 
(Ajathi and Krumme, 2002). The WCU/IUCN conservation guidelines are used in 
networking projects of individual organizations. Different activities of these 
organisations in Africa fit well and build into the IUCN and UNESCO bioregional 
model. For example, WWF facilitates the establishment of ecoregions - terrestrial or 












landforms. These landforms represent the geographically distinct arrays of natural 
communities with similar environmental conditions and regional human activity 
patterns (Burgess et al., 2004, Ricketts et al., 1999, Brunckhorst, 2000). The CI‟s 
mission in Africa remains largely on supporting the protection of hotspots – areas of 
high biodiversity concentration. Among others, Nature Conservancy creates new 
protected areas and facilitate infrastructure planning in the regions of high 
biodiversity (Ajathi and Krumme, 2002). The WCS/IUCN supports the establishment 
of living landscapes - large wild ecosystems integrated within the wider landscapes 
of human influence as well as specific threatened species on site. The AWF works to 
establish African Heartlands - large landscapes of exceptional wildlife and natural 
value extending across states, private, and communal lands (African Wildlife 
Foundation (AWF), 2000, Muruthi and Frohardt, 2006, Burgess et al., 2004). In 
addition to the ABCG, the PPF works independently to establish TFCAs and TFPs in 
southern Africa. It is apparent from the above examples that different organizations 
work independently but they all focus on constructing bioregions of one type or 
another. 
 
The similarities of activities and foci on cross-border areas by different international 
development agencies and conservation NGOs are remarkable but not entirely 
accidental. These actors and their activities form part of networks necessary for the 
construction of scale. As Legg (2009) argues, scales are not only planes at which 
processes operate but they can also present the size of networks. It is argued further 
that the (global) environmental governance represent a mosaic of spheres of 
authority within which different actors operate continuously, changing scale 
preferences, networks and alliances that link conservation and development 
agendas together (Büscher and Dressler, 2007). Views have also emerged that 
these networks and their scale effect reflect the environmentalist‟s underlying unity in 
what has come to be known as the greening of politics (Meyer, 1995, Hulme and 
Edwards, 1997, Adams, 2001). This line of thinking considers biodiversity 
conservation as mainly a buzzword used by different actors to compete for donor 
funding. In fact, critics from within environmental organisations suggest that 
ecological concepts such as ecoregions, heartlands, hotspots, landscapes, to 
mention a few, are scientific decorations but the marketing aspect is undeniably 












reflect priorities of different global financial institutions. Apparently, international laws, 
conventions and agreements to finance, coordinate, manage and facilitate the work 
of conservation organizations are closely linked to the same [global environmental] 
network thus making conservation and financial priorities part of one process.   
 
International conservation NGOs forged the link between environmental protection 
and economic growth policies arguing that the two are not only compatible but 
directly dependant on each other. Precisely, the WWF, IUCN and UNEP produced 
the World Conservation Strategy in 1980, which became a landmark document that 
accentuated the relationship between conservation and development (Hails, 2006). 
Later in 1987 the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) 
produced the Bruntland Report (Our Common Future) that framed discussions on 
conservation and development arguing that environmental issues are closely related 
with development policies and practices (Brundtland, 1987). The report insinuated 
that environmental goals and actions should be defined in relation to development 
objectives and policies.  
 
 
Similarly, financial institutions which are, apparently, established by intellectual 
entrepreneurs hoped to gain control and influence over those seeking conservation 
funds following the changes in the global environmental outlook (McAfee, 1999). 
Notably, the World Bank underwent reorganization in 1987 that aimed at conforming 
to environmental portfolio and to establish new regulations to guide environmental 
assessments (Levine, 2002, McAfee, 1999). Following this new portfolio, the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) was founded in 1991 as a joint program of the World 
Bank, UNEP and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to provide funds 
for projects that focused on biodiversity (Levine, 2002, McAfee, 1999, McShane, 
2003). As McAfee (1999) suggests, international conservation NGOs such as IUCN 
were insiders in the formation of GEF followed by others such as WWF, The Nature 
Conservancy, WRI, Biodiversity Action Network (BioNET), Climate Action Network 
and Environmental Defence Fund. The GEF envisaged the development of a 
portfolio that encompasses representative ecosystems of global biodiversity 
significance and it linked its instruments to the criteria such as levels of endemism 












programs such as the Red List, Protected Area Categories, World Heritage Sites and 
Man and Biosphere Reserve (Boyle, 2003, Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, 2004). Embracing most of the CBD strategies for biodiversity 
conservation, GEF considered protected areas linked to their surroundings as the 
most important tool to achieve biodiversity conservation and ecological integrity 
(Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2004). Therefore, the GEF 
ecosystem conservation approaches ensured availability of funding and it accounted 
for the significant growth of conservation institution‟s interests in addressing 
conservation issues at the bioregional scale in the past three decades. In addition to 
the abovementioned actors, bilateral agreements between governments, 
development agencies and tourism companies have interest in bioregions in general, 
and in TFCAs in particular (see Chapter Five).  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates the process that constructs scale and how, once the 
scale is constructed, transforms space and necessitates the re-definition of borders. 
The analysis of literature supports that scale is not an independent concept but is 
limited to playing a role as handmaiden to the more important concepts of regions 
and space production (Howitt, 1998). The re-definition of scale and space becomes 
an act of power which causes power disequilibrium. Therefore, the transformation of 
space through scaling processes is neither neutral nor is it innocent with respect to 
practices of domination and control (Harvey, 1996). Scale and border literature as 
used in this study is therefore crucial for understanding the emerging issues of power 
geometry in conservation agenda. As Spierenburg and Wels, (2006) warns, power is 
about space and space is created through the exercise of power. The chapter 
reveals also that bioregional scale is supported by a complex network of actors who 
converge to facilitate transformations but nevertheless maintain control over different 
ecological spaces. This network and the powers embedded in it does not only 
jeopardise the role and powers of state governments as the proprietor of natural 
resource in their sovereignty but also becomes the root cause of local community‟s 
marginalisation. In the next chapter, I analyze the ways in which the scaling 
processes unfold in Tanzania and how they support the establishment of bioregions 













CHAPTER THREE: COLONIAL POWER, CONTESTED NATURE AND WILDLIFE 
PROTECTION IN TANZANIA 
 
3.0 Introduction  
This chapter examines the institutional organization, policies and laws that govern 
the protection and utilization of natural resources in Tanzania. The main objective of 
the chapter is to provide the basis for analysing the processes that support the 
construction of bioregions in southeastern Tanzania. The chapter demonstrates that 
the colonial vie of Africa as a pristine nature coupled with the economic importance 
of wildlife resources to the political economy of the colonial administration led to the 
establishment of laws that re-defined rights, access and modality of use of African 
wildlife resources. Hunting is used as an example of the contested use of African 
wildlife that stimulated debates culminating into laws that established protected 
areas. These colonial laws excluded natives‟ rights and framed natural resources as 
the property of the Empire, which required protection from destruction by Africans. 
The chapter attests also that the political transformation from colonial to independent 
government was dominated by Western conservation lobbyists who retained their 
influence over African wildlife as expatriates, tourists and sponsors of conservation 
projects. I argue further in the chapter that, the dominance of Western conservation 
thinking, political and financial powers of ex-colonialists and international institutions 
derive changes that support the establishment of new conservation scales and 
continue to determine access and right of resource use  by Africans in the newly 
established conservation areas. The chapter demonstrates how the independent 
government inherited colonial conservation policies that continue to promote nature 
protection at the expense of local needs.  
 
The discussion in this chapter is organised into four sections. Section one examines 
colonial conservation policies and laws and how the political economy of the colonial 
masters influenced practices in southeastern Tanzania, particularly in the Rufi ji basin 
where the SGR is presently located. Section two focuses on the role of individuals 
and conservation organisations in defining conservation agendas for the colonies in 
Africa and how the collective work of these actors resulted in the current laws that 
govern the establishment of large-scale conservation areas in Tanzania. Section 












in Tanzania after independence while section four demonstrates how different actors 
participate in changing global environmental outlook to influence institutional 
structures that provide support for the ongoing establishment of bioregions.  
 
3.1 The politics of nature control in colonial Tanzania 
Political history often informs contemporary government policies and Tanzania is no 
exception (Barrow et al., 2000, Goldstein, 2005). The country‟s governance history is 
founded on two colonial regimes. The first was the German East Africa colonial 
regime which included Tanganyika (now Tanzania1), Burundi and Ruanda. This 
regime started when the Berlin Conference partitioned the African continent in 1884. 
After the First World War (WWI) in 1919, Burundi and Ruanda territories were 
transferred to Belgium and the Tanzania part of the colony was transferred to Britain 
as a mandate by the League of Nations. Both colonial regimes formulated laws that 
governed the administration of the colony in general and the control of natural 
resources in particular, each with differences that related to the specific economic 
and political objectives of the imperial government. Essentially, land was renounced 
the property of the Empire throughout the colonial period and natural resource 
control meant circumscribing native rights of access to fertile agricultural lands, 
game, forests and use of their products. Throughout colonial rule, African livelihood 
strategies were outlawed; collection of fuel wood became encroachment and theft, 
hunting of animals became poaching and pasturing cattle became grazing trespass 
(Chachage, 1988, Kideghesho, 2006, Goldstein, 2005, Adams and McShane, 1996). 
However, colonial laws recognised professional forestry and hunting became a white 
man‟s game (Ylhäisi, 2003, Sunseri, 2003, Neumann, 1998, Chachage, 1988).   
 
3.1.1 German colonial rule and the local political economy  
The history of conservation in Tanzania starts from the southeast along the coast of 
the Indian Ocean around Rufiji basin where the present SGR is located (see Map 
3.1). In 1874 - ten years before German colonial rule began in East Africa - the 
British officer Frederic Elton had visited the southeastern coast of Tanzania and 
noted the presence of forest and wildlife resources and their commercial importance 
                                                 












to the dwellers of the Rufiji delta (Sunseri, 2003). The Rufiji people obtained a wide 
variety of forest products, including wax, rubber, ivory, mangroves, and large 
quantities of copal to trade with Indians and Arabs who settled on the coast. During 
this time the entire Rufiji delta was occupied by local ivory and rubber traders. Trade, 
particularly on ivory, had been there since the tenth century when Arabs moved to  
the southeastern coast of Africa that included Mombasa, Bagamoyo, Lindi, Kilwa and 
the Island of Zanzibar (Toit, 1951). Professional hunters, Indian merchants and 
trading companies from Europe and America provided capital to furnish caravans to 
exchange clothes, beads, wire, guns and powder for copal, ivory, and rubber in the 
interior (Gißibl, 2006, Adams and McShane, 1996, Majamba, 2001). 
  
Figure 3.1 The location of the present Selous Game Reserve in the Rufiji Basin 
 
 
Source: Illife, (1967: 496) 
 
When the German explorer Carl Peters appeared on the scene in 1884, ivory trade 
was still the most lucrative export commodity along the Indian coast followed by 












land from the coast across the interior was suitable for colonisation and hurried to 
sign false treaties with local chiefs while at the same time establishing the Society for 
German Colonisation (DOAG). The DOAG was initially established to control the 
southeastern coastal trade routes (Stoecker, 1987, Meritt, 1978). However, the 
German government granted an imperial charter to DOAG in 1885 to support the 
expansion of the territory to different directions (Toit, 1951). In 1891, the German 
government took over the administration of the territory acquired under the DOAG in 
southeastern Tanzania. 
 
The analysis of early accounts of Rufiji basin in southeastern Tanzania before and 
during colonial administration suggests that wildlife and forest resources in the area 
that includes the present SGR had since been contested. The local economy in the 
Rufiji basin that included Lindi, Liwale and Rufi ji districts depended on trade of 
nature-based commodities (Figure 3.1). The region teemed with elephants that 
maintained their habitats in the forests. The basin was thus famous for its wildlife and 
attractive hunting ranges, water catchments and a bay that offered an outlet to the 
Indian ocean (Sunseri, 2003, Iliffe, 1979). In the struggles to compete with the 
established European and Indian traders for ivory, German rule in East Africa used 
DOAG Concession Company to expand the state control over forest as a strategy to 
take over the coastal trade in forest products (Sunseri, 2003). By 1900 thousands of 
hectares of mangrove forest in the Rufiji delta had been put under firm state control 
and Rufiji was in effect designated as a wood reserve for the capital city of Dar es 
Salaam (Sunseri, 2003, Ylhäisi, 2003, Chachage, 1988). During this time, the 
governor leased forests to German business companies interested in marketing 
mangrove logs to Zanzibar, Dar es Salaam, and South Africa, and enlisted German 
chemical firms as buyers of mangrove barks for leather dye (Ylhäisi, 2003). 
 
The first colonial legislation was instituted to protect wildlife in 1891 followed by the  
forest law of 1893. These laws were important since they empowered the 
government to designate reserves for hunting and forest exploitation. Furthermore, 
the two laws gained more power with the establishment of the Crown Land 
Ordinance in 1895. Specifically, the Crown Land Ordinance marked the start of the 
colonial state-regulated resources whereby the ownership of occupied and 












right of use granted to indigenous occupants (Kideghesho, 2006, Goldstein, 2005). 
Obviously, the control of land, the most important resource for the local people, could 
only be legitimised for use by the imperial government. This meant also that it would 
be possible for the government to demand alienation of local people in useful areas 
at any time (Sunseri, 2003). The most important of these lands, from different 
viewpoints, remained forests, game, water sources and agricultural lands (Neumann, 
2002, Kideghesho, 2006, Sunseri, 2003, Iliffe, 1967, Chachage, 1988). Using the 
Crown Land Ordinance, the colonial government created forest and wildlife reserves 
followed by the formulation of other specific laws for the protection of specific 
resources against the natives (Barrow et al., 2000).  
 
The Wildlife Ordinance was instituted in 1896 and became a licence for the 
establishment of the first hunting reserves. Among others, the Rufiji delta and a one 
hundred mile stretch of coastal mangroves was designated a forest reserve in 1904 
(Sunseri, 2003, Iliffe, 1967). Further in 1905 part of the Rufiji basin in Muhoro - also 
known as Kisaki - was set aside as the first hunting reserve (Baldus, 2001). Although 
written records give little indication of the time of the establishment of other hunting 
reserves, Matzke, (1976) reports that by 1912 three more such reserves had been 
designated around the Rufiji basin. These reserves are Mtetesi in the south, 
Matandu in the southeastern and Mahenge in the west (Matzke, 1976) (see Figure 
3.2). This means that the first hunting reserves in Tanzania were concentrated along 
the Rufiji basin near Liwale and Lindi districts (Baldus, 2001). With the developments 
around Rufiji basin, the German East Africa Corporation controlled wildlife and forest 
exploitation and occupied all main coastal trading ports. African rights of access to 
forest and wildlife resources were thus severely circumscribed (Sunseri, 2003). 
Restricted access to resources coupled with colonial agricultural and labour policies 
that imposed levy head taxes and forced labour triggered the movement against 
colonial oppression that resulted into the Maji Maji rebellion of 1905. Indeed, the 
Rufiji basin became the first unit of Maji Maji rebellion that lasted for two years 
(1905-1907) (Illife, 1967). As the sections below will demonstrate, most of the Maji  
Maji war sites turned out to be unsettled and thus ideal for the expansion of wildlife 












Figure 3.2 Hunting Reserves in the Rufiji Basin 
 
Source: Adopted from Matzke (1976: 30) 
 
The concentration of activities in the southeastern Tanzania during the early years of 
the German colonial administration suggests that the control and exploitation of 
natural resources was a matter of urgency and the main motive for the occupation of 
the area by the first German explorers. Indeed, far from simply protecting nature, 












Empire (Sunseri, 2003). Although conservation politics suggest that ivory exports 
from mainland Tanzania declined sharply with the assumption of formal German rule 
in 1891 (Iliffe, 1979, Baldus, 2001), this explanation ignores the fact that until 1894 
ivory accounted for half the value of all exports from the German colony (Iliffe, 1979, 
Gißibl, 2006) and that southern Tanzania was still the major conduit for the export of 
elephant and ivory (Koponen, 1994). It is important to note too that state-regulated 
access to forest and wildlife resources did not restrict hunting by military and colonial 
administrative workers and they did not put strict rules for sport hunting (Bonner, 
1993). These rules were rather sought to clear reserves of natives by holding their 
multifaceted sources of local livelihoods; gathered food in times of famine, location of 
wild rubber, honey, wax, ivory, and game for cash economy as well as spiritual sites. 
Deprivation of resources coupled with hunting bans brought the famous ivory trade 
to an end for natives but not for white hunters (Neumann, 2002, Chachage, 1988).  
 
3.1.2 Conservation in British East Africa  
The expansion of protected areas characterised conservation activities throughout 
the British East Africa that included Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya. As it was with 
German administration, land and natural resources remained the property of the  
Crown (Gißibl, 2006, Neumann, 2002, Goldstein, 2005, Matheka, 2008). The British 
government in Tanzania (1919-1961) gazetted all hunting reserves that German 
administration had created and enacted the Game Preservation Ordinance in 1921 
to support the designation of more land for protection. In Kenya and Uganda, major 
changes were also made in the game departments including the establishment of 
controlled hunting areas and national parks (Matheka, 2008, Himmelfarb, 2006). 
Essentially, conservation under the British colonial government was influenced by 
two main issues; firstly, changes in the global political economy following the impacts 
of the two world wars and secondly, the emergence of conservation lobbyists who 
worked to influenced decisions made by the colonial administration.  
 
Illife (1979) argues that in the period following the WWI, political and economic 
trends changed the content, implementation, and enforcement of wildlife and 
national park laws in East and Central Africa. The economic depression following the 












long-term market demands of the Empire. Linked to this was the rising importance in 
Africa of the scientific experts in agriculture and natural resources management, 
particularly wildlife conservation (Drummond, 1972, Neumann, 2002). 
Notwithstanding the economic motive behind wildlife conservation, the British 
government had pressure to respond to the alarm on the decline of African wildlife 
numbers which were mostly raised by people who happened to be members of the 
British and Europe‟s aristocracy (Neumann, 2002, Epstein, 2006, Beinart, 1990, 
Goldstein, 2005, Gißibl, 2006, Adams and McShane, 1996). Apparently, these 
individuals had, since 1900, formed an independent Society for the Protection of the 
Fauna of the Empire (SPFE) that had powers to lobby and influence the colonial 
office on the policy content and modalities of their implementation in Africa 
(Prendergast  and Adams, 2003, Gißibl, 2006, Epstein, 2006).  
 
Post WWI period experienced the emergency and increased importance of 
international conservation organisations in setting and implementing the agenda for 
national park and wildlife conservation (Levine, 2002, Neumann, 2001, Epstein, 
2006). Indeed, this period was critical in the history of conservation policies that, for 
many, represented the scramble for African wildlife (Igoe and Brockington, 2007, 
Levine, 2007, Honey, 1999, Bonner, 1993). Notably, controversy and inconsistency 
surrounded the issue of the state of African wildlife population throughout the British 
colonial period. The controversy was on two issues; whether there was a decline of 
African wildlife as reported by members of SPFE; and the appropriate strategies to 
deal with the problem (if there was any). The SPFE - mainly an elite group of nature 
scientists and experienced game hunters - reported unprecedented decline of 
population in African wildlife due to the careless native slaughter while the British 
territorial government disputed these reports based on the field administration 
reports and first hand experiences (Neumann, 2002). Nevertheless, the government 
created more protected areas and strengthened the control and management of 
wildlife, which constrained the future of native hunting while creating more favourable 
regulations to allow sport hunting that could bring money to the territory 
(Kideghesho, 2006, Gißibl, 2006, Majamba, 2001).  
 
The Game Preservation Ordinance was then followed by the establishment of the 












Serengeti Game Reserve in 1928 and 1929 respectively (Wildlife Sector Review 
Task Force, 1995). In the southeastern Tanzania, the Rufiji basin was still a 
stronghold of elephants and „it had a sentimental interest of having within it the grave 
of the British great hunter Frederick Selous‟ (Hingston, 1931: 412). The four hunting 
reserves established by the German colonial administration were merged in 1929 to 
create larger area that could accommodate the growing number of elephants (United 
Republic of Tanzania (URT), 1998). Details of these changes and how they built into 
the present SGR are provided later in Chapter Five. Elsewhere in the country five 
game reserves (Ruvu-Masai, Mkomazi, Rungwa, Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount 
Meru) were gazetted in 1951, and Uwanda and Biharamulo in 1959. In addition, 
Game Controlled Areas were established countrywide in 1946 and divided into 
hunting blocks for professional hunters and their tourist clients (Graham, 2005). 
Throughout the British colonial period, therefore, laws permitted hunting in the game 
reserves and game controlled areas. With the exception of Serengeti National Park, 
which was gazetted in 1951, the government did not gazette national parks until 
1960, a year before independence when Lake Manyara and Arusha (formally 
Ngurdoto) National Parks were established.  
 
3.2 African wildlife contestation: the role of almighty hunters  
There is a growing body of literature which suggests that the space of interaction in 
the protection of nature in Africa was first created by a web of individuals and 
organizations who were at different times involved directly or indirectly in wildlife 
expeditions, business and later as conservationists (Chachage, 2000, Gißibl, 2006, 
Neumann, 2002, Bonner, 1993). Ivory, the commodity that could only be procured at 
the expense of elephants, made elephants the main target for tourists and business 
but also the main focus of wildlife experts and conservationists throughout the 
colonial period (Gißibl, 2006). Indeed, the early outcry of extermination of African 
wildlife mostly made reference to elephants so were the nature protection measures 
that followed. Literature suggests also that the idea of Africa as a symbolic Eden 
stimulated Western interests in African conservation before and throughout the 
colonial time and it strongly influenced the practices in nature conservation today 
(Adams and McShane, 1996, Bonner, 1993, Ramutsindela, 2007, Neumann, 1998). I 












environment in the context of Western civilization and maintain deceptive views of 
the relationship that existed between nature and African societies. 
 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Western professionals and sport 
hunters produced rich literature that sparked scholarly attention and influenced laws 
that led to the preservation of some wild animals as part of the wider conservationist 
initiative2. Some of the popular accounts of early expedition literature include A 
Hunters Wanderings in Africa (1881), Sport and Travel, East and West (1900) both 
authored by the British explorer and hunter Frederick Courteney Selous; the Five 
Years of Hunter’s Life in the Far Interior of South Africa (1850) by the Scotsman 
hunter Roualeyn Gordon Cumming; the African Game Trails (1910) authored by 
Theodore Roosevelt, the twenty-sixth President of the United States (1901-1909). 
Indeed the account of African expedition by these and other hunters is well 
documented in museums, novels, electronic databases as well as in academic 
literature. It is reported, for example, that by the time of his death in 1917, „Selous 
had in his bag thirty-one lion, at least two hundred buffalo and a large number of 
elephants‟ (Adams and McShane, 1996: 27). In the Roosevelt‟s trip in 1909, „over 
five hundred animals were shot‟ (www.nationmaster.com/Frederick-Selous). 
Moreover, Cumming claimed to have short hundreds upon hundreds of elephants, 
impala, rhino and wildebeest among others in his career (Adams and McShane, 
1996). Notwithstanding this massive slaughter European hunters received 
recognition for their contribution to science that shaped ways in which wildlife 
protection could be carried out in colonial Africa. For example, Selous was awarded 
the Royal Geographical Society Founders medal in recognition of his work in African 
wildlife and the SGR was named in his honour (Bonner, 1993, Adams and McShane, 
1996). Currently Selous is described as „the largest game reserve in the world‟ 
(Baldus, 2001) and among the „best hunting destinations in Africa‟ (Interview, 
Wayner, 4/9/2008). 
 
Drawing on the experience acquired from African exploration, Western individuals 
and links to their institutions played a major role in influencing colonial governments 
                                                 
2 See for example Bonner, (1993): At the Hand of Man; Beinart, (1990): Hunting and Ecological Change in Southern and 
Central Africa, Chachage (1998): Nimrods and Thomas Cooks: Accumulation and Tourism in Tanzania, Adams and McShane 












on matters of wildlife. For example, through their organised publications they 
managed to undermine African hunting and persuade colonial governments on the 
matter (Bonner, 1993, Beinart, 1990). Views held by this group dominated 
conservationist thinking in most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and they 
form global environmental laws that operate today (Epstein, 2006, Neumann, 2001). 
For example, the reports that expressed concerns over the decline of wildlife in East 
Africa was one of the major reasons that prompted British and German colonial 
offices to organize an international conference to discuss matters related to the 
protection of African Wildlife. The conference for the „Preservation of Animals, Birds 
and Fish in Africa‟ was held in 1900 in London. The colonial offices in London and 
Berlin agreed on the conference resolutions, which developed international 
standards that were in line with the London Convention. In particular, the convention 
included the idea of establishing a closed hunting season, protection of some animal 
species, particularly elephants, and banning of African hunting techniques such as 
use of nets, snares, traps and pits (Kideghesho, 2006, Neumann, 2002). Since 
colonies and their administration were fully integrated into the international system, 
the London Convention remained a critical document that framed African wildlife as 
imperial heritage that required preservation and it laid down international sta ndards 
on the establishment of national parks. As such, the conference was the first step 
towards the establishment of rules that internationalised African wildlife (Epstein, 
2006, Gißibl, 2006). 
 
In 1903 - three years after the London Convention - conservationists organised 
themselves through the London-based SPFE and published the Journal of the 
Society for the Protection of the Fauna of the Empire (the precursor of Oryx) that 
largely authored accounts of hunting trips in the Empire and editorials against African 
hunting (Gißibl, 2006, Epstein, 2006, Bonner, 1993, Neumann, 2002). Despite all the 
damages caused by the hunting expeditions of the members of the society and other 
hunters, this literature labelled African hunting as the cause of wildlife extinction, thus 
captivating the imagination of Westerners who sympathised with conservationists. 
More importantly, the literature put pressure on colonial governments, which had 
been mandated to protect wildlife of the Empire. Nevertheless, the British colonial 
governments were far from united in the interpretation of the dangers caused by 












most active conservation lobbyist group in the British Empire that later won the 
support of the colonial offices in London and Berlin (Epstein, 2006). Specifically, in 
1930 the Secretary of States for British colonies approved the SPFE‟s mission to 
visit the East African group of colonies to discuss the future policy regarding African 
wildlife, and particularly, on the establishment of national parks (Hingston, 1931). 
The SPFE entrusted Major R.W Hingston whose report accented the importance of 
protecting African wildlife in the following words:  
 
The most wonderful thing in Africa is its animal life. It has probably been the 
wildlife more than any other factor, which has been responsible for attracting the 
Englishmen to Africa and establishing in our colonies a white population. Its 
disappearance through any shortsightedness or neglect would be a deplorable 
calamity...Native hunter cares nothing about trophies, species or sex, nor does he 
hunt for the fun of the thing. What the native want are as many animals as 
possible for the purpose of either meat or barter (Hingston, 1931: 406). 
 
Hingston proposed the scheme of national parks in British East Africa that included 
Selous, Serengeti and Kilimanjaro in Tanzania and the South-Central African 
National Park in the border between Nyasaland (now Malawi) and Northern 
Rhodesia (now Zambia). The report and the proposed scheme for national parks in 
Africa coincided with the Society‟s international conference held in London in 1933 
(Epstein, 2006, Bonner, 1993). Part of the conference resolution saw the 
establishment of the International Office for the Protection of Nature (IOPN) in 1934. 
The SPFE, which is referred to as the world's first conservation society played a key 
role in establishing most of the international conservation organizations including the 
IUCN, WWF, and the CITES Convention (www.fauna-flora.org). Collectively, these 
organizations influenced nature protection throughout Africa during and after 
independence. Before demonstrating how these organizations influenced wildlife 
protection in Africa, the section below links the London politics, responses and 
impacts on Tanzania‟s SRG. 
 
3.3 London politics and the management of the Selous Game Reserve 
Although the British colonial office in London signed the Convention for wildlife 
protection in 1900, rules of the convention were loosely applied in the East African 
group of territories. In fact, Neumann, (2002) argues that the East African territory 












park proposal and the native hunting restrictions with the exception of elephants. 
Colonial officers in Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and Northern Rhodesia maintained a 
view that reports on the decline and wildlife population in their territories were far 
from the reality thus native hunting, albeit controlled, continued to be an important 
economic activity. Correspondence within game department offices in Tanzania 
suggests that both SPFE and the colonial office in London had overrated the issue of 
decline in wildlife numbers because the game department was dealing with problems 
related to the increased wildlife population. Examples of such correspondences from 
the Tanzanian National Archives (hereafter Tanganyika Notes and Records (TNR) 
include that of 13 March 1942 where the Southern Provincial Commissioner reported 
to the Arusha Game Warden about elephant problems in SGR saying ; 
 
...the measures to protect crops from marauding elephants are no longer 
sufficient. The most fertile valleys outside the reserve in Milola, Kahungutwa, 
Mangi, Lijundu, Ndapata and Mbindera suffer to an increasing extent from the 
marauding elephants. Game scouts, several of whom, have been doing a very 
stout and hard job in this district for several years. It is no longer merely a matter 
of scaring off elephant at night, but a perpetual day and night warfare, with 
unprotected African a clear loser... (Tanganyika Notes and Records (TNR), 1942).  
 
Notwithstanding the overrated loss of wildlife, the government was still compelled to 
create protected areas for two reasons; firstly, tourism - particularly sport hunting - 
was still targeted for economic recovery of the British Empire and the running of the 
colonies. Besides, game departments had been overwhelmed by the wildlife 
protection task that involved the use of game rangers in crop protection against 
raiding elephants. To deal with the problem, the department instigated the need to 
confine the expanding population to exclusive reserves. The second reason, 
however, was the necessity for land for agricultural schemes in connection to the  
increased demand for food both in Britain and in the colonies following the impacts of 
the Second World War (WWII) (Neuman, 2001). Confining wildlife in the reserves 
was thus to open up fertile areas for crop production.  
 
As part of the solutions for the increasing wildlife numbers in SGR the game 
department embarked on the reserve expansion project. In a letter dated 8 
November 1933, the Tanganyika Chief Secretary in Dar es Salaam office ordered 












Selous in Ulanga and Songea districts. However, Hartnoll expressed dissatisfaction 
with the decision to expand the reserve in the letter dated 12 January 1937 saying: 
„after visiting and discussing the matter with the Ulanga district officer (Mr. Culwick) 
and the game ranger (Mr. Arundell), I have come to the conclusion that a sufficient 
case has not been made to justify the alteration of the present boundary’ (TNR, 
1937). This response bears the testimony that decisions for the expansion of the 
reserve were not based on the local needs. In practice, there were no threats to 
wildlife when demands for expansion were raised. Nevertheless, cases were made 
that deliberated the expansion of the reserve throughout the 1940s and 1950s.  
 
Conditions were created to justify the displacement of local people in the present 
SGR. However, these conditions were not necessarily related to the threats posed 
by African hunting as suggested by European wildlife activists but were part of the 
scheme that sought to concentrate the control of wildlife in a single land unit. One of 
the conditions used to create areas devoid of people was the spread tsetse flies and 
sleeping sickness. Kjekshus (1977) and Iliffe (1979) report that elephant control 
schemes encouraged the expansion of bush lands and, by implication, the spread of 
tsetse flies in the most fertile valleys. The increased elephant numbers and tsetse 
flies eliminated possibilities for cultivation and settlement which became the basis for 
the relocation of people. This way, more land was secured and wildlife borders were 
re-defined to include areas that had been farms and settlements in the SGR. Based 
on the elephant concentration objectives, some reserves were abolished while 
others were designated.  
 
The Mtetesi game reserve in the southern Selous was abolished in 1940 and a new 
reserve was created north of Mtetesi in Njenje-Mbarangandu-Luwegu area. 
Inhabitants of the newly established reserve were concentrated elsewhere as an 
anti-sleeping sickness measure, and therefore dropped out of the reserve picture 
(TNR, 1941). Later in 1944 the Provincial Commissioner, game officers and sleeping 
sickness surveyor deliberated the extension of the eastern borders of the reserve 
that would consequently eliminate Liwale district. It was resolved that; ‘the 
concentration of the bulk population of Liwale in three centres at Ngarambi, Muhinji 
Chini and Namatele Valley will leave this area empty, which will lead to a great 












be included in the reserve for easiness of elephant control‟ (TNR, 1944). Further in 
1947, decisions were made to extend the northern borders of the SGR in Rufiji  
district and the sleeping sickness measures were used to evacuate more people in 
Mpanga and Mkindu areas to a site in Ndundu valley (TNR, 1947). 
 
Wildlife protection in SGR was supervened by the proposal put forward by the 
Overseas Food Cooperation (OFC). As such, OFC proposed to withdraw from the 
reserve areas that had agricultural potential. Apparently, game officers who had, in 
different times, expressed dissatisfaction with the decision to expand the reserve 
merely for the sake of protecting wildlife, welcomed this proposal. For example, the 
Southern Provincial Commissioner had expressed in a letter dated 24 October 1935 
that; 
 
‘I shall be grateful if that portion of the reserve may be altered. The reason for this 
request is that the area desired to acquire from the reserve is very valuable rice 
and cotton land. Many natives would settle and produce in the area if marauding 
game could be kept behind the proposed new line’ (TNR, 1935) 
 
Writing to the Selous game warden on 25 October 1935, the Commissioner 
proposed that the portion of the western Selous in Mahenge district be altered to the 
east to acquire from the reserve twenty five square miles of land which was valuable 
for rice and cotton schemes. This plan was to encourage natives to settle and 
cultivate in the area. In response to this proposal, the Chief Secretary‟s 
recommendation was succinctly that; ‘the Kilosa-Ifakara road between Ruaha and 
Msolwa rivers be accepted as a boundary rather than twenty five square miles. After 
all a mile or two in the great area of the SGR is no great consequence to wildlife‟ 
(TNR, 1938). In 1948, the OFC identified more areas in the eastern Selous in Liwale 
district for a groundnuts scheme thus limiting the possibility to include areas of the 
district in the reserve as proposed earlier.  In responding to one of the many appeals, 
the agricultural officer maintained that,  
 
...it is clear to my mind quite impossible to pledge any large areas of virtually 
unoccupied land as a game reserve if it should ultimately prove possible to grow 
groundnuts. Moreover, I do not really feel that the game department has any 














Two main issues are quite clear from the above discussion; Firstly, that throughout 
the official communication, no mention whatsoever is made of other wildlife species 
but elephants and rarely rhinoceros. In most cases, proposals for expansion were 
based on the assumption that the reserve was too narrow to afford protection to the 
growing elephant population. As the communication between the Southern Provincial 
Commissioner and the Game Warden supports, wildlife laws were to be changed to 
afford elephants more protection;  
 
‘…an order be made under Section 14 (of the Game Ordinance, 1940) to declare 
certain species of game animals other than elephant and rhinoceros as vermin in 
a defined and demarcated area…The extension to the Selous was made primarily 
for elephants, therefore, such an order would allow the reserve to fulfil its function’ 
(TNR, 1942).  
 
This is a testimony that the outcry in London about African wildlife extinction was, 
apparently biased towards elephants and it did not match the local realities. The 
situation in the neighbouring colonies was not different. Mathake (2008) reports, for 
instance, that by the late 1950s district councils in many parts of Kenya were 
bombarded with reports of elephant depredations from the local chiefs and that it 
was not a new development but the problem was at its height. As Abensperg-Traun, 
(2009) argues, threats that Africa‟s wildlife populations would become almost 
completely extinguished have proved unfounded. On the contrary, the core protected 
areas can no longer accommodate wildlife populations. In South Africa, for example, 
80% of the potential elephant range is outside protected areas, and in Botswana, 
60% of its elephants live outside protected areas while in Zimbabwe, some 10,000 
elephants reside in communal lands (Abensperg-Traun, 2009). It is this growth in 
wildlife population that has necessitated the expansion of protected areas and the 
use of community and private lands as buffer zones and wildlife corridors (Gallo et 
al., 2009). 
 
The second observation relates to the fact that the expansion of protected areas 
meant alienation and relocation of dwellers of land whose livelihoods depended on 
hunting and farming. For example, about 40,000 people were evicted from Rufiji  
basin to establish the SGR and these relocations were fundamental to the 












1998, Baldus, 2001). Currently, the reserve covers an area of 50,000 km2, which 
represents 6% of the Tanzania‟s surface (Siege and Baldus, 2000). Comparatively, 
the area exceeds the size of Switzerland. Coupled with the ban on ivory trade in 
1980s, elephant populations in the ecosystem increased to over 67,000 in 2004, 
which is about 60% of Tanzania‟s total elephant population (Stephenson, 2004). Of 
these, 20% are found outside the reserve boundaries. In fact, Siege and Baldus 
(2000), reports that elephants roam over an area larger than 100,000 km2, which is 
beyond the reserve boundaries by 50%. Against this background, interest to expand 
SGR to accommodate elephant populations continues today focussing on areas 
currently settled by the same local communities that were relocated from the reserve 
during its creation.  
 
3.4 Political independence and the transformation of natural resources 
governance 
Echoing my earlier discussions about the role of SPEF (today Flora and Fauna 
International (FFI)) in the establishment of other conservation NGOs such as IUCN 
and later WWF and AWF, this sections aims to demonstrate how these and other 
NGOs became an important vehicle for adjusting colonial laws and conservation 
ideologies to an independent Tanzania in the early 1960s. The section provides a 
critical analysis of activities that support the use of the SGR in the Rufiji basin as a 
core area for the construction of a bioregional scale, which is the main focus of this 
study. I seek to attest that the concern over African wildlife extinction, which 
dominated conservationist thinking throughout the colonial period, transformed into 
fear of loss of power and access over wildlife to African governments on the eve of 
political independence. The work of the private sector, led by long established 
conservation NGOs such as FFI, IUCN, UNESCO, AWF and WWF established a 
general framework for the global environmental governance, which altered 
considerably the powers of African governments over natural resources, especially 
wildlife. In my view, it is this struggle over power and control of natural resources in 
Africa, and Tanzania in particular, that accounts for the continuous re-scaling of 
environmental governance. 
 
It follows that the future of African wildlife was an issue of major concern to the 












decolonization throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Almost all southern African states 
experienced changes in conservation programs around their time of independence 
(Ramutsindela, 2008). It is argued, however, that these changes were not 
necessarily related to deteriorating environmental conditions but the concerns over 
the implications of political transformation on access and control by those who 
benefited most from resources (Ramutsindela, 2008). Although government 
commitments in conservation was called for, neither African states were considered 
capable nor the leaders were trusted as sole custodians of wildlife (Matheka, 2008). 
In particular, European scientists conducted research mostly focusing on the 
international importance of African wildlife thereby framing wildlife as a global 
heritage (Huxley, 1961, Riney, 1961, IUCN, 1963) and its protection as a choice for 
African governments between civilization and savagery. Such studies opined for 
example that;  
 
In the modern world, as Africa is beginning to realize, a country without a national 
park can hardly be regarded as civilized. And for the African territory to abolish a 
system of national park already established or to destroy its existing wildlife 
resources would shock the world and incur the reproach of barbarism and 
ignorance (Huxley, 1961: 94) 
 
According to Ramutsindela (2008), critics that undermined the capacity of states to 
protect nature strengthened the role of the private institutions in the conservation of 
natural resources. In the years that followed political independence in British East 
and Central Africa, conferences were organised consecutively to bring together elite 
groups that worked with the British government to deliberate the succession of the 
wildlife sector. Unlike in the past where conferences were held in London, a number 
of such conferences were hosted in Africa during the 1950s and 1960s. This shift of 
the venue from London to Africa itself recounts the agency that was there to get the 
African leaders and their governments involved in endorsing conservation blueprints 
that had long been prepared by Europeans. Conferences were, for instance, held in 
Bukavu - Belgium Congo in 1953, Entebe (Uganda) in 1956, Arusha (Tanzania) in 
1961 and Nairobi (Kenya) in 1963 (IUCN, 1963). There are important features of 
these conferences that inform the scope of this section; their organisation, 
representation and ways in which decisions were made to frame African wildlife for 













The Bukavu-Congo conference of 1953 brought together Africa-based 
conservationists and leaders and linked them to external interest groups (IUCN, 
1963). Among others, Dr. K.T Caldwell and Dr. E.B Worthington were key 
representatives of the British colonial office and the Scientific Council for Africa 
South of the Sahara (CSA), respectively. In the earlier conferences, however, 
Caldwell had represented the Flora and Fauna International (Mathake, 2008). 
Interest groups were represented by members of the Game Preservation and 
Hunting Association of Northern Rhodesia, Fauna Preservation Society of 
Nyasaland, Kenya Wildlife Society, Tanganyika Wildlife Society and the East Africa 
Tourist Travel Association. Among others, the conference commissioned a team of 
experts to lead an enquiry about nature conservation in British colonies. The team 
that was lead by Worthington brought together a long serving African-based scientist 
such as Prof. Julian Huxley (also the first director of UNESCO) and Mr. Gerald 
Watterson (the FAO forestry officer and the IUCN general secretary) (IUCN, 1963, 
Matheka, 2008). The report of this inquiry led to the establishment of the African 
Special Project (ASP) which ran from 1960 to 1963 (Riney, 1970, IUCN, 1963). The 
ASP involved a tour in almost all states in Africa south of the Sahara with the aim of 
discussing the principles and practices of conservation with African leaders.  
 
The nature conservation inquiry and ASP run concurrently with a number of other 
activities at the background. Apart from the major events related to the political 
independence of Tanzania in 1961, Uganda and Kenya in 1962 and 1963 
respectively, powerful alliances between international conservation organisations 
and individuals were forged to facilitate the smooth running of the conservation 
debates and deliberations. Whereas IUCN- the brainchild of FFI - had been the key 
player in organising and facilitating meetings in the region, it conceived the idea, 
which established WWF during these regional debates. To be precise, WWF was 
founded on 11 September 1961 by a group of ardent, mostly businessmen and 
British naturalists such as Victor Stolan, Peter Scott, Max Nicholson, Guy Mountfort 
and Julian Huxley (Hails, 2006). All the founders had connections with other 
conservation organisations such as IUCN, the Fauna Preservation Society, 
UNESCO and the British Nature Conservancy thus WWF had a springboard from 
their knowledge and connections (Hails, 2006, www.panda.org/about_wwf). The 












money to support the protection of African wildlife (Bonner, 1993, Neumann, 1998). 
Notably, the IUCN launched an association with WWF immediately. According to 
Bonner (1993), about the same time that WWF and IUCN collaboration started, 
American game hunters established the African Wildlife Leadership Foundation – 
later to be the AWF. Similarly, AWF was backed by political conservatives, who like 
in other organisations, many had hunted in Africa and feared that African 
independent governments would place untrained Africans in charge of conservation 
and thus spell doom for game (Neumann, 1998, Bonner, 1993).  
 
The report of the inquiry and the ASP project echoed the views of many 
conservationists who believed that only international intervention could save African 
wildlife. Both reports highlighted the need to influence African opinion on wildlife, the 
need to train African game officers, integrate conservation into socio-economic 
development programs, and the need for international support for wildlife 
conservation in Africa (IUCN, 1963). More importantly, however, is the fact that 
African governments were urged to consider a new and broad-based convention 
designed to conserve natural resources in decades to come (Matheka, 2008, Riney, 
1964). These recommendations and the convention captivated conferences in 
Arusha and Nairobi in 1961 and 1963 respectively and they had major impacts on 
individual African states and the region at large following its adoption by the 
Organization of African Unity in 1968 (Organization of African Unity (OAU), 1968).  
 
In September 1961 - three months before the independence of Tanzania - the 
Arusha conference, officially titled Pan-African Symposium of Conservation of Nature 
and Natural Resources in Modern African States, marked the peak of the 
conservation mission and the beginning of decolonization of nature in Africa 
(Neumann, 1998, Matheka, 2008, McCormick, 1989, Adams and McShane, 1996). 
Funds for this purpose had been offered by the American Conservation Association, 
the Deutsche Afrika-Gesellsehaft, the Fauna Preservation Society, the Governments 
of Sweden and Switzerland and UNESCO (IUCN, 1963). The meeting was attended 
by delegates from different parts of the world - about hundred and forty participants 
from twenty one African and six non-African countries, and five international 
organizations, not counting the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa 












preparation of the Conference (IUCN, 1963). Among the participants were also 
fifteen representatives from the Central African Republic, Chad, Dahomey, Kenya, 
the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda. Among 
the messages of good wishes for success that were sent to Arusha were those from 
Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands and Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh. On a side 
event, WWF that had just been established had its de facto launch during the 
conference. In fact, one of its founders, Max Nicholson, wanted a launch to be 
accompanied by a „Declaration of a state of Emergency‟, that would be signed by 
new African leaders, scientists and conservationists in Europe and the United States 
(Bonner, 1993: 64).  
 
Among the top officials of the Tanzanian transitional government who attended the 
conference was the Prime Minister Mwalimu J.K Nyerere (Watterson, 1961). The 
Tanganyika Governor Richard Turnbull presented the conference opening remarks 
which corresponded sharply with the recommendations of the reports of inquiry and 
the ASP that preceded the conference. In short, the Governor summarized the 
nature protection agenda under three main themes: 1) that wildlife and wild nature 
were an undoubted source of revenue needed for social services, and must 
therefore be rationally exploited as it is the best form of land use, 2) the public 
opinion, whose support was essential, must be convinced of the value of this 
heritage, 3) the international aid would be needed if the world in general wished to 
see Africa's unique fauna preserved in Africa for the benefit of humankind (IUCN, 
1963). The culmination of the Arusha conference was the Manifesto which was 
presented by the Prime Minister Mwalimu Nyerere. Indeed, the Arusha Manifesto 
echoed issues raised by the colonial government and conservationists:  
The survival of our wildlife is a matter of grave concern to all of us in Africa. These 
wild creatures amid the wild places they inhabit are not only important as a source 
of wonder and inspiration but are an integral part of our natural resources and of 
our future livelihood and well-being. In accepting the trusteeship of our wildlife, we 
solemnly declare that we will do everything in our power to make sure that our 
children’s grandchildren will be able to enjoy this rich and precious inheritance. 
The conservation of wildlife and wild places calls for specialist knowledge, trained 
manpower, and money. We look to other nations to co-operate with us in this 
important task, the success or failure of which not only affects the continent of 













It should be noted that the manifesto similar to this was read by the Kenyan Prime 
Minister Jomo Kenyatta during the Nairobi conference organised by IUCN in 1963 
precisely the year Kenya received its political independence. Part of the Manifesto 
reads:  
 
The natural resources of this country - its wildlife which offers such an attraction to 
visitors from all over the world, the beautiful places in which these animals live, 
the mighty forests which guard the water catchment areas so vital to the survival 
of man and beast - are a priceless heritage for the future.... The Government of 
Kenya, fully realising the value of its natural resources pledges itself to conserve 
them for posterity with all means at its disposal. We are confident of the 
cooperation of other governments of East Africa in this important task but, we are 
unable, unaided, to provide specialist staff and money which are necessary. We 
therefore invite other nations and lovers of nature throughout the world to assist 
us in honouring this solemn pledge (Quoted in Matheka, 2008: 124) 
 
The two manifestos indicate distinctly that East Africa‟s ecological diversity was the 
first determinant of its history. The manifestos give the international conservation 
actors the mandate for the protection of African flora and fauna on the assumptions 
that African states were and sti ll are economically weak and, perhaps, their leaders 
unwilling to take up conservation agendas (Ramutsindela, 2008, Muthake, 2008, 
Singh and Houtum, 2002). Thus, the manifestos presented wildlife conservation as a 
choice for African governments, natural resources as the World Heritage and 
external assistance as an option agreed upon by scientists and African leaders. 
Indeed, the three tenants of the manifestos correspond sharply with broad themes of 
the IUCN categories of protected areas; preservation of nature, balancing protection 
of nature with recreation and managing nature for its sustainable use (Ramutsindela, 
2008). The impact of these themes in shaping the global natural resources 
governance cannot be overstated.  
 
By signing the Arusha Manifesto, the Western view of African wildlife had 
successfully been endorsed as an agenda for the newly independent Tanzanian 
government. Known to be an economically weak state, the continuation of the flow of 
aid packages was tied to conditions, which favour the conservation interests of 
Western countries, international conservation NGOs and bilateral institutions 
(Kideghesho, 2006, Neumann, 1998). Indeed, shortly after the Arusha conference 












implemented. For example, in 1963 the WWF provided the grant for the 
establishment of the College of African Wildlife Management (CAWM) - Mweka in 
Tanzania as its initial efforts to produce technically trained game officers for positions 
such as game wardens for all of Anglophone Africa (Neumann, 1998, Bonner, 1993).  
 
As Neumann (1998) suggests, the transition from colonial to independent natural 
resources governance relied almost entirely on CAWM and thus a reliance on 
international conservation organisations that funded it. The college received planning 
consultants and hosted exchange of park officials in America and Europe (Garland, 
2006, Neumann, 1998). This is without considering the fact that former colonial 
officers maintained key positions in wildlife department in the independent 
government until the first bunch of trained officers in CAWM, Europe and America 
could take over wildlife protection responsibilities (Iliffe, 1979, Bonner, 1993). For 
example, the British game ranger and renowned hunter Brian Nicholson was the 
Principal Game Warden of Tanzania until 1973 when he retired to manage the 
Afriventures – an alliance of hunters group based in Nairobi (Brian, 1970). During 
Nicholson‟s term in office, game reserves (including SGR) were demarcated into 
hunting concessions and areas outside the reserves were designated as hunting 
blocks exclusively for hunting tourists. Apparently, Afriventures managed the largest 
number of hunting concessions (Brian, 1970). By the late 1970s, an elite class of 
bureaucrats trained in Western ideologies and practices of natural resource 
conservation had emerged subscribing to the Western belief that African wildlife 
should be protected from Africans. The CAWM-Mweka remains a pioneer institution 
which has, since its establishment, trained 4000 wildlife managers from 28 African 
countries (www.mwekawildlife.org). Having been fully facilitated by Westerners, 
protected area programs continue to exclude local communities from accessing and 
benefiting from natural resources in their ancestral lands. Even in the supposedly 
community-based conservation projects that emerged recently, village game scouts 
are still trained as guards who protect wildlife from people and the vice versa hardly 
functions (Garland, 2006). 
 
Whereas the impact of the Arusha Manifesto on wildlife protection cannot be 
overemphasized, the popular view that it was originally the choice of African leaders 












manifesto was prepared by members of Western conservation organisations for 
African leaders to sign (Rangarajan, 2003, Honey, 1999, Bonner, 1993). In fact, 
Bonner (1993: 65) maintains that, „the statement (Arusha Manifesto) is often cited by 
Western conservationists to display their commitments to conservation. It was written 
by Europeans, including Max Nicholson, founding member of WWF, and Ian 
MacPhail, an advertising executive hired by WWF‟. This is not surprising when 
conceptualised from the historical narrative of the European involvement in African 
wildlife as discussed earlier in this chapter. As such, this study establishes that apart 
from the use of the Arusha Manifesto in different citations, the document is not 
available in any other format suggesting that it was adopted as a government 
document. Notwithstanding its questionable authenticity the manifesto serves as a 
mantra for conservation in Tanzania and it is widely used by donors, conservationists 
and researchers to hold the government to its conservation commitment and 
responsibilities for the preservation of forests and wildlife (URT, 1998a; URT, 1998b; 
Goldstein, 2005). Recently, the TANAPA headquarters in Arusha was named after 
the late Mwalimu J.K Nyerere and his statute holds the Arusha Manifesto firmly at 
the entrance (see Figure 3.3). In the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism the 
manifesto features on the second page of the wildlife policy and it remains the basis 













Figure 3.3 Mwalimu J.K Nyerere and the script of the Arusha Manifesto 
 
Source: Photo taken by the author, 21/8/2008 
 
3.5 Post-independence and nature conservation in Tanzania 
The sentiment that conservation at the time of political independence in Tanzania 
was a colonial agenda that served the colonial interest is not an overstatement. This 
opinion does not invalidate the fact that the government had commitments and 
responsibilities for the protection of natural resources. Rather, it serves as a 
reminder that the government had inherited a poor country with an export-oriented 
economy, little internal infrastructure and low levels of literacy and education (Iliffe, 
1979, Nyerere, 1967) which should have been the main concerns of the independent 












followed, were the main national agenda in 1967 and formed the basis for what 
would be considered a true Arusha Declaration (see Appendix 6). The 1967 
declaration is not to be confused with the Arusha conservation Manifesto of 1961. 
The two declarations should, however, serve as a basis for differentiating the 
colonial and national agenda in the early years of independence. The difference also 
shed light on the contemporary organisational structure for natural resources 
management and the role that international actors had in shaping conservation 
policies and practices in the country. 
 
The Arusha Declaration represented a turning point in Tanzania‟s political and 
economic development and it placed on record the acceptance of socialism as the 
ideology of the country, the major tenet of the policy being self-reliance. The 
declaration outlined Tanzania‟s policy on socialism that included compulsory 
villagization (Ujamaa), nationalization, and price controls. The declaration and 
actions relating to public ownership required the state apparatus to control the major 
means of production and exchange to ensure that the economic development was to 
be based on self reliance (Nyerere, 1967). As the founder of the idea, Mwalimu 
Nyerere believed that Tanzania received political but not economic independence 
and he maintained that donor assistance would not pull Tanzania out of poverty 
(Nyerere, 1967). Notably, the Declaration recognized land, forests and wildlife as 
major means of production and thus they were nationalized. This meant that the 
external cooperation in conservation was discouraged as the government had hoped 
to monopolize natural resource-based revenues (Goldstein, 2005). The responsibility 
for the management and utilization was thus put under government departments and 
parastatals. For example, land management and control was taken over by the 
National Food Corporation (NAFCO), forests conservation by the Forest Division and 
wood based industries by the Tanzania Wood Industries Corporation (TWICO). The 
TANAPA managed wildlife in the national parks while the Wildlife Department (now 
the Wildlife Division) managed wildlife in game reserves and game controlled areas.  
 
On the one hand, nationalization of natural resource elucidates Nyerere‟s own views 
on the Arusha conservation Manifesto in relation to the political implications of 
private and external influence over natural resources. Unlike in other countries in 












legislations supported private conservancies (Ramutsidela, 2008, Wels, 2003, Carter 
et al., 2008), socialism blocked the privatization of nature until the 1980s when the 
economic liberalization necessitated reforms that opened doors for the private sector 
involvement. Nationalization of natural resources was based on the assumption that 
wildlife and forest resources could propel economic growth. Admittedly, conservation 
in the new government continued to reflect the political and economic circumstances 
of the country after independence. However, natural resources management 
remained almost entirely on the colonial organizational structure; laws remained the 
same with the exception of minor amendments. For example, as it was with colonial 
laws, the independent government was vested with ownership and control powers to 
all lands and the land tenure took the form of conveyance of ownership and 
leaseholds (Mallya, 1999, Shivji, 1998). The legal land regime established under the 
British Land Ordinance of 1923 was taken over virtually unaltered (Shivji, 1998). In 
fact, the difference was made only by changing the trustee‟s authority over the land 
from the Governor to the President (Goldstein, 2005). The concept of public land 
introduced by the colonial law was thus inherited and the President assumed powers 
to grant land rights of occupancy. In 1963 the freehold tenure, which was a German 
colonial relic, was abolished. However, this move affected only a small proportion of 
the land. The freehold titles were converted first into government leases and later 
into long-term (99 years) rights of occupancy (Shivji, 1998). Yet none of the above 
measures amounted to land tenure reform in the 1960s and 1970s. As Chapter Four 
will demonstrate, changes in land tenure came about indirectly through economic 
liberalization in the 1980s rather than a result of a consciously conceived national 
land tenure policy.  
 
Like in the Ministry of Lands, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism became 
the centra l body responsible for the country‟s overall wildlife and forest policies. The 
government retained all the colonial institutional pillars, which included the Wildlife 
and Forest Departments (now Wildlife and Forest Divisions), TANAPA and 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority (NCAA). The colonial Fauna Conservation 
Ordinance Chapter 302 of 1940 was used unti l 1974 when the Wildlife Conservation 
Act No. 12 of 1974 repealed and replaced it. As it was with the Fauna Conservation 
Ordinance, the Act rests ownership and control of wildlife solely on the government. 












conservation,  management and utilization (in the regions, districts and villages) are 
vested in the President, the Minister responsible, the Director of Game (now the 
Director of Wildlife) and the Game Officers appointed to administer legislation (URT, 
1974). The Wildlife Conservation Act No. 12 of 1974 continues to provide the legal 
framework for wildlife management throughout the country in game reserves, 
wetlands and game controlled areas. In the national parks, the TANAPA National 
Parks Ordinance Chapter 412 of 1959 that was established under the British 
government was only amended in 1978. As the initial purpose of its establishment, 
TANAPA‟s core business remains to protect wildlife in the national parks throughout 
the country (TANAPA, 2008). Likewise, the Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
Ordinance Chapter 413 of 1959 was amended in 1975 and is still responsible for the 
management of the Ngorongoro Crater and its surroundings. 
  
Essentially, the 1980s marked a turning point in Tanzania‟s socialism policy and 
government monopoly in the management of natural resources following the global 
political and economic liberalization. For reasons beyond the scope of this study, 
details of the failure of the Arusha Declaration will not be provided. It is important to 
note, however, that the Cold War (1945-1989) and the global political struggles that 
followed were among the reasons for the adoption of capitalism in Tanzania, the 
mode that derived political and economic changes throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
The acute economic crisis following the global oil crisis coupled with the war with Idd 
Amin in 1978/79 and a natural drought that hit the country during the same period 
left Tanzania as the world second poorest country in per capita terms (Mniwasa and 
Shauri, 2001). Although the country resisted the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
conditionality since it adopted the self-reliance policy, it succumbed to foreign aid to 
meet development expenditures and, by implication, accepted the Economic 
Recovery Programs (ERP) in 1986. As it was implemented elsewhere, the ERP 
focussed on eliminating state monopoly in the economy. 
 
During the acute economic crisis the country‟s natural resource base also became 
noticeably threatened perhaps due to budget cuts for activities such as wildlife 
research, monitoring and surveillance. This resulted in, among others, the plight of 
elephant and rhino widespread poaching in the late 1980s. Leader-Williams, (2000) 












and 1980s. In particular, the number of elephants in SGR dropped from 110,000 in 
1976 to approximately 55,000 in 1980 (Baldus and Hahn, 2004, Leader-Williams, 
2000). In 1986, the government banned the local ivory trade and in 1989 embarked 
on a countrywide special operation known as „Operation Uhai‟ to crack down on 
poachers and local dealers in ivory and other elephant products (URT, 2007a). 
Conceptually, the ban on ivory trade fuelled the country‟s dependency on external 
sources of funding and created conditions that strengthened the view that Tanzania 
does not have the capacity to adequately manage its protected areas without 
permanent external assistance. Indeed, Tanzania appealed to the international 
community for assistance. It is important to note also that some of the protected 
areas in the country had qualified for the IUCN‟s list of protected areas and had, 
during the 1980s, already been registered as World Heritage Sites and Biosphere 
Reserves (UNESCO, 2006) (see Table 3.1). By a considerable margin Tanzania 
contributed much more land under IUCN protected area categories than any other 
sub-Sahara African countries. Precisely, the country contributes about 27% of the 
total Area of World Heritage Sites with its SGR being the largest natural World 
Heritage Sites in Africa (IUCN, 2008). 
 




Area Category  
UNESCO Status  Criteria Year  
Ngorongoro 
Conservation Area  
VI (Managed 
Resource 
Protected Area)  
Biosphere Reserve  








II (National Park) Biosphere Reserve 

















Kilimanjaro NP II (National Park) Natural World 





















The foregoing discussion points to the fact that Tanzania‟s nature conservation 
policies were directly linked to the neoliberal global environmental agenda. Like in 
most developing countries, the international financial conditions that came through 
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in the 1980s challenged the regulatory role of 
the state in economic planning. Subsequently, pressures to liberalize from the World 
Bank committed Tanzania to regulate powers that the Arusha Declaration had 
placed on the central government (African Forum and Network on Debt and 
Development (AFRODAD), 2007). Guided by SAP, policy reforms continued apace 
with emphasis on the privatization of public-owned enterprises (including parastatals 
that dealt with land, forest and wildlife) and market liberalization (involving relaxation 
of government controls on prices, production, marketing, transport and foreign 
exchange allocations) (Maliyamkono and Mason, 2006, Shivji, 2006). Supported by 
economic reforms and the Arusha Manifesto, international conservation actors, their 
funds and networks facilitated the harmonization of the country‟s new economic 
policies and global environmental outlook that recognised the environment and 
development as dependant variables. These policies also affected the agricultural 
sector as the balance between subsistence food production and the market became 
complex (URT, 2001a). As discussed in detail in Chapter Four, land reform became 
the basis of these transformations followed by further reforms in wildlife and forest 
sector that reduced government powers and control over natural resources (URT, 
1998a; 1998b; GTZ, 2003b). These reforms legalised the use of community and 
private land for expansion and for the establishment of a network of protected areas. 
 
In addition to the internal reforms, the government of Tanzania took part in the 
regional and international policy dialogues, which saw the country signing several 
international and regional agreements on conservation and development. This way, 
the international conservation actors acquired powers to monitor and influence 
government decisions over the management and use of protected areas especially 
those identified as World Heritage Sites and Biosphere Reserves. Tanzania signed 
the CBD at the time of the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio 
de Janeiro in 1992. Following the ratification of the CBD, national and regional 
environmental objectives were revised and agreed upon by the states to match those 
of the international conservation and financial institutions. Precisely, Tanzania signed 












controlling Illegal trade in wildlife); the  Convention on Migratory Wild Animal Species 
in 1999 (to provide for mechanisms to conserve migratory wild animal species); the 
SADC Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement in 2000 (to establish 
common approaches to the conservation and sustainable use of wildlife resources) 
and others such as the RAMSAR convention ratified in 2000 (directed at sustainable 
use and management of habitats that are critical for the survival of elephant 
populations). Collectively, these conservation agreements created synergy between 
the global environmental, development agenda, and national programs. For 
Tanzania, the implementation of these agreements continued to rely on funding from 
international NGOs, bilateral governments and international financial and 
development agencies. 
 
The institutional framework that emerged shortly after changes of the global 
environmental politics in the 1990s supported conservation NGOs and development 
agencies in mobilizing worldwide support for programs that offer solutions for threats 
that allegedly challenged national and global natural resources. Along this line, the 
GEF‟s objective of facilitating the establishment of protected areas network ensured 
sustainable funding for such projects in cross-border regions. As Table 3.2 indicates, 
GEF/World Bank funding in East Africa focussed on facilitating cross-border projects. 
Most of the long-established conservation institutions and NGOs have since then 
moved from their traditional small-scale land units to increasing engagement in 
particular themes that reflect changes of their operational scale. For example, 
programs such as the WWF‟s „Wildlife and Human Needs’ and AWF‟s „People and 
Parks’ reflect changes from traditional single species focus on elephants to 
landscape scale projects that combine diverse set of land uses and social contexts. 
In many ways, this change has also meant working on larger geographical areas 














Table 3.2 Cross-border projects in East Africa 
Name of the Project Facilitator Project Area Year 
Started 
Institutional Support for the 
Protection of East African 
Biodiversity 
GEF/UNDP Tanzania, Kenya and 
Uganda 
1992 
Lake Tanganyika Biodiversity 
and Pollution Control 
GEF/UNDP Tanzania, Burundi, 
Democratic Republic of 




Biodiversity Project  
GEF/World 
Bank 
Tanzania, Malawi and 
Mozambique 
1995 
Conservation of Coastal 




Tanzania, Kenya and 
Mozambique 
1997 




Tanzania, Kenya and 
Mozambique 
1997 
Reducing Biodiversity Loss at 
Cross-border Sites in East 
Africa 





PPF Southern Africa 1997 
Ecoregions WWF Globally 1998 
African Heartlands  AWF East and Southern 
Africa  
1998 
Forest frontiers Program WRI Globally 1999 
Western Selous-Niassa 






Source: (World Bank, 2001, URT, 2001b, GEF/UNDP, 2004, Manikowski and 
Gündling, 2000, WWF, 2005, AWF, 2007, PPF, 1997) 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates that global environmental governance is linked to 
environmental NGOs, which had since colonial times represented the interests of 
individuals, their institutions and governments. Politics around governance 
transformation from colonial to independent regime facilitated the continuation of the 
colonial influence and control over natural resources in most African countries. 
Intrinsically, laws for wildlife protection were mostly driven by Western ideologies 
through the international conservation NGOs and they continue to form the main 
subject of international cooperation in conservation today (Gißibl, 2006, Chachage, 
2000, Epstein, 2006, Bonner, 1993). In practice, norms to protect wildlife remain 












2003, Ramutsindela, 2004b, Neumann, 1998, Chachage, 2000, Epstein, 2006). 
Viewed from the angle of its genesis, contemporary natural resources governance 
remains heavily tied to the past through policies and laws that create dependency on 
financial and technical assistance from Western individuals and institutions . As 
Bonner (1993) argues, Western conservation partners and their money have as 
much influence on conservation governance as the imperial colonial government 
would have. The trend in the establishment of large-scale cross-border protected 
areas in the region is not surprising when considered from the historical and political 
economy of wildlife in Africa. As such, the international investments in the 
construction of new conservation scales in Tanzania have transferred much more 
powers over wildlife resources from the government to the external institutions rather 
than to the local institutions that they claim to empower. In the next chapter, I 
analyze the process that establishes WMAs as a local conservation scale and 
demonstrate how that process is adopted by different actors to facilitate the 













CHAPTER FOUR: WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREAS IN TANZANIA: ACTORS 
AND NETWORKS IN FRONTIER EXPANSIONS 
 
4.0 Introduction 
Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) as referred to in this chapter represent land use 
type established in communal and/or privately owned lands to facilitate the protection 
and utilization of wildlife resources outside core protected areas. This chapter seeks 
to demonstrate that WMAs in Tanzania are a local scale at which buffer zones and 
wildlife corridors are established in order to promote the bioregional model referred 
to in Chapter Two. Since WMAs represent a particular scale, the process that 
establishes them is endemic to power struggles between the national government 
(that owns land and wildlife), the local communities (who have rights to land), 
conservationists and the private sector (that facilitate the WMA process and seek to 
create a self-regulating wildlife market economy). Power struggles between these 
actors push local communities to the margin while economic and environmental laws 
continue to protect wildlife and expand commercial investments in communal lands.  
 
The chapter is organised in three main sections. The first section introduces various 
initiatives that seek to break through the fortress conservation approaches to bring 
local communities into nature conservation. These initiatives are discussed in 
relation to their evolution as community-based conservation projects, which have 
recently been transformed into autonomous institutions working parallel to the 
conventional government structures. The second section provides an analysis of the 
WMA process in Tanzania. In particular, the section presents the review of 
institutional transformations that led to the establishment of WMAs. Furthermore, the 
section demonstrates how the network of actors and their strategies facilitated the 
re-arrangement of conventional natural resource management institutions as a pre-
requisite for the establishment and functioning of WMAs. The third section draws on 
the previous chapters to ascertain that the WMA process in Tanzania is entirely 
designed and financed by international conservation NGOs and development 
agencies that seek to deregulate government powers over natural resources 
management and utilization. The section uses the case of five WMAs 












Namtumbo districts. These WMAs are merged to establish the wildlife corridor 
(SNWC), which is the anchor of the Selous-Niassa TFCA.  
 
4.1 Paradigm change, WMAs and conservation at the local scale  
Setting aside WMAs is neither new nor is it a patented invention to Tanzania. Well-
documented cases of community-based wildlife management are found in widely 
different cultural and physical settings in the world. However, the emergence of 
community-based projects linked to the establishment of bioregions is a recent 
phenomenon. Ali (2007) suggests that these community-based projects are currently 
used to establish large conservation areas in Africa, Asia and Latin America. This 
observation supports the view that WMAs occur at the local level yet they are part of 
a network of scales that are used to promote the establishment of bioregions. The 
use of communal and privately owned land as buffer zones and wildlife corridors has 
thus become a common practice in bioregional planning. 
 
Following the emergence of community-based projects in many African countries in 
the 1990s, community WMAs became an acceptable approach within a discourse 
opposed to centralised and top-down natural resource policies and which favours the  
adoption of local governments and grassroots communities as the most effective 
natural resource governance structures (Schroeder, 1999). The approach was 
variously put in practice as Community-Based Conservation (CBC), Joint Resource 
Management and/or Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM)3. 
There are views that various community-based projects came forth as a panacea for 
alleviating the antagonistic relationship between protected area authorities and local 
communities that had resulted from the failure of fortress conservation (Adams and 
McShane, 1996). This approach was guided by principles of decentralization and 
local community empowerment as opposed to the central government control and 
ownership of natural resources. Despite being widely heralded as Africa‟s most 
successful conservation initiative in the 1990s, critics emerged from amongst its 
proponents, practitioners and researchers over where the decision-making power 
was placed within the local communities. Thus, the issue of power has since the 
                                                 












beginning of the community-based approaches been central to the debate on the 
appropriate governance structure for local resource management. 
 
Critics consider initial community-based projects as partially decentralised wildlife 
conservation programs, which are complex, bureaucratic and upwardly accountable 
to central governments (Junge, 2002, Schuerholz and Baldus, 2007, Baldus, 2008, 
Nelson et al., 2007, Katerere et al., 2001, Nelson, 2007). For example, the 
Communal Area Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in 
Zimbabwe is one of the first famous models in Africa that faced fundamental 
challenges relating to powers over natural resource and property rights (Alexander 
and McGregor, 2000, Murombedzi, 1999, Murphree, 2000). In particular, the district 
councils which are designated as the „appropriate authority‟ for wildlife management 
in communal lands are criticised for failing to devolve authority to lower tier 
structures of administration, such as village and ward committees (Mamimine, 2000, 
Murombedzi, 1999). In fact, critics argues that CAMPFIRE is a district-based and not 
community-based program (Murombedzi, 1999). In Zambia, however, the 
Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMADE) opted 
for what could be considered a true community-based governance system where the 
program used traditional chiefs from participating communities. Even then, ADMADE 
was criticised for being a chieftaincy-based organisation where chiefs were vested 
with powers to control its agenda and membership (Gibson and Marks, 1995). Taken 
as a whole, these criticisms point to the politics of scale jumping that support 
environmentalists in their efforts to construct new spaces of conservation. As it will 
be demonstrated below, both the state and indigenous environmental governance 
are ignored and instead replaced by new regimes that are exposed to forces 
operating at various scales thus weakening the power of the state and local 
communities over natural resources (Ramutsindela, 2007). 
 
Criticisms against local-based conservation and governance structures imply that 
alternative governance institutions are necessary to reassert the local. This becomes 
even more urgent in the face of globalization and neoliberalism, and the 
unwillingness of governments to genuinely promote the decentralization of natural 
resource governance. The call for strong local structures is made against the 












transformations of community-based conservation initiatives, a process that 
represents the beginning of the new era of nature privatization. It is held that only 
once the state accepts its total disengagement in the ownership of natural resources 
that conservation will have net economic gains to the communities (Schuerholz and 
Baldus, 2007). In practice this means that wildlife resources in the communal lands 
should be managed by non-state institutions as opposed to the conventional local 
governments and local structures (Hitchcock, 2000, Parren and Sam, 2003). On the 
basis of this view, WMAs are transformed into new institutions that govern the local 
resource base. However, since the notion of the local is ambiguous and it 
encompasses state and non-state actors with divergent interests, the question of 
who will retain power and control over WMAs has become the core of struggles 
between the  government and the private sector (the later often being understood as 
business-related subjects) (Schroeder, 1999).  
 
It goes that African governments have since the 1990s been engaged in the 
redefinition of state-centric conservation objectives to formulate conservation 
strategies that reflect new conservation thinking. As a result, national conservation 
strategies that highlight the importance of non-state institutions have been adopted 
as blueprints for nature conservation (Schroeder, 1999, Hitchcock, 2000). For 
example, Botswana has, since 1986, established community WMAs and granted 
local people the right to use the wildlife resources subject to the government 
regulations (Arntzen, 2003). However, in 1991 the IUCN facilitated the formulation of 
the National Conservation Strategy which changed environmental policies and 
legislation resulting in the adoption of management plans that supported the 
establishment of local-based non-state institutions for the management of wildlife in 
communal lands (www.iucnbot.bw). This way, the conventional WMAs governance 
structure was replaced by new Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) established 
to govern wildlife in the WMAs with a greater degree of freedom from the central 
government system (Hitchcock, 2000, Arntzen, 2003). By the year 2000 about forty 
six such CBOs had been registered in Botswana focussing mainly on economic-
oriented approaches to wildlife management  (Hitchcock, 2000, Arntzen, 2003).  
 
Likewise, in Ghana the Conservation International, USAID, World Bank and 












culminated in the establishment of Community Resource Management Areas 
(CREMAs) (Parren and Sam, 2003). As with WMAs in Botswana, CREMAs are non-
state institutions recognised as „body corporate‟ responsible for wildlife matters in the 
local areas (Parren and Sam, 2003). Elsewhere in Africa, the government of Namibia 
granted rights to establish and own conservancies for private landowners since 
1975. However, the conservancy approach involving rural black communities on 
public land emerged in 1996. Supported by the private sector and conservation 
NGOs such as WWF and USAID, the government of Namibia led the development of 
policies and legislation that approved the new policy for communal areas 
conservancies in 1997 (Schuerholz and Baldus, 2007). The policies and legal 
framework related to conservancies in Namibia was the basis for the nation-wide 
movement that had registered about thirty communal area conservancies by 2001 
(Schuerholz and Baldus, 2007). For more examples of private conservancies in 
Africa see Wels, (2003); Carter, et al., (2008) and Gallo, et al., (2009). 
 
Recent studies establish that WMAs and their contemporary governance structures 
in Africa build on the broader neoliberal movement that assigns greater roles to the 
market system (Igoe and Brockington, 2007, Spierenburg et al., 2008). New 
institutions that are created parallel to the conventional government structures 
facilitate the acquisition of legal titles to communal lands and related resources. 
Having legally guaranteed property rights these institutions acquire capital and/or 
collateral to enter into conservation oriented business ventures (Igoe and 
Brockington, 2007). This implies that the community-based doctrine neither 
strengthens the capacities of African states in conservation of biodiversity nor, for 
that matter, does it empower grassroots communities through their local 
governments. At best, it forms part of the process that establishes new regimes and 
transforms the communal land use and tenure system into wildlife market-based 
economy.  
 
The above discussion points to the importance of conservation NGOs, development 
agencies and other local-based private institutions in the rescaling of environmental 
governance. These rescaling tendencies are responsible for the establishment of 
land use pattern and governance structures necessary for the creation of bioregions 












acknowledge that protected areas in IUCN categories I–VI in Africa have gaps that 
constrain the current efforts to establish bioregions in the region. Many of the gaps 
are identified in areas of high human population and good agricultural potentials 
which challenge the conventional approaches in biodiversity protection (Fjelds et al., 
2004, De Klerk et al., 2004). Notwithstanding local land uses, it is envisaged that 
communal land that supports wildlife be included within official lists of protected 
areas to warrant their use for closing the existing protected area gaps. Indeed, the 
Fifth World Parks Congress held in Durban in September 2003 adopted the 
recommendation that national and international recognition of Community 
Conservation Areas4 (CCAs) is an urgent necessity (Secretariat of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, 2004, IUCN, 2005). The Congress recognised CCAs as a 
means to strengthen the management and expand the coverage of the world‟s 
protected areas, to promote connectivity at landscape and seascape level and to 
enhance public support for protected areas (Pathak et al., 2004; IUCN, 2005). 
Specific recommendations were thus provided to encourage governments to 
recognise CCAs as legitimate conservation tools, and to, as appropriate, assign 
them to national and to the IUCN international protected area categories (Pathak et 
al., 2004, IUCN, 2005). It is against this background that CREMAs in Ghana are the 
main option for the establishment of elephant corridors between protected areas 
(Parren and Sam, 2003) while communal and private conservancies in Namibia and 
WMAs in Botswana are critical to the establishment of TFCAs/TFPs in southern 
Africa (Schuerholz and Baldus, 2007, Hanks, 2006, Gallo et al., 2009, Ramutsindela, 
2007).  
 
4.2 WMAs in Tanzania: the manifestation of scalar construction  
Political ecologists have maintained the view that local scale arrangements are more 
likely to be beneficial to local communities than other scales.  However, there is lack 
of clarity on how the local scale is constructed to achieve this goal.  This section 
seeks to contribute to knowledge about local scales and their nestedness by 
analysing the process that establishes WMAs in Tanzania. Even though WMAs 
occur at the local level they are not independent from other scales. In the context of 
                                                 
4 CCAs are off icially defined as natural and/or modif ied ecosystems containing signif icant biodiversity values, ecological 
services and cultural values, voluntarily conserved by indigenous and local communities through customary laws or other 












this study, WMAs are integral to the establishment of the Selous-Niassa TFCA, 
which in turn forms part of the global goals for establishing cross-border bioregions. 
The WMA process as presented in this chapter focuses on three interrelated issues 
critical to the analysis of scale and the construction of space. These issues are: the 
use of legal instruments for re-structuring natural resources governance, actor 
networking and assemblage of activities at the local level as well as the 
establishment of new governance structures parallel to the conventional government 
institutions.   
 
This research suggests that the establishment of WMAs in Tanzania depended 
entirely on the institutional and legal transformations that involve the formulation and 
changes of policies and laws governing natural resources. Through these 
transformations, traditional resource use, tenure and governance systems were 
reoriented to support the functioning of WMAs on the ground. Although the new 
policies and laws were aimed at the local scale and their net effects were felt by local 
communities, the basis of the whole process of law making and legislation change 
can hardly be said to be driven at the local level. This is to say that laws governing 
WMAs are heavily implemented at the local level but are not limited to a particular 
category of scale.  
 
Major reforms occurred in the Ministry of Lands (ML) and the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism (MNRT). Whereas the ML oversees land management 
issues countrywide, the MNRT is responsible for the management of forest and 
wildlife resources through the Wildlife, Forest and Beekeeping Divisions (URT, 
1998a; 1998b; 2001a). Under the MNRT are also government parastatals such as 
Tanzania National Parks (TANAPA) and Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority 
(NCAA). Transformations in the two ministries were implemented as part of the wider 
local government reform project that had been running as the component of the 
World Bank Economic Recovery Program (ERP) since 1993. Most important for this 
discussion is the fact that the connection was established between reform processes 
and rural development. Among others, this connection presented community-based 
approaches as part of rural development strategies. The country‟s Rural 
Development Strategy that had been in place since the Arusha Declaration was 












involvement in rural development (URT, 2005). Precisely, the revised strategy 
considers ecotourism and tourism planning as potential areas for attracting private 
sector and unlocking opportunities for economic gains in rural areas (URT, 2002b). 
Obviously, the strategy influenced conservation since wildlife tourism around 
protected areas has long been a target for private investments in the country.  
 
By recasting tourism as the source of economic gains for local people, new tourism 
ventures and capital investments were called for and local communities around 
protected areas were encouraged to plan their land uses with particular attention on 
tourism as a poverty alleviation strategy. At the same time, however, the 
international financial policy on poverty required Tanzania to produce the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) as a condition for writing off debts or making new 
loans (Alastair, 2005). Following the PRSP, a number of local programs were revised 
and initiated along the lines of poverty reduction. Yet, Tanzania had no legal and 
institutional framework to implement recommendations of new developments. For 
example, the Wildlife Conservation Act No. 12 of 1974 did not provide for 
participation and ownership of wildlife by local communities. Likewise, the land law, 
which was inherited almost unaltered from colonial rule entrusted the government 
with ownership of land and related resources under the trusteeship of the President. 
Hence land use and tenure system became central issues in the reform processes. 
These issues stimulated debates that focussed on resource use politics that had 
resulted into forced relocations, property and human rights violations (Parkipuny, 
1991, Shivji, 1998). At the core of the debate was the need for re-defining land 
ownership to protect community rights to own and benefit from wildlife in their lands.   
 
It is worth noting that colonial laws which protected most of the areas immediately 
bordering national parks and game reserves for the purpose of regulating hunting 
outside core protected areas continued to influence wildlife management in 
Tanzania. As in colonial times, lands bordering core protected zones were 
maintained as Game Controlled Areas (GCAs). The Wildlife Conservation Act No. 12 
of 1974 which replaced the colonial law inherited provisions for creating and 
managing GCAs. Throughout the colonial and post-colonial period, however, the 
laws did not regulate human activities such as settlements, cultivation and livestock 












national-wide villagization program of 1975, scattered croplands and homesteads 
were mobilized which left most of village lands open for wildlife dispersal and 
migration. To date, GCAs have remained a land category surrounded by 
considerable confusion and ambiguity concerning the protection and utilization of 
wildlife (Majamba, 2001, Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004, Nelson, 2007). Apparently, 
these are the areas targeted for WMAs. As in colonial laws, the Wildlife Conservation 
Act No.12 of 1974 empowers the Minister to declare any area of Tanzania to be a 
GCA (Section 14 (1)) where no person, except with the permission of the Director of 
Wildlife can hunt, burn, capture, kill, wound or molest wild animals (Section 17 (1)). 
The same section empowers the Minister to designate GCAs as hunting blocks 
under the administration of the Wildlife Division. Currently, there are more than 50 
GCAs and 150 hunting blocks which cover 10% of the country (TANAPA, 2008). As 
the details below suggest, the ownership and use of land and wildlife in GCA 
remained the focus of land, wildlife and forest sector reforms that supported the 
establishment of WMAs in GCAs.   
 
a. Land sector reforms  
Tanzania had no policies on land, wildlife or forest resources until the mid-1990s. 
The first land policy was passed in 1995 with the objective of, among others, setting 
ceilings on land ownership to prevent land grabbing (URT, 1995). In 1996, the United 
Kingdom‟s Department for International Development (DfID) hired a British 
consultant for the Ministry of Lands to draft land laws (Shivji, 1998).  By 1999, the 
government had passed the Land Act No.4 of 1999 and Village Land Act No.5 of 
1999 to deal with land in urban areas and private estates and in villages, 
respectively. These laws redefine rights, ownership and use of land and related 
resources and they support, among others, the establishment of a new wildlife 
regime that directs the sector towards the modern political and economic 
transformation. As such, the land laws of 1999 divided the land throughout the 
country into three categories: general, reserved, and village land (URT, 1999a). 
These land categories are defined as follows: 
 
Reserved lands: Are all land set aside for special purposes, including national 
parks, game reserves and forest reserves, which are established under sectoral 
pieces of legislation including the National Parks Ordinance, Forest Ordinance, 












As it remains in the Wildlife Act of 1974, the Land Act recognises national parks, 
game reserves and forest reserves as exclusive protected areas put aside for 
wildlife protection. 
 
General lands: Are all public lands which are neither reserved nor in village lands 
(URT, 1999a).  
 
Village land: Is the area of which the boundaries have been demarcated as vi llage 
land under any law or administrative procedure in force at any time before the 
Village Land Act came into operation (URT 1999b). These previous laws include 
the Village Settlements Act of 1965 which established villages and the Local 
Government (District Authorities) Acts of 1982, which established local 
governments (URT, 1999b).  
 
The land policy and Land Acts are directly related to the Wildlife Conservation Act. 
For example, Section 4.1.1 (iv) of the land policy states, on the one hand, that where 
necessary, alienation of village lands [for wildlife protection] can be carried out with 
consultation and consent of Village Councils (URT, 1995). On the other hand, the 
Village Land Act has provisions for the transfer of village land to any other category 
as deemed right. As such, Section 4 (I)) of the Village Land Act declares that „where 
the President is minded to transfer any area of village land to general or reserved 
land for public interest; he may direct the Minister to proceed in accordance with the 
provisions of this section’ (URT, 1999b). Section 4 (2) of the same Act clarifies 
further that public interest in this case shall include investments of national interest. 
However, a further analysis of Section 5.6 (2) of the Land Act leads to the conclusion 
that GCA‟s are reserved lands under the jurisdiction of the Wildlife Division. Yet the 
Land Act defines village lands according to the definitions laid out in the Village Land 
Act. This translates that the Land Act defines village land as both reserved and 
village lands. Nelson (2005) has also made this observation where he argues that 
the two Land Acts together with the Wildlife Act create a legal situation that accounts 
for the on-going conflicts, as both the villages and the Wildlife Division are able to 
interpret the laws as giving them powers over wildlife outside protected areas. The 
main point is, however, the fact that all these laws facilitate wildlife protection in 
village lands today. 
 
The conflict of power caused by wildlife and land laws has been the source of 












side of local communities emanates from the fact that GCAs (most of them are 
WMAs now) overlap entirely with demarcated village lands which were once the core 
of the common property systems (Neumann, 2002, Leader-Williams, 2000, 
Homewood and Rodgers, 1991). Yet, local communities do not own wildlife. As a 
result, communities have no role to play in the allocation of hunting blocks and their 
land rights are not taken into account in the distribution of benefits from hunting 
(Majamba, 2001, Nelson, 2005, Nshala, 1999). The private sector blames the 
government for its reluctance to relinquish ownership of land and wildlife (Interviews, 
Anonymous Informant, 31/1/2008; Zakaria, 15/3/2008), which is a requirement for 
the establishment of an independent conservation scale (Baldus, 2008, Institute of 
Resource Assessment, 2007). In fact, the central control of the resources has been 
considered too bureaucratic thus constraining wildlife commercialization (Lawyer's 
Environmental Action Team (LEAT), 1998, Baldus et al., 1994, GTZ, 2003b, Baldus 
and Cauldwell, 2004, Institute of Resource Assessment, 2007, Nelson et al., 2007, 
Baldus, 2008, Baldus et al., 2004, Garland, 2006, Junge, 2002, Brockington, 2005).  
 
b. Wildlife and Forest sector reforms 
As it was with land, there had been neither a policy on wildlife nor any on forests until 
1998. In fact, the urgent need for these policies emerged mostly from private 
investors, international environmental NGOs and development agencies who are 
opposed to central ownership and control of resources arguing that; firstly, local 
communities and the private sector do not have adequate or secure rights. The 
second argument is that the exclusive central ownership and management of natural 
resources has failed to deliver efficient protection of wildlife and forest resources 
outside core protected areas (Interviews, Hahn, 27/11/2007; Rodgers, 25/1/2008). 
Thus new policies were needed to faci litate the establishment of community WMAs 
and their autonomous governance structures (Baldus et al., 1994, GTZ/SCP, 1995, 
Nshala, 1999, GTZ, 1998). Not surprising, individuals and environmental NGOs 
lobbied for wildlife and forest sector reforms with the main objective of downscaling 
state powers over resources while at the same time establishing new governance 
structures. Details of how individual actors and their institutions formed networks that 
influenced the establishment of WMAs are provided later in this chapter. Meanwhile, 
it is important to note that the external pressure attached to donor funding conditions 













Official records suggest that the preparation of the first draft of the wildlife policy 
commenced in 1988 with the main architects being conservation NGOs and donors 
who had, for a long time, been providing financial and technical assistance for 
wildlife protection in the country (Nelson et al., 2007, Hartley, 1997). It is 
acknowledged that the policy process dragged on for about a decade following 
negotiations between the government and local communities on the one hand, and 
the government and the private sector on the other (Interview, Anonymous 
Informant, 31/2/2008). Central to these negotiations was the issue of wildlife control, 
especially on communal lands. Following lengthy discussions, the wildlife policy was 
passed in 1998. Like it was with land, the wildlife policy states that the government 
will maintain ownership of wildlife, and that national parks and game reserves will 
continue to be the basis for wildlife conservation (URT, 1998b). However, the policy 
calls for a new approach to wildlife conservation in the village lands, that is the 
establishment of WMAs. The policy states its objectives as „to promote the 
conservation of wildlife and its habitats outside core protected areas (National Parks, 
Game Reserves and Ngorongoro Conservation Area) by establishing a new category 
of protected area to be known as WMAs for the purpose of effecting community-
based conservation’ (URT, 1998b: 8,10). The policy defines WMAs as  ‘areas set 
aside by communities and declared by the Minister5 to be so for the villages to use 
and manage wildlife resources for their own benefits’ (URT, 1998b: 35). On wildlife 
utilization, the policy aims „to create an enabling environment for the private sector to 
invest in different forms of wildlife utilization and conservation’ (URT, 1998b: 8). 
Therefore, the main thrust of the wildlife policy of 1998 is the empowerment of 
private sector and local communities to manage wildlife and forest resources in the 
village lands outside protected areas. 
 
The spirit of the policy suggests the weakening of control by the central government, 
attempts to delegate powers to local communities and the promotion of community 
and private sector involvement in the conservation of wildlife (GTZ, 2003b, Nelson et 
al., 2007, Baldus, 2008). However, the conflicting provisions on land and wildlife 
continued to give the central government an exclusive authority over wildlife outside 
                                                 












protected areas (LEAT, 1998).  The role of the government becomes ambiguous as 
it seeks to protect its resources and people while providing incentives for the private 
sector (often associated with Western domination) on the other side. In fact, key 
informants in the Wildlife Division hold the view that external actors use community-
based approaches as their support for land grabbing and control of wildlife resources 
(Interview, Zakaria, 10/3/2008). Although it goes unsaid, this remained the major 
source of tensions between the government, which provides a legal framework, and 
its external development counterparts who are the main donors and proponents of 
WMAs (Interview, Anonymous Informant, 31/1/2008). Notwithstanding these 
tensions, the government released Wildlife Conservation (WMA) Regulations and 
guidelines in 2002 to provide a legal basis for the establishment of sixteen pilot 
WMAs around the country6 (URT, 2002c, URT, 2003b). As summarized in Table 4.1, 
the regulations set out detailed procedures for the designation of WMAs. 
 
Procedures for the establishment of WMAs suggest that an AA is a legitimate body 
responsible for all issues related to natural resources management and utilization. A 
typical AA structure is formed by the central council and the board of trustees whose 
members are elected by their respective Village Assemblies. The implication of the 
AA structure at the village level is the addition of two committees over those of the 
mainstream Village Council. These are namely the CBO committee and Village 
Game Scouts (known in Kiswahili as Kamati ya Jumuiya and Askari wa 
Wanyamapori, respectively). Five elected vi llage members normally form the former 
committee while twelve members form the later. The two committees are thus 
representative of the village to the AA council and are charged with the conservation 
and protection of wildlife in village areas set aside as a WMA. To this end, the new 
committees in the village are directly associated with the WMA scale even though 
their responsibilities are similar to those of Village Council committees on natural 
resources and defence. 
                                                 












Table 4.1: Procedures for the establishment of WMAs  
1) Village Councils intending to become a WMA are required to recommend to the 
Village Assembly an area of village land that is suitable for establishment of 
WMA. Villages are also required to form Community-Based Organization (CBO), 
which will be given wildlife management responsibilities and user rights in the 
WMA.  
2) The application to designate a WMA is made by the Village Councils through the 
District Council to the Director of Wildlife and each application is processed 
together with: 
 i) A land use plan approved by the Village Assembly 
 ii) A certified copy of minutes of the Village Assembly meeting that endorsed 
the designation of village land to be WMA. 
iii) Completed village information data sheet 
iv) Certified copy of the certificate of registration of a CBO 
3) The Director of Wildlife forwards the application to the Minister of Natural 
Resources and Tourism and a successful application are published to be 
managed by the Authorized Association (AA).  
4) The Director of Wildlife facilitates a Village Assembly and guides the formation of 
CBO7 
5) The Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism issues a certificate of 
authorization to the CBO and declare the CBO an AA.  
6) The AA applies for wildlife user rights to the Director of Wildlife who grants user 
rights in a WMA to an AA. WMAs will then be managed by the AA, which 
consists of representatives from one or several member villages. The AA is 
responsible for, among other things, negotiating and entering into contractual 
agreements with investors in WMA, developing mechanisms for the equitable 
sharing of benefits between WMAs as well as supporting wildlife protection.  
Source: URT, (2002c) 
 
Since the election of new committees is made a public matter carried out in the 
Village Assemblies, AA governance structure is presented as a true representation 
of villages forming a WMA. However, it remains understated that villagers in these 
rural areas have had no influence over top-down processes that manipulated their 
decisions on resource management and administration. In my view, the creation of 
WMAs and CBOs capitalises on this low level of understanding of the functions, 
jurisdictions and the implications of two governance systems. In the light of this, 
Village Councils become the source of legitimacy for the new institution, which in 
turn, secures support of villagers who are to endorse their lands for wildlife 
protection. Mr. Adam Mdoo who is the Kilimasera vi llage chairperson iterated in an 
interview that democratic election of village representatives to the AA legitimized the 
division between the Village Council and the AA and, in his view, this division is the 
                                                 
7 According to the WMA guidelines, a CBO is a civil society organization (registered under the societies Ordinance Chapter 
337) whose primary objective is to conserve resources in a manner that facilitates the sustainable utilization of the resourc es by 












choice made by the proponents of WMAs in order to ensure a smooth re-distribution 
of powers between the Village Council and AAs (Interview, 21/11/2007).  
 
The foregoing suggest that rather than transferring wildlife rights to Village Councils, 
the WMA regulations require the creation of a new governance structure, the CBO, 
which becomes an AA and given wildlife user rights and management 
responsibilities. Naturally, all the villages contributing land to the WMA become 
members of the CBO. In the context of this study as a whole, the creation of WMA 
space and the formation of CBO for their management is a scale issue; it signifies 
the construction of space and the division of power over such space. Since WMA 
space cuts across village borders and forms areas larger than a single village, the 
management authority must be at a level above that of the village. This interprets 
then that, WMA is a supra-village scale with CBO as its autonomous government. 
This observation is supported by the reading of the constitution of the recently 
established CBO for the management of the Mbarang‟andu WMA in Namtumbo 
district. The constitution reads that;  
 
Mbarang’andu will be a CBO which will be independent, non-political and without 
any religion or discrimination of any kind (Article 1). The functions of the 
organisation will be to manage WMA in accordance to the existing general 
management plans, negotiate and enter into contractual agreement with investors, 
develop and implement mechanisms for benefit sharing between village members 
and to oversee investment of development activities (Article 4) (Mbarang'andu, 
2005). 
 
4.3 Expansion, governance and the politics of power 
Although wildlife areas are the core of the WMA initiative, unreserved village forests 
have recently been critical to the expansion of WMAs across the country. It is 
acknowledged that forests in Tanzania cover 15% of the country‟s surface area and 
of this, „3% overlap with wildlife protected areas‟ (URT, 1998a: 4). Thus, the forest 
sector reforms that run alongside those of the wildlife sector took into consideration 
the fact that unreserved village forests make important wildlife habitats. Indeed, the 
forest and wildlife policies were launched in the same year (i.e. 1998) and both made 
conditions conducive for the creation of WMAs. For example, similar to the wildlife 
policy, the forest policy provides incentives for local governments and the private 












1998a: 14). It is also important to note that as it was with wildlife, forest sector 
geared towards the establishment of new conservation areas in village lands but 
their institutional and management structures differed. Whereas the wildlife sector 
established supra-village institution for wildlife management, the forest sector 
realigned vi llage forest management activities to those of the mainstream Village 
Councils (URT, 2001c). Village Councils are thus accountable to the community 
forest users. As the scale literature suggests, the institutional difference does not 
invalidate the observation that new village forest areas contribute to the expansion of 
WMAs. Instead, these differences are considered as conditions created to re-
organise the existing institutions to allow for a smooth establishment of a desirable 
scale (Smith, 2004, Zimmerer, 2006).  
 
In early 2000 the Forest and Beekeeping Division received further financial support 
from the Finish and German governments to develop a forest program for 2001-2010 
period (URT, 2001c). Since the legal framework of the time did not provide for 
community ownership of forest resources as recommended by the policy, the forest 
program initiated the review of the colonial Forest Act of 1953 and the new Act was 
passed in 2002. The Forest Act of 2002 conforms to other legislations such as the 
Wildlife Act, the Land and Village Land Acts and it delegates responsibilities for the 
management of forest resources to the Village Councils as the lowest level of 
management (URT, 2002a). The forest program continued to facilitate the 
collaboration between local governments and the private sector in the management 
of both reserved and unreserved forests in vi llage lands. Like in the wildlife sector 
the program involved local communities in the establishment of buffer zones around 
forest reserves through Joint Forest Management (JFM) and Community-Based 
Forest Management (CBFM) (URT, 2001c).  
 
JFM was practised in formerly established forest protected areas such as National 
Forest Reserves (NFRs), Local Government Forest Reserves (LGFRs) and Private 
Forest Reserves (PFRs). The JFM was then formalised through the signing of an 
agreement between Village Councils and the government (either the District Council 
or Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism). Unlike JFM, the CBFM took place in 
unreserved forests found in villages lands. Under CBFM, villagers take full ownership 












declared by the Village Council as a Village Land Forest Reserve (VLFR). The same 
arrangement establishes Village Beekeeping Reserves (VBRs) thus enabling the 
protection of woodlands and forests in vi llage lands. In these reserves villages are 
not obliged to share forest royalties with the central government  (Blomley, 2006). 
Most recently, however, the proposal was made to merge VLFRs, VBRs and WMAs 
within village lands (Blomley, 2007). This strategy is particularly referred to as ‘eating 
from the same plate’ and it suggests that forests are wildlife habitats thus the 
institutional and physical borders in the management of forest and wildlife should be 
removed to enhance conservation of both (Nelson and Blomley, 2006). As a result, 
the harmonisation of forest and wildlife areas has meant that Village Councils lose 
powers over VLFRs and VBRs to WMAs and their AAs. Conceptually, the re-
alignment of wildlife and forest areas at the vi llage level confirms the argument that 
institutional reforms were instrumental to the creation of WMAs in Tanzania and that 
they created conditions for intensifying conservation efforts  at the local scale. Also 
these reforms supported the re-organisation of conventional institutions and the 
establishment of the supra-vi llage institution to allow for the smooth establishment of 
the desirable scale. Figure 4.1 demonstrates how legal reforms formed part of the 
process of creating the local scale in Tanzania. 
 
The establishment of the WMA scale in Tanzania raises three key questions related 
to the nature of CBOs, power struggles and beneficiation. Firstly, CBOs established 
for WMAs should under normal circumstances, have been initiated by communities 
themselves with the guidance of the Societies Ordinance Chapter 337. The 
procedure is for the community to agree on the CBO constitution which qualifies it to 
be a civil society organisation registered under the Ministry of Home Affairs. Contrary 
to this procedure, the WMA process has been overly influenced by wildlife laws and 
that local communities are literally mobilized and facilitated by various actors to 
complete the procedures in a rather top-down fashion (Interview, Anonymous 
Informant, 23/9/2008). I argue, then, that WMAs in Tanzania are not local initiatives 
hence communities have no direct role/influence over their establishment. Instead, 
different actors who facilitate wildlife protection (the government, international 
conservation NGOs and development agencies) maintain command of the WMA 
process, mostly in favour of wildlife protection, expansions and utilization in 












Figure 4.1: Governance reforms and scale effects in Tanzania 
 
 
The second question relates to the tensions that exist between the old and newly 
established natural resource institutions at the local level. The tension emanates 
from the fact that WMA governance established structure alongside the existing local 
government institutions such as District and Village Councils . The Tanzanian 
government recognises District and Village Councils as responsible bodies for the 
management of natural resources in their jurisdiction (with village as the lowest level 
in the hierarchy). In the villages, the Village Assembly is a supreme authority made 
of all constituent member households of the village (URT, 1982). The assembly 
elects its own village government (that is the Village Council) composed of the 
chairperson, executive secretaries and representatives of social workers and 












development committees for, say, natural resources, finance, planning, security and 
defence. According to the Local Government (District Authorities) Act of 1982, the 
Village Council is an independent legal entity with powers to manage resources in 
village lands, hold property and is able to enter into contractual arrangements (URT, 
1982). As observed earlier, the Wildlife Conservation Act No. 12 of 1974 has 
additional provisions that grant the Minister responsible for wildlife discretionary 
powers to designate Village Councils as Authorised Associations for wildlife 
conservation (Section 26 (1)). These provisions make Village Councils central 
institutions for local natural resources management.  
 
Prior to the establishment of WMAs, Village Council natural resource committee 
(known as Kamati ya Mali Asili in Kiswahili) would oversee all issues related to 
natural resources in the village land in addition to the vi llage defence committee 
(Mgambo wa kijiji). Discussions with people in the study villages revealed a 
perception of WMAs as an outside body confused with the central government and 
donors (mostly Western institutions) who support the protection of the SGR. This 
was confirmed in the group interviews held with Huria and Kilimasera villagers who 
refer to the newly established committees as „conservationists’ (famous as Wahifadhi 
in Kiswahili) and WMAs as GTZ/SCP project areas (Group discussions, Kilimasera, 
21/11/2007; Huria, 8/8/2008). This suggests that villagers consider Wahifadhi who 
are entrusted with wildlife protection in WMAs as agents of GTZ and not the 
community representatives. This perception relates directly to the legacy of colonial 
and post-colonial wildlife laws that withheld indigenous rights and access to wildlife 
and forest resources in protected areas.  
 
The confusion that exists in the local level relates also to the wider debate on 
whether mainstream local government (in this case Village Council) is an appropriate 
scale to support wildlife protection. On this note, views have been expressed that 
community wildlife management in Tanzania should be practised through the 
conventional local government institutions and the focus should be on making village 
government truly democratic (Shivji, 2001). Counter arguments hold that resources 
and skills would inevitably remain inadequate at the village level thus new 
approaches are necessary for diversifying conventional governance structures 












divergence between the old and new institutions in the WMA process. The two 
institutions remain the source of tension in the vi llages following unclear borders and 
overlap of responsibilities. Whereas new institutions have power and knowledge on 
matters related to wildlife conservation and utilization in WMAs following recent 
trainings, Village Councils are also legal entities with powers to control all the land 
and activities in their area of jurisdiction, including in WMAs. These tensions are 
even more intensified by the division of village revenues accrued from natural 
resources in the same village.  
 
The third question relates to how revenue from tourism-related activities is 
distributed. It is apparent that CBOs in WMAs have power to do one thing that local 
governments (District and Village Councils) never did; that is to enter into contractual 
arrangement with private investors. However, as noted earlier in this and previous 
chapters, the government has, through the Wildlife Division, maintained a command 
system of control of hunting investments over a long time and hunting tourism 
remain the main source of its revenue (Wildlife Sector Review Task Force, 1995, 
Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004). Since WMA is an additional institution in the sector, it 
has brought financial implications to the Wildlife Division. As part of the enforcement 
of the WMA regulations, a benefit-sharing mechanism has been proposed to protect 
this important source of the government revenue while ensuring that local 
communities benefit (but are not exploited) by private investors (Interviews, Zakaria, 
15/3/2008). At the time of this study, the benefit sharing formula had not been 
released to the public. However, informants who spoke on condition of anonymity 
revealed that the Wildlife Division and Treasury hold a stake as the two support the 
establishment of WMAs. Views of these informants suggest further that, the 
Tanzania Wildlife Protection Fund supports wildlife protection throughout the country 
thus, it is legible for the share of benefits accrued from the conservation of WMAs. 
Moreover, District Councils provide social and technical services to the villages 
owning WMAs so they need to cushion their revenues using WMA funds. Likewise, 
Village Councils, which own the land where wildlife is found, and CBOs, which are 
the AAs in WMAs, deserve a lion‟s share of the revenue (Interviews, Anonymous 













Even though other actors such as conservation NGOs and development agencies 
facilitated reforms with the objective of downscaling government powers over wildlife 
and creating an autonomous local scale, the process has depended largely on the 
government laws, which have since the approval of WMAs, been continuously 
changing. For example, in 2000 new regulations to govern hunting tourism were 
issued. Although this is around the same time that WMA regulations were prepared, 
the hunting regulations prohibited tourism from being carried out in any hunting 
blocks, including those in WMAs, without the permission of the Director of Wildlife 
(URT, 2000, Nshala, 2002). Recalling from the WMA procedures on the same issue, 
the regulations require that before the AA enters into investment agreement with 
private investors the Director of Wildlife must approve the investment (URT, 2002c). 
In the meantime, the review of the Wildlife Conservation Act No. 12 of 1974 which 
had been under way since early 2000 led to the adoption of the Draft Wildlife 
Conservation Act (2004)8 which legitimizes the creation and use of WMAs (URT, 
2004). The Draft Act reflects even a much more centralized framework. For instance, 
Section 3(1) of the Draft applauds that;  
 
The ownership of all wildlife in Tanzania is vested in the President on behalf of, 
and for the benefit of the people of Tanzania’. The Act declares further in Section 
28(3) that, „benefit sharing in WMAs shall comply with circulars issued by the 
government from time to time and shall adhere to mechanisms of equitable 
distribution of costs and benefits9.  
 
Furthermore, the Wildlife Conservation (Non-consumptive Wildlife Utilization) 
regulations were reviewed and passed in September 2007. The regulations have 
provisions that give the government powers to control wi ldlife-related activities and 
revenues in WMAs (URT, 2007b). The regulations indicate that all sources of 
revenue are planned and controlled by the Wildlife Division, including tourist entry 
fees to WMAs. Therefore, local communities have no direct access to the revenues 
generated from WMAs. The above law provisions raise concerns among local 
communities and non-government actors, most of them blaming the government for 
regulating the process in its favour. The main concern is the degree of the autonomy 
of the WMA institutions. Currently, CBOs remain semi-autonomous following new 
                                                 
8 During the time of this study the Draft Wildlife Conservation Act 2004 was waiting to be tabled in Parliament. 
9 Distribution in this case is between the government, AAs (for communities that happen to reside proximity to w ildlife areas) 












government regulations and laws that redefine powers from time to time. Thus 
different views have emerged on the viability of WMAs as the catalyst for community 
and private sector empowerment under the current practices. On the one hand, 
donors, conservation NGOs and even local representatives consider wildlife laws 
and WMA regulations too complex. The protest cites critical issues such as 
mechanisms for benefit sharing, quota utilization and investments in the WMAs, 
which are still under the control of the Minister and the Director of Wildlife (Nelson, 
2007, Nelson and Blomley, 2006, Nelson et al., 2007, Rodgers et al., 2003). There 
has also been an outpouring allegation of corrupt and inept government officials at 
both the Wildlife Division and at the local government levels.  
 
Research demonstrate that the existing mechanisms for benefit sharing favour 
institutions and individuals – the Wildlife Division, District Councils and private 
investors - who do not bear the costs of conservation while constraining the flow of 
benefits to the local communities (Brockington, 2007, Kideghesho, 2008b, Baldus, 
2006a, Tanzania Natural Resource Forum (TNRF), 2009, Baldus and Cauldwell, 
2004). Government officials, particularly in the Wildlife Division are alleged of not 
only colluding with illegal hunters but also with foreign private investors in influencing 
the allocation of hunting blocks and other wildlife benefits in WMAs (Kideghesho, 
2008b, Nelson et al., 2007). It is alleged that hunting concessions are allocated at 
prices far below market value irrespective of size, quality and income potential 
(Tanzania Development Partners Group (DPG), 2006, Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004). 
As a result, the income to the Wildlife Division has remained the same despite the 
increasing number of hunting clients. Even where distribution to the District Councils 
is effected, the discretion of allocating wildlife funds rests with government officials 
and most of the revenues do not find their way down to the communities 
(Kideghesho, 2008b). These allegations have been the source of tensions in the 
Wildlife Division as donors and local communities express their dissatisfactions 
about the WMA process. Tensions and struggles over control of natural resource 
between different actors are not exceptional to Tanzania but are inherently the 
manifestations of scaling processes. Since scale changing inevitably re-arrange 
institutions, create new space and redefine powers over that space , the process is 
expected  to empower some actors while disempowering others (McCarthy, 2005, 












should therefore be the basis for the analysis of the impacts of WMAs on different 
actors involved in their creation. 
 
4.4 Actor networks and assemblages  
Echoing the discussion in Chapter Three, the management of natural resources in 
Tanzania depends heavily on external actors - most of whom represent major global 
corporations, bilateral governments, development agencies and transnational 
conservation NGOs. In fact, it is argued that almost all external actors direct their 
funds toward activities that influence policy changes and the re-definition of borders 
of nature as a strategy for translating the global conservation and economic policies 
into workable situations in the country (Williams and Mohan, 2005, Alastair, 2005, 
Barrow et al., 2000). In particular, these actors and their different activities have, in 
one way or the other, focused on the implementation of the bioregional planning 
model by creating a network that facilitates the realignment of their activities that 
target WMAs as stepping stones toward the implementation of specific bioregional 
projects. The networks that connect these actors and their specific programs in the 
country are complex. For example, the „Tanzania Development Partners Group 
(DPG)’ brings together all development actors but does not include „government 
membership‟ (Tanzania Development Partners Group (DPG), 2006). As such, the 
government of Tanzania receives about 40% of its total annual budget from these 
partners (Levine, 2002, Nelson et al., 2007). More specifically, the MNRT draws 
about 90% of its annual conservation funds from these partners (URT, 1998b). The 
point here is that scales (including WMAs) must be appreciated as effects of these 
networked practices (Legg, 2009, Swyngedouw, 2004a). Indeed, the  network of 
development partners in Tanzania, their financial and technical support in training, 
ideas and philosophies of Western nature conservation sustained greater control 
over the country‟s environmental conservation policies (Schroeder, 1999, Levine, 
2002, Bonner, 1993, Igoe and Brockington, 2007) which facilitated the establishment 
of WMAs. 
 
Different members of the DPG targeted core protected areas as the place where any 
strategy for expansion and protection of wildlife must begin (AWF, 2006). Thus, 
assistance for conservation programs in the country targeted wildlife institutions with 












projects were important for achieving conservation objectives since protected areas 
are surrounded by the poorest communities (Parkipuny, 1991) who not only pose 
threats to such areas but also have rights to the land that is considered critical for the 
expansion of protected areas. Precisely, the WWF facilitated anti-poaching and 
general management activities of game reserves and national parks through the 
Wildlife Division and TANAPA since 1985 (URT, 2001b). The management plans 
that followed introduced the community-based approaches to wildlife protection 
(WWF, 2004). Later in 1989, the WWF through its Wildlife and Human Needs 
program started community-based projects around protected areas in Ruaha and 
Udzungwa National Parks, East Coast Forests, Eastern Arch Mountains as well as in 
SGR (Levine, 2007; TANAPA, 2008; Interview, Sosovele, 22/9/2008). 
 
Similarly, since 1988 AWF supported TANAPA‟s general management plan and anti-
poaching activities (AWF, 2006, TANAPA, 2008). Interviews held with the TANAPA 
ecologist (Mr. Inyasi Lejora) and the AWF‟s Heartland Director (Dr. Stephen 
Kiruswa) confirmed that the joint efforts of the AWF and TANAPA led in the  
establishment and running of the TANAPA-Community Conservation Service (CCS) 
program in all the national parks (Interviews, Lejora, 30/1/2008; Kiruswa, 12/9/2008). 
In fact, the CCS program (commonly known as Ujirani Mwema10) was anchored on 
the AWF‟s philosophy of „Neighbours as Partners‟ (www.tanzaniaparks.com). The 
AWF financed a full time officer to run the TANAPA-CCS and the program expanded 
to a full-fledged department with permanently employed staff in all the national parks 
(TANAPA, 2008, Goldstein, 2005, AWF, 2006). Further in 1992 AWF focused on 
facilitating community wildlife projects in northern Tanzania around Arusha, 
Kilimanjaro, Serengeti, Tarangire and Lake Manyara National Parks (Muruthi and 
Frohardt, 2006, AWF, 2006, Barrow et al., 2000).  
 
Meanwhile, the German government initiated collaboration with the Wildlife Division 
with the aim of influencing the management plan for the SGR. By 1988, the German 
technical agency, GTZ, had set the Selous Community Conservation Project (SCP) 
that aimed at establishing wildlife buffer zones in village lands surrounding the 
reserve (Siege and Baldus, 2000, Baldus and Hahn, 2004). The GTZ extended its 
                                                 












community-based projects in other reserves such as Katavi-Rukwa and Saadani 
Game Reserves. Later, GTZ embarked on nationwide projects that supported 
institutional framework for the community-based approach. At the central 
government level, GTZ established an office for community wildlife management in 
the Wildlife Division where the German technical expert (Dr. Rolf Baldus) held the 
post as a „National Advisor’ for community-wildlife management (GTZ-Tanzania, 
2005). At the local government (which include District and Village Councils), GTZ 
sponsored the District Natural Resource Management projects and placed its 
technical advisors as district employees who worked to advise District Councils on 
community wildlife issues (www.wildlife-programme.gtz.de/wildlife/start.html). Other 
actors include the Norwegian Agency for International Cooperation (NORAD) and 
German Frankfurt Zoological Society (FZS) who jointly facilitated wildlife CBC 
projects around Serengeti National Park; DFID, the Danish International 
Development Agency (DANIDA) and USAID who jointly supported the establishment 
of CBC projects in different parts of the country (URT, 2007a, Levine, 2002). These 
CBC projects were thus transformed into WMAs with the continued support of 
different international conservation NGOs and development agencies (see Table 
4.1). 
 
The preceding discussion points to the importance of networks and assemblages in 
the creation of a desirable scale and how common scalar interests are pursued by 
different actors from different angles. Specifically, WMAs have become a tool for the 
implementation of the bioregional planning model as applied by different actors in 
Tanzania. The WWF is currently using WMAs to create ecoregions (Interviews, 
Salehe, 28/2/2008; Sosovele, 22/9/2008); AWF uses WMAs for the expansion of 
heartlands (Interview, Kiruswa, 12/9/2008) while the German government uses 
WMAs to create the SNWC and the TFCA. As Adams and McShane (1996) put, the 
Western dream of the „frontier of wilderness‟ has managed to re-organise African 
governments and translate community-based approaches into a policy tool for the 
expansion and control of wildlife outside core protected areas. Indeed, there has 
been a drastic increase in wildlife numbers in communal lands (Baldus, 2008, URT, 
2007a). Not surprising, elephants are increasingly reported killing people and 
livestock, competing for water and destroying facilities in the villages as well as 












Nahonyo, 2001, Kideghesho, 2006, Kikoti, 2001). In 2007 alone, wildlife-caused 
agricultural losses averaged 40% of the crops grown in Tanzania and about 68 
people were killed by elephants countrywide (URT, 2007a). Against this background, 
WMAs have become important tools for achieving global conservation objectives of 
expanding and establishing a network of protected areas. 
  
Table 4.2 WMAs and their main facilitators countrywide 
Name of WMA Main facilitator (s) 
Mbarang‟andu (Namtumbo) GTZ/GTZ-IS  
Nalika (Tunduru) GTZ/GTZ-IS 
Kisunguke (Namtumbo) GTZ-IS/GEF/UNDP/KfW 
Kimbanda (Namtumbo) GTZ-IS/GEF/UNDP/KfW 
Chingoli (Tunduru) GTZ-IS/GEF/UNDP/KfW 
Makame (Kiteto)  AWF  
Pawaga-Idodi (Iringa) WWF 
Burunge (Babati) AWF 
Ikona (Serengeti) FZS 
Enduimet (Longido) AWF 
Liwale (Liwale) GTZ 
Ngarambe-Tapika (Rufiji)  WWF 
Uyumbu (Urambo) Africare 
Ipole (Sikonge) Africare/USAID 
Wami-Mbiki (Bagamoyo & Morogoro) Danish Hunters‟ Association 
Ukutu (Morogoro) MNRT-Wildlife Division  
Source: Author compilation 
 
In the case of the SNWC and the TFCA, the process of establishing WMAs is not 
completed yet, and institutional conflict continues to grow but different strategies are 
converged to ensure that WMAs can be expanded once they are in place. As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, the proponents of WMAs viewed the Forest and 
Beekeeping Division as an important partner in the initiative. Thus different bilateral 
and multilateral development partners (some of whom had facilitated wildlife sector 
reforms and the establishment of WMAs) including the DANIDA, the Finnish 
International Development Agency (FINIDA), GTZ, NORAD and the World Bank 
supported the implementation of a national wide forest program that focussed on the 
realignment of village forest and wildlife areas (URT, 2001c).  Consequently, new 












that purpose. For example, at the same time that the SNWC project started in early 
2006, the FINIDA financed a three year plan (2006-2010) to establish nine VLFRs in 
Namtumbo and Tunduru districts with particular focus on villages in the SNWC area 
(Interview, Mgela, 12/9/2007). This source confirmed that until March 2007 six VLFR 
(Kilangalanga, Solute, Chegena, Masuguru and Naikesi Kumbara) had been 
established.  Along these lines, an email correspondence of 2 March 2008 from Tom 
Blomley - the Senior GTZ-Technical Advisor on Participatory Forest Management to 
Rudolf Hahn - the GTZ-Technical Advisor for WMAs attested that the integration of 
VLFRs to WMAs would expand wildlife habitats across village borders and support 
the creation of the SNWC (Blomley, 2007). In the coming section I demonstrate how 
WMAs (that include VFLR and VBRs) are created and used to establish the SNWC 
and the Selous-Niassa TFCA.  
 
4.5 The creation and functioning of WMAs in Selous-Niassa area 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Selous Conservation Program (SCP) was a 
CBC project jointly implemented by the German government through the GTZ and 
the MNRT-Wildlife Division. While the German government was the pioneer and the 
main sponsor of the SCP (hereafter GTZ/SCP), the MNRT-Wildlife Division is the 
government agency responsible for the overall management of the SGR. The 
GTZ/SCP worked between 1988 and 1998 to establish buffer zones in communal 
lands of fifty one villages in seven districts (GTZ/SCP, 1995, Baldus, 2006a). Put 
together, approximately 8600 km2 of communal land was converted into some sort of 
wildlife conservation areas (Baldus, 2008). In the context of this study, the ten year 
period of the GTZ/SCP was the first phase of the implementation of the broader 
objective of the establishment of a bioregion across the Tanzania-Mozambique 
border. The second phase of the bioregional project is discussed in this section only 
in relation to the creation of WMAs. Further analysis of how these WMAs are used in 
the creation of the SNWC is provided in Chapter Five.  
 
In 2003, the five GTZ/SCP buffer zone areas were designated among the first 
sixteen WMA sites in the country. The buffer zones in Namtumbo and Tunduru 
districts formed Mbarang‟andu and Nalika WMAs respectively. CBOs for the two 
WMAs were registered recently; Nalika in 2007 and Mbarang‟andu in 2008. At the 












declare them AAs. In the meantime, Graham (2005) reports that these WMAs have 
prevented further settlement and farming activities in the village areas identified for 
wildlife and have provided openings for the continuation of habitats southward to the 
NGR in Mozambique. This would thus mark the beginning of the SNWC, which is an 
important component of the bioregional planning model. The creation of the SNWC 
depends exclusively on the establishment of more WMAs. Hence, three WMAs have, 
since early 2006, been proposed and the process of their establishment is currently 
underway. The proposed WMAs are Chingoli, Kisungule and Kindamba that extends 
southwards to the Tanzania-Mozambique border. As demonstrated in Figure 4.2, it is 
these WMAs coupled with the already established Mbarang‟andu and Nalika WMAs 
that form the 15,000 hectares zone mentioned earlier (Baldus and Hahn, 2004, 
Baldus et al., 2003). The ownership and use of WMAs remain ambiguous as they 
are village lands but, at the same time, the Wildlife Division leases them as hunting 













Figure 4.2: WMAs that form the SNWC across village lands  
 
Source: Modified from Schuerholz and Bossen, (2005: 2) 
 
The SNWC project was first introduced in the villages in early 2006 with the aim of 












Mbarang‟andu and Nalika, the twelve villages have not been involved in community-
based conservation so the WMA idea is relatively new to the villagers. It will be 
recalled that Mbarang‟andu and Nalika WMAs took nearly two decades from the time 
GTZ/SCP started in 1988 to 2007/2008 when WMAs were registered. 
Comparatively, the process for the proposed WMAs in the SNWC project was well 
advanced when the fieldwork was finalised in August 2008. The progress could be 
explained by the fact that the SNWC is an extension of the GTZ/SCP thus the 
experience and techniques used are replicated. While this is a positive result for the 
project, the side of the local communities lacks knowledge on the WMA process and 
its livelihood impacts. As the details below will indicate, the process of creating the 
three WMAs has been surrounded by fear of loss of land by local communities and 
also generated conflicts over control and use of wildlife by local natural resource 
institutions, the central government and the proponents of WMAs. 
 
Table 4.3: Study villages and their WMA memberships  
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CBO registered in 2007 
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CBO registered in 2008 















March 2008 (part 
of the SNWC) 
Proposed WMA 
(subject to the  village 









March 2008 (part 
of the SNWC) 
Proposed WMA 
(subject to the  village 










March 2008 (part 
of the SNWC) 
Proposed WMA 
(subject to the  village 
land use plans) 
 
It follows that the SNWC project trained Village Council leaders and twelve game 
scouts from each village. On their arrival from the training, village leaders convened 
Village Assemblies where five village members were elected to join the game scouts 
in representing the village in the SNWC project (Picard and Hahn, 2007). As it was 












with the mainstream Village Council natural resource committees. New committees 
are specifically identified with the SNWC project. Literally, the villagers call the 
members of these committees the Washoroba (literally meaning the corridor people). 
The washoroba would also include the SNWC officials, district game officers and any 
other person in the village who supports the SNWC project. Other village-based 
training programmes followed in early 2007 where Village Councils, traditional and 
religious leaders were trained on laws governing village land administration and 
planning vis a vis conservation (Lerise et al., 2007). According to the District Land 
Officers in Namtumbo and Tunduru, the training focussed on providing legal 
assistance to community leaders for them to understand the Village Land Act No. 5 
of 1999 and to guide community members on land issues related to use, rights and 
ownership. Of importance to this discussion is the fact that the training used the 
Village Land Act to elucidate that all the land in Tanzania is public property and the 
President holds it in trust on behalf of all the citizens. This was to let vi llagers know 
that the President can take away a person‟s right to occupy land for the benefit of the 
public. Indeed, village leaders who attended the training acknowledged in the 
interviews that the training came as a threat at the time when they were supposed to 
decide on the areas of vi llage lands to set aside for wildlife (Interviews, Matepwende 
Village Council, 18/9/2007, Lusewa Village Council, 19/9/2007). Villagers generally 
shared this view. In fact, the villagers regarded the delegation of the training 
facilitators (that composed of district game officers, the SNWC project managers, 
sponsors and technical advisers) as an indicator of the value of their land for wildlife, 
which according to the laws, would outweigh the existing community use. Leaders of 
the Msisima vi llage were especially concerned about the statement that Dr. David 
Kaggi, a German conservationist and one of the pioneers of the SNWC project made 
to the Village Assembly. According to these leaders, the statement insinuated that;  
 
...even if the village disapproves the project (SNWC project), by virtue of having 
wildlife the area is of international importance and the government would declare it 
a wildlife corridor (Interview, Msisima Village Council, 18/9/2007) 
 
Accordingly, the Msisima village endorsed the project because it could not oppose 
the government. In other villages such as Likusanguse, the training delegation 
encountered hostility from villagers following the SNWC project‟s plan to relocate 












provided in Chapter Six. In short, the location of the Semeni sub-village is 
considered a threat to wildlife and the SNWC project in general. However, villagers 
question the decision to relocate 332 people of Semeni when the village is yet to 
decide which part of its land will be set aside for wildlife. The Likusanguse village 
leaders brought to my attention that in October 2007 the Village Assembly put the 
Village Council under pressure to conduct democratic voting for or against the 
SNWC project. It follows that, fifty three vi llagers supported the project while one 
hundred and eighty three voted against the project (Interview, Likusanguse Village 
Council, 20/9/2007). On arrival of the delegation of the SNWC and the DC in the 
village on 19 October 2007, the Village Council presented views of the assembly 
based on the votes. According to the key informant in the village, the DC tore the 
voting report and insisted that „the wildlife corridor project is not a subject of 
discussion. The President has already signed an agreement so nobody can oppose 
this decision’ (Interview, Anonymous Informant, 18/11/2007). At the end of the 
fieldwork, land use issues and the demands of the Village Assembly in Likusanguse 
village remained inconclusive. In other villages land use maps were produced with 
the participation of local residents. For example, the SNWC facilitated training 
workshops in November 2007 which, for the first time, brought together eighty five 
newly elected representatives of the twelve villages (Lerise et al., 2007, InWent, 
2007a, Picard and Hahn, 2007). In terms of the WMA governance structure 
discussed earlier in this chapter, these village representatives would form WMA 
councils and establish the CBOs. Among other things, the workshops reiterated on 
issues of land use, ownership and conservation in the village lands. Discussions on 
these issues formerly registered village endorsements of the SNWC‟s objective of 
establishing WMAs. In fact, village representatives participated in the drawing of land 
use sketch maps for their vi llages as the initial step towards setting aside wildlife 
conservation areas. Figure 4.3 shows the example of such maps for Magazini village 
in relation to the neighbouring villages of Amani (to the west), Likusanguse (to the 
east) as well as Mozambique11  (to the south).  
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Figure 4.3:  An example of land use maps drawn during the training workshop  
 
Source: Adopted from InWent (2007a: 22)  
 
The drawing of these sketch maps by village representatives suggests that there 
was an attempt to decide on village land use through a small section of the 
community. Likewise, these representatives deliberated the names of the proposed 
WMAs/CBOs (as indicated earlier in Table 4.3) and elected the leaders (including 
the chairpersons, secretaries and treasurers as well as members of Board of 
Trustees) (Picard and Hahn, 2007, InWent, 2007a). Thus in my view, the training 
workshops and land use maps prepared by village representatives served to ratify 
ceding vi llage lands for wildlife. As such, the workshops established the governance 
for the WMAs and prepared grounds for the actual land use planning that would 
facilitate the acquisition of village lands for wildlife and therefore create space for 
WMA institutions to function. To this end, the wildlife management responsibilities 














4.6 Conservation, commercialization and private trusts 
The AWF, with the support of the FFI, GEF, Nature Conservancy (NC) and USAID 
initiated the idea of a conservation land trust that would facilitate the purchase of 
community, private and government-owned lands in wildlife rich areas with a motto 
that „to save wildlife one must save land’ (AWF, 2007, Muruthi, 2005, Tanzania Land 
Conservation Trust (TLCT), 2000). In early 2000, the first Tanzania Land 
Conservation Trust (TLCT) was registered as an NGO with the objectives of 
acquiring critical wildlife areas threatened by private developments (www.awf.org). 
Precisely, the TLCT is managed by a Board of Trustees who are drawn from AWF, 
WWF, UNDP and TANAPA (Sumba et al., 2005). The Trustee‟s role is to ensure that 
the Trust Fund and the Property (land) is expanded for wildlife protection (Tanzania 
Land Conservation Trust (TLCT), 2000: 22).  
 
On 19 April 2001 the TLCT made its first successful business when it bought the 
government-owned Manyara ranch, an area of about 44,000 acres with a 99-year 
deed issued „gratis’ to the TLCT (Sumba et al., 2005). The ranch is located within the 
wildlife corridor that links the Tarangire and Lake Manyara National Parks in the 
northern Tanzania. Surrounding the ranch is the Burunge WMA, which forms an 
important part of the corridor. The acquisition of the ranch was thus a critical step 
towards the expansion of both the WMA and the corridor and it contributes to the 
creation of the AWF‟s Maasai Stepples Heartland. The consequences of the ranch 
on local communities will be made clear in Chapter Six. For now, I concentrate on 
how the TLCT acquires land for conservation. Interviews with anonymous trust 
officials revealed that the TLCT is focusing on any negotiable lands (government or 
privately owned) in ecologically rich areas, preferably around national parks and 
cross-border zones. The TLCT has a national mandate to secure areas of interest for 
conservation and is expected to use a range of legal and economic tools such as 
easement, direct purchase and management agreements with local land owners 
(Sumba et al., 2005). Elsewhere in the region, the AWF, which acts as the 
secretariat for the TLCT facilitated the establishment of such trusts in Kenya, Zambia 
and Mozambique, and are to become regional models in securing land for the 
establishment of large scale conservation areas (www.awf.org). Thus, the creation of 












land acquisition that points to the need for further analysis of the role and interest of 
the private sector in the expansion of conservation at a local scale.  
 
It is apparent that reforms that occurred in the natural resource sector in Tanzania 
have created an environment conducive to the expansion of wildlife areas and have 
opened space for the liberalization. As such, the private sector has recently become 
an active player in deciding investments in communal lands as ways of accessing 
markets in nature conservation. Although land laws in Tanzania still restrict private 
ownership of land, especially by foreign individuals and companies, there are 
provisions in the law that encourage partnership between foreign and local investors 
and does allow foreigners to own investments in the land (URT, 1999a). In this case, 
foreign development partners could invest on land where wildlife exists as private 
properties albeit in a joint venture with local partners. It should be emphasized that 
investment and partnerships in WMAs are part of larger projects. Since the current 
policy direction is clearly towards the establishment of WMAs as non-government 
institutions (Marcus, 2007, Nelson et al., 2007), it is likely that WMAs will be core 
areas for nature commodification in Tanzania. Based on this view, the current 
investment and partnerships in WMAs intend to create a commercial niche for 
individuals and private sector actors. 
 
Although WMAs in Tanzania are yet to attain complete autonomy over wildlife, there  
have already been striking business connections between them and private investors 
that require little or no approval of the central government. Thus, rather than the 
economic empowerment of states and local communities that were envisaged 
earlier, WMAs in Tanzania are used to forge connections that integrate local 
resource base directly into the global market. Under normal circumstances, however, 
principles of globalization create conditions that local people are not often able to 
compete effectively in the face of much more powerful multinational interests (Igoe 
and Brockington, 2007). In fact, Brockington (2003) argues that neither protectionism 
nor neoliberal economic development needs to benefit the poor in order to thrive.  
Despite these views, poverty in rural areas is often invoked to promote conservation 
and nature-related businesses as the recent scientists and hunters symposium held 
in London in 2006 demonstrates. The aim of the symposium was to examine 












partner in rural development. At that symposium, the president of the Tropical Game 
Commission of the International Council for Game and Wildlife Conservation (CIC)  
Rolf Baldus - formerly the Technical Advisor for the GTZ/SCP - used his experience 
of wildlife policies and practices in Tanzania to sell the idea that hunting could 
contribute significantly to the conservation objectives and to poverty alleviation 
schemes in economically marginal regions (Damm, 2006). Subsequently, the idea 
was adopted in the Ninth Conference of the Parties (COP 9) to the CBD held in May 
2008 in Bonn, German. For the first time in history, CIC and the German Federal 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection presented a Markhor Award 
during the COP to the leaders of the five WMA CBOs in the SNWC and three others 
on the Mozambique side (Figure 4.4) (International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (IISD), 2008).  
 
Figure 4.4: CIC Markhor Award for the WMAs in SNWC 
 












This award points to the fact that the local scale and its resources are connected to 
the global market through individuals and global corporations that facilitate the 
establishment of WMAs. As Igoe and Brockington (2007) argue, this connection and 
the role played by these actors will determine who has powers over wildlife 
resources in the village lands in Tanzania and elsewhere in Africa. Comparatively, 
the German government has assumed an exceptional donor position in the 
development of the SGR and the Selous-Niassa TFCA. Details of this discussion are 
provided in Chapter Five. In the meantime, my assertion that Germany is the main 
actor of the ongoing TFCA process is supported by the analysis of the scientific and 
financial contributions made through different German government agencies to the 
Wildlife Division with the focus on the SGR and the SNWC project. I go further to 
ascertain that since the planned Selous-Niassa TFCA has economic potential, 
different actors have interests which range from personal, institutional and political 
(through international relations and geospatial expansions) to regional and global 
recognition (through the support for biodiversity conservation). As such, the Selous-
Niassa TFCA is considered a gateway for regional commerce and trade through the 
MtDC thus interests of different actors revolve around access and control of this new 
business area. The German government is better placed since it controls the TFCA 
process and it is likely that the Selous-Niassa TFCA will be the political ground on 
which it regains control and influence over the southeastern Tanzania that had once 
been its centre of commerce. This argument is captured by views of different 
informants. For example, a policy analyst in the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Tourism opined that; 
  
...we should not ignore the fact that reasons that brought colonialists to Africa 
remain the same. They (former colonial masters) are still interested in expanding 
their geopolitical influence from which they can continue getting raw materials for 
their industries, cheap labour, and employment for their people and of course 
market for their manufactured goods. These things are needed more than during 
colonialism. The only difference is the approach that they take… (Interview, 
Anonymous Informant, 15/2/2008).  
 
Conceptually, business in the wildlife protection projects in southeastern Tanzania 
manifests in a number of ways; one is through direct wildlife-based businesses such 
as hunting tourism, which involves coordination of regional and international tourism 












direct placement of experts in such projects. On the first way, hunting tourism 
especially in southeastern Tanzania remains an important business area with high 
potential for expansion since the SGR is currently considered one of the best wildlife 
hunting destinations in Africa (African Indaba, 2007). Securing sustainable hunting 
areas and other wildlife-based investments is thus one of the interests of different 
actors in the Selous-Niassa area. Currently, the GTZ boosts for facilitating the 
achievement of the said status (Baldus, 2008, GTZ-Tanzania, 2005). Related to this 
is the fact that in November 2007 the German Federal Environment Ministry 
established the „Business and Biodiversity‟ initiative through which leading 
companies are encouraged to integrate the protection of biodiversity more closely 
into their business activities (GTZ, 2008, www.gtz.de/en/unternehmen). Precisely, 
the GTZ is charged with the implementation of this initiative. Thus, GTZ provides 
experts and arranges contacts with institutions and environmental organisations to 
work in partnership with the businesses (GTZ, 2008). These organisations determine 
how nature protection and utilization can be integrated into their business activities. 
This way, the biodiversity conservation, especially in developing countries where 
states lack sufficient resources, becomes a business area for different actors. In fact, 
the Markhor award to the SNWC villages is part of the business and biodiversity 
project and, according to the CIC sources, the award will be given every two years at 
the future COPs in recognition of good practices in conservation through sustainable 
use of wildlife, particularly hunting (www.cic-wildlife.org). 
 
The second way in which business environment is created in the Selous-Niassa area 
relates closely to the foregoing. Chapter Five provides details of how the network of 
actors and assemblage of technical and financial resources facilitate the 
establishment of the SNWC. These networks have relevant connections to the 
discussions in this section. In short, the SNWC is implemented by the private 
consulting companies most of which are the agencies of the main donor (i.e. the 
German government). These agencies provide consultancy services in the 
implementation of worldwide projects financed by the German government and other 
partners in developing countries including the World Bank, European Union or 
United Nations and other private organisations. In the case of the SNWC, the GTZ-
IS is paid commission to implement the GEF/UNDP component of the project 












Ingenieure is paid commission to implement the KfW funds in the project (Interview, 
Anonymous Informant, 4/8/2008). Apparently, JBG Gauff Ingenieure is also a 
German-based private company with its head office in Nuremberg (www.bau-
ingenieure-gesucht.de). Apart from commissions, the private companies enjoy tax 
exemptions which are part of bilateral cooperation agreements. Specifically, Article 1 
(1.3) of the German-Tanzania financial agreement for the SNWC states that „Taxes 
and other public charges will be borne by the recipient and import duties shall not be 
financed from the financial contribution’. Article 6 (6.1 (d) clarifies further that, „the 
recipient shall ensure the full financing of the project costs not paid from this financial 
contribution’…which includes import duties [my emphasis] (KfW and URT, 2006).  
 
Literature supports that schemes of profit through capital, market and labor are 
inherently unequal and have, for the past three centuries, been the fundamental 
force in reshaping the world‟s politics, economy and environment in favour of 
capitalist countries (Harvey, 2001, Ingham, 2008, Castree, 2008). Linked to the 
foregoing discussions about biodiversity protection and business connections is the 
fact that Germany remains among the top trading partners of Tanzania. This position 
was partly supported by the signing of a number of economic cooperation 
agreements immediately after Tanzania secured independence from Britain in 1961. 
These agreements include, for example, the trade and economic agreement of 1962, 
the shipping protocol of 1962, the investment protection accord of  1965 as well as 
the bilateral air service  agreement of 1981 (www.daressalam.diplo.de). Worthy of 
notice in this regard is the fact that Tanzania is currently a focal country of the 
German development cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa with an annual budget of 
around Pounds 45 million (Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, 2007). As 
would be expected, the level of development allows Tanzania to export mainly 
agricultural products to Germany while importing machines and chemical products 
(www.daressalam.diplo.de). Recently, the United Nations revealed further that the 
German companies see a considerable potential for expansion of trade relations with 
Tanzania following the expanded market size and access through East African 
Community which is expected to offer investors the second largest single market in 














...Tanzania has great potentials for business with German...the country is very rich 
in agricultural and tourism areas. The government of German has obligations to 
assist it in alleviating poverty because in a globalised world it is a mutual benefit 
for a poor country to develop. A well-off Tanzania will be of interest to any partner 
in business. Tanzania cannot buy much-sophisticated products from German if it 
remains poor so German will lose market to China… (Interview, Dorken 
19/2/2008).  
 
4.7 Conclusion  
Scale perspective as used in this chapter offers an alternative approach towards 
understanding the political and economic processes that influence decisions over 
natural resources management in Tanzania. The analysis of WMAs as a new scale 
challenges the view that WMAs are community-based projects. The chapter 
demonstrates that although WMAs operate at the local level, they are not local 
initiatives and their establishment is predominantly top-down. The chapter has 
demonstrated how different Western conservation and development agencies have 
been instrumental in the implementation of the reforms that subsequently managed 
to alter the scale and reverse power relations thus giving them powers over local 
natural resource management and utilization. As Bonner (1993) suggests, these 
actors and their money have as much influence on Africa today as the imperial 
colonial government would have. Scale narratives have confirmed that the existing 
tensions among different actors in the establishment of WMAs in Tanzania are a 
manifestation of struggles for power over local resources. Certainly, WMA scale is 
not an end to itself but a logical step towards the establishment of African heartlands, 
ecoregions and TFCAs in Tanzania. The chapter suggests, therefore, that the 
analysis of the impacts of these WMAs on local communities should consider the 
broader ecological and economic contexts at which they are established. So too is 
the analysis of the roles and interest of different actors who facilitate their 
establishment. Thus Chapter Five focuses on how WMAs in southeastern Tanzania 















CHAPTER FIVE: SCALE, BORDERS AND THE MAKING OF THE SELOUS-
NIASSA WILDLIFE CORRIDOR 
 
5.0 Introduction 
The main aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how conservation activities in 
southeastern Tanzania take the expression of the bioregional planning model 
discussed in the previous chapters. The chapter reveals that WMAs serve as both 
buffer zones to the SGR and are instrumental to the creation of the wildlife corridor 
(SNWC). In the context of the scale analysis, WMAs and the SNWC are used to 
scale-up the status of the SGR to a supra-national unit, namely, the Selous-Niassa 
TFCA. Whereas the establishment of WMAs was an attempt to scale-down 
government powers to the supra-village institutions, the TFCA process has 
necessitated the establishment of the supra-national unit currently operating as a 
Joint Cross-Border Environmental Conservation Group. From this understanding, the 
chapter argues that the process of creating the SNWC involves the re-organization 
of communal land and borders to facilitate the expansion of wildlife areas. Thus the 
Selous-Niassa TFCA is characterised by the introduction of new borders that 
promote the displacement and further division of cross-border communities. In 
attesting this, the chapter analyzes border narratives in southeastern Tanzania in 
relation to the ongoing establishment of the Selous-Niassa TFCA. The chapter 
challenges the TFCA idea of the removal of political borders by suggesting that the 
meaning of borders is selectively applied to support TFCAs.  
 
The chapter is organised in four main sections. The first section analyzes border 
issues based on local narratives and colonial plans and practices that led to the 
expansion of the SGR. The section ventilates that human-wildlife as well as the 
Tanzania-Mozambique borders in southeastern Tanzania are not „physically erected 
fences‟ but natural features (including rivers and mountains) which are not barriers to 
the movement of wildlife per se. Thus, borders for wildlife areas were and remain 
metaphors that are supported by the use of map representations, which emphasizes 
the separation between humans and wildlife. Based on this analysis, the section 
suggests that political borders that served colonial administrations did not interfere 
with the movement of people nor did they block wildlife migration. The second 
section makes the connections between colonial practices and contemporary scaling 












how, like in other TFCAs, the Selous-Niassa is linked to the projects of different 
institutions, thus making different actors to take part in the re-definition of borders. 
The section leads to the proposition that, as it was during the expansion of the SGR, 
the creation of the SNWC and the Selous-Niassa TFCA are based on the re-
organization of local communities and their land uses to create space for wildlife 
protection and control. Section three demonstrates the process of creating the 
SNWC and how that process has introduced new metaphors and new meanings of 
borders that prevent people from accessing resources in communal lands but giving 
wildlife unrestricted access to such lands. Hence, section four examines the TFCA 
idiom of borders and its practicality in southeastern Tanzania. The section asserts 
that rather than removing borders, the Selous-Niassa TFCA has brought new 
human-wildlife and institutional borders. 
 
5.1 Colonial borders in southeastern Tanzania  
 
As it has been implied earlier in this thesis, one of the authoritative arguments for 
TFCAs is their potential for re-establishing ecological links as well as re-uniting local 
communities that were allegedly divided by colonial borders. This section analyses 
border narratives in the southeastern Tanzania as the basis for understanding the 
meaning of borders as perceived by both the proponents of TFCAs and local 
communities. These narratives are, in turn, used to understand the impacts of the 
Selous-Niassa TFCA on cross-border communities in Chapter Six. In short, the 
section demonstrates that both wildlife and the Mozambique/Tanzania borders are 
not physically erected fences but natural features whose meanings are defined by 
humans. The removal of borders as advocated by the proponents of TFCAs has 
meant the removal of what is perceived as obstacles to wildlife migration between 
SGR and NGR. Apparently, these obstacles are local communities and their 
livelihood activities. Their removal has thus been a matter of urgency for the 
successful establishment of the SNWC. On their side, local communities perceive 
borders as a political strategy to prevent them from sharing community natural 
resources rather than restricting their movements locally and across the 













5.1.1 Borders for people 
Perceptions on borders as captured in local narratives support two types of views. 
Firstly, that borders existed in pre-colonial society but they neither were lines on 
maps nor were they physical barriers. They marked homesteads that identified 
dwellers of the area by their families and land of origin. These borders came about to 
define chiefdoms where disagreements occurred between migrants and indigenous 
groups. Mzee Swedi Sanangula, a historian in the regional museum in Songea town 
recounts that;  
 
...when tribes engaged in fighting that is when they started defining their territories 
using homesteads of the tribes and those they concurred...settlements and the 
people of a certain ethnic group defined Chiefdoms. Before trouble arises, people 
of different groups and chiefdoms could establish close settlements (Interview, 
10/9/2007). 
 
Historically, the district of Songea was among the first settlements and an indigenous 
home for Wandendeule. Between 1840s and 1862 Wangoni migrated into the area 
following Shaka's rise to power and the growth of the Zulu nation in South Africa 
(Popplewell and Harcus, 1938, Gulliver, 1974). The Wangoni fought for control over 
the region and its people thus some indigenous were colonised and integrated into 
the newly established Ngoni Kingdom while others fled to the neighbouring districts 
of Tunduru, Masasi and Liwale (Gulliver, 1974). Popplewell and Harcus (1938) 
suggest also that around 1900s groups of Wahyao, Wamakonde, Wangindo and 
Wamakua crossed Ruvuma river from Mozambique and settled along the river in 
Tunduru district. Although different ethnic groups had settled permanently across the 
river by the nineteenth century, each group had its history of migration. For example, 
Wahyao bear the title of Wahyao-Masininga, which is the name of a hill on the 
borders of Nyasaland (now Malawi) where they originally migrated. This group 
crossed Ruvuma river under their chiefs and they settled in the northwestern part of 
the river, which is the present Tunduru and Namtumbo districts. The following 
narrative supports this observation;  
 
...different groups who at times were involved in the ivory and slave trade between 
the hinterland and the Kilwa coastal market migrated into the Tunduru and 
Namtumbo from different areas since the seventeenth century. A group led by 












Others led by Satia came from Nampula in the eastern Mozambique and also 
settled in present day Masasi. These two groups are today Wamakua tribe. 
Wahyao came from Lichinga in Mozambique led by Kundenda, Mataka and 
Mtarika and settled in where is now Tunduru. Wandendeule (formally 
Wandonde/Wandamba) were indigenous groups but they also moved in the area 
from Ifakara valley (in Morogoro, Tanzania).  Wangoni is a group of Zulu people 
from the south who came through Zimbabwe; they crossed Limpopo and Zambezi 
rivers to the northern Mozambique and later crossed Ruvuma and settled in the 
marshlands now called Songea in Tanzania (Interview, Sanangula, 5/9/2007).  
 
Stories of the arrival of different groups in southeastern Tanzania are in records and 
few people remain to narrate them. For example, Sheikhe Mohammed Ilali  Mikonga 
of Msisima village tells his personal story of arrival in the area; 
 
...a recent history is Mozambique but my ancestors came from Nyasaland where 
they fled a family clash…they settled in Mozambique for a long time until  the 
Portuguese came and caused many problems. During this time, ivory and slave 
trade were the main ways of acquiring wealth; we exchanged ivory for bullets, 
guns and Marekani12 with Arabs along the coast. Due to problems with the 
Portuguese, my father’s friend called Mataka moved with some people and settled 
in Tunduru. Later my father (K wizombe) sent a messenger with two ivories to the 
chief of Ndonde (now Songea) to request for a place to stay...We then moved 
from Mozambique and settled in Tanganyika along the Lukimwa river in 1933 
when I was six years old (Interview, 8/11/2007). 
   
There are two elements of the above stories that seem to have particular relevance 
to the border narratives of the area. Firstly, it is implied in the narratives that migrant 
groups left relatives behind and they maintained their relationships based on the 
push factors that ranged from ethnic clashes to trade and recently as a result of 
colonial oppression. Therefore, the present southern Tanzania and northern 
Mozambique functioned as one unit before colonialism. Secondly, it is implied 
throughout the memory and understanding of the narrators that different ethnic 
groups moved and settled where they are today because there were no borders to 
restrict their movements; rivers and valleys were crossed not as borders but as part 
of the landscape.  
 
The second type of narrative relates to the famous perception that African borders 
are colonial creations that gradually weakened traditional institutions and interactions  
(see Asiwaju, 1985). Local narratives do not dismiss this claim but they do challenge 
                                                 












the view that colonial borders disrupted their social relations. It is implied that, rather 
than borders per se, colonial policies that continue to influence cultural practices 
such as land administration are responsible for the present ethnic divisions. 
Mamdani has consistently used this argument to explain ethnic violence in rural 
areas in Africa and the recent conflict in Darfur (Mamdani, 2009, Mamdani, 1996). As 
such, the Portugal and German colonial administrations signed the declaration on 30 
December 1886 to use the course of Ruvuma from its mouth westwards as an 
international border to separate the two colonies (Thomas, 1951). For local 
communities, the border implied that those who remained in Mozambique were 
officially Mozambicans and those who had crossed the river assumed a Tanzanian 
identity even though they belonged to the same ethnic group. As observed 
elsewhere, official borders do not correspond with local realities (Griffiths, 1986). As 
a result, the border status assigned to the Ruvuma and new nationalities that 
emerged from it did not fundamentally change the perception of the river by the 
border communities. For many, the international border remains a natural feature 
that predates colonialism and, as it was, is seldom an obstacle for people‟s 
movements. However, community members acknowledge that colonial policies and 
laws that defined land administration in the two countries restrained the level of 
cultural interaction among the border communities (Interview, Sanangula, 5/9/2007).  
 
Literature supports further that even during colonial administration the movement of 
people between Niassa and Cabo Delgado hinterlands to Tanzania continued and it 
was neither officially approved nor viewed as undesirable thus making it a 
spontaneous international migration zone (Alpers, 1984, Redmond, 1975). In 1922, 
for example, a significant number of Wamakua, Wayao and Wamakonde from 
Mozambique were recorded in Tanzania (Alpers, 1984). Most recently, InWent and 
GTZ (2007) established that these cross-border movements continue to date and 
communities have maintained good ties by participating in different social and 
economic activities such as weddings, initiations and funerals to mention a few. In 
fact, Village Councils on the Tanzanian side have powers to issue a written permit as 
a formal procedure for crossing the border; passport and visas are not a requirement 
for vi llagers intending to visit their relatives. Thus the popular perception that colonial 












realities in southeastern Tanzania. As a group of Matepwende vi llagers affirms in the 
clip below, the international border is not their main problem;  
 
...it depends on the water level...we cross freely during the dry season because 
the water level is low. It is normal to visit relatives and even intermarry…we still 
speak Kihyao…It is only yesterday that Mhyao from Mozambique married our 
sister in this village. We did not need a passport to go and celebrate the 
wedding...so really the border is not an issue for us unless one needs to go further 
in the country for activities other than socialisation… (Group Discussion, 
7/11/2007). 
 
Conceptually, colonial borders were tools for control over land and other natural 
resources, and policies focussed on disrupting traditional land ownership and social 
organisations while creating land use patterns that favoured colonial plans. In 
Tanzania, competition between the German administration and local communities 
resulted in the use of force to demarcate and re-arrange native lands thus 
weakening the powers of traditional institutions over land (Monson, 1998). This is to 
say that German colonial administration re-arranged local borders and created new 
ones. Precisely, the colonial administration divided the country into twenty two large 
districts in 1890 (Chachage, 1988). District administrative borders did not consider 
ethnicity hence ethnic groups were divided and scattered in more than one district 
(Popplewell and Harcus, 1938). Wahyao, for instance, were divided and today are 
found in Tunduru and Songea districts so is Wamakua in Masasi and Liwale districts. 
This way, German administration disrupted traditional settlements and community 
organisations. Resistance to this forced rule in turn resulted in the organisation of 
native alliance that broke into Maji Maji rebellion in 1905 throughout southern 
Tanzania.  
 
When the British took over the colony in 1920 the implementation of indirect rule saw 
the demarcation of larger provinces where chiefdoms within them were used as 
administrative units. Native Authorities were created in the same year and their 
borders more or less overlapped with those of the districts created by German 
administration (Neumann, 2001, Chachage, 1988). However, in place of traditional 
chiefs, British rule introduced new tax administrators called Liwali and Jumbe and 
native authorities became focal points for service delivery; schools, clinics, judiciary, 












settlements (www.lindi-mtwara-regions.com). Parallel to this, the British government 
launched a plan to concentrate native settlements based on medical reports that 
established the need to separate people from wildlife to control the spread of tsetse 
and sleeping sickness epidemic (Hoppe, 1997, Kjekshus, 1996). This plan involved 
evacuation of people from ‘tsetse labelled areas’ into new settlements (Neumann, 
2001).  
 
By 1927, medical reports had officially established that humans were the vertebrate 
host for tsetse and the spread of sleeping sickness was spread to humans by human 
beings. This doctrine informed colonial policies for a decade that followed. In 1940s, 
however, other medical reports suggested that wild animals were the permanent  
reservoirs of flies. Overall, these medical reports became scientific evidence for 
separating humans from wild animals and depopulation became a country-wide 
policy that facilitated the establishment of permanent settlements throughout the 
1930s and 1940s (Kjekshus, 1996). Literature supports also that several game 
reserves were established between 1920s and 1940s which is around the same time 
that settlement centres were established. For example, Gombe Stream Game 
Sanctuary in Kigoma and Mbulu Game Reserve were established in 1920, Dodoma 
Game Reserve followed in l930 (Chachage, 1988). Other game sanctuaries were 
gazetted in districts such as Mpanda (1931), Manyoni (1931) and Liwale (1940). As 
the section below will demonstrate, game sanctuaries in Liwale contributed to the 
expansion of the SGR. Until the 1960s, settlement patterns in the country had taken 
clearly a desirable condition that supported the separation of wildlife and people and 
the expansion of protected areas (Kjekshus, 1996). I argue on the basis of this trend 
that the new administrative units and borders were a plan carried out at the scale of 
the territorial state and entailed a fundamental reordering of space. The new order 
divided and contained human populations, changed their interaction with nature and 
ultimately produced new landscapes for wildlife (Neumann, 2001, Chachage, 1988).  
 
5.1.2 Wildlife and borders 
It goes virtually unacknowledged that most of the land that had once been 
settlements and farms in southeastern Tanzania was depopulated to establish the 












Hingston, (1931: 412) proposed that „the land in Selous is waste without possibility of 
settlements; it holds only a scanty native population‟. Popplewell and Harcus, (1938: 
36) suggested also that the area around Tunduru is „sparsely populated by a poor 
type of Bantu who eke out a precarious existence mainly by fishing and gathering‟. 
Most recently, Baldus (2006: 1) described the area around the SGR as „once been 
home to small clans and lineage groups, which lived an isolated life without any 
larger tribal structures and coherence and their settlements were separated by 
considerable stretches of uninhabited bush’. These descriptions ignore the fact that 
local communities never reoccupied areas that were heavily cultivated in the late 
nineteenth century, most of which were labelled as major sleeping-sickness areas. 
Conceptually, the politics around relocations for wildlife protection have roots from 
colonial policies and they remain the grounds on which people are removed for the 
establishment of TFCAs today. As Hingston (1931) advised, the use of land by 
African communities was to be restricted for the interest of wildlife but the later would 
not be limited by fences. In proposing the model of protected areas for British East 
Africa, Hingston 1931: 419 wrote that;   
 
It is not intended that game reserves and national parks should be limited by any 
kind of fencing. The natural increase within the park area should find a free 
overflow across the boundary. Once over the boundary the animals can be shot in 
accordance with the game regulations of the country...Time will come when these 
sanctuaries may provide through overflow across their boundaries the one 
remaining resort for the sportsman. This has happened in the Kruger National 
Park...a buffer area has been formed along the border consisting either of 
unoccupied land or of farms sold or let to sportsmen...the park authorities are 
relieved of the complaints which would occur if settlement or cultivation were on 
the boundaries of the park. 
 
The abovementioned proposal was the basis for the adoption of metaphoric borders 
that were presented on maps and enforced by laws for all protected areas in 
Tanzania. Although these metaphors do not divide ecological systems per se, they 
do support the broad rationales for establishing TFCAs. As the previous chapters 
established, relocations in and around the present reserve resulted in the 
displacement of thousands of indigenous people and loss of their ancestral land 
which was left open for wildlife (Kjekshus, 1996, Matzke, 1976, Neumann, 1998). At 
first, the German imperial governor's office laid down the size (and not the borders) 












implication every hunting reserve was to measure approximately 1,000 km² (Baldus, 
2006b). Thus the governor declared two hunting reserves in the northern areas of 
the present SGR called Kisaki and Muhoro amounting into 2000 km² (Baldus, 2006b, 
Kibonde, 2006). As Figure 5.1 indicates, the two reserves were merged and different 
names were used; Rufiji, Mohoro or Kisaki hunting reserve. These reserves were to 
be extended over several decades to assume the present borders of the SGR. As 
such, the British colonial government inherited the responsibility for wildlife protection 
consolidated the two hunting reserves to form the Selous game sanctuary in 1922 
(Matzke, 1976). Figure 5.1 shows that the reserve was expanded in 1928 towards 
northeast to include an area of about 6,500 km2 in Mahenge. Matzke (1976) reports 
further that during this time (i.e. 1928); elephant population was being contained in 
the reserve only due to the hunting pressure in the northern and eastern areas. The 
northern and eastern areas had already been declared unfit for cultivation and since 
it was uninhibited, a proposal was made to expand the boundaries of the reserve to 
provide more room for elephants. The proposal became a law in 1931 and, as Figure 
5.1 suggests, the reserve was thereafter expanded and new others were gazetted in 
Liwale district, namely, Matandu and Mtetesi reserves.  
 
As Chapter Three demonstrated, the British government embarked on crop 
protection against wildlife throughout the 1930s in response to food shortages 
following the aftermath of the Second World War. Elephant control schemes in the 
areas neighbouring SGR such as the coastal regions of Kilwa and the Ruvuma river 
pushed excessive number of elephants towards the southern hinterlands of Liwale, 
Tunduru and Songea districts (Neumann, 2001, Matzke, 1976). As part of crop 
protection measures the Mtetesi reserve in the southern areas was eliminated in 
1935 and Matandu reserve was expanded in 1936 to accommodate elephants from 
the south. During this time indigenous settlements were largely abandoned 
voluntarily following excessive elephant population and crop damages around the 












Figure 5.1: The creation and expansion of the SGR 
 
Source: Modified from Matzke, (1976: 42-48) 
 
By the early 1940s the game department had proposed that the abandoned areas be 
included in the SGR and others be gazetted as Game Controlled Areas (GCAs). This 












eliminate sleeping sickness. In 1943 settlement in Madaba and Luwegu rivers near 
Mahenge were declared sleeping sickness zones and villages were shortly 
evacuated (TNR, 1947). Likewise, people from the south of SGR in Liwale and 
Tunduru districts were moved towards Songea while others in the east and 
southeast were moved to a settlement in Njino (TNR, 1947, Matzke, 1976). By 1947, 
the evacuation plan had created a huge section of uninhabited area along 
Mbarang‟andu river, which was then declared part of the game reserve to avoid  the 
re-establishment of settlements (see Figure 5.1). Further, in 1951, the Matandu 
reserve was re-opened for human settlement in exchange for other suitable areas for 
wildlife. This plan aimed at consolidating contiguous units in the southeast into one 
reserve. Indeed, Figure 5.1 supports that the plan added large areas of miombo 
woodlands around Mbarang‟andu and Luwegu river valleys and the area has since 
then been described as the best game areas in the present SGR (Baldus, 2006, 
Kibonde, 2006). Other areas such as Lungonya river were added into the reserve in 
1960 shortly before independence.  
 
The post-colonial government inherited most of the colonial game policies and the 
SGR became an important source of foreign currency through hunting tourism. Thus, 
wildlife protection became part of the national economic policies. Further expansions 
of the reserve were envisaged to cater for large wildlife movements and the 
government endorsed the expansion plan in 1967. In addition, the villagisation 
program of 1974 supported the elimination of more scattered settlements. Like 
colonial policies, villagisation aimed at consolidating villages as one of the 
government strategies to achieve rural development set out in the Arusha 
Declaration. Villages were to become focal points to facilitate social service delivery 
and the administration of other government development plans. Notwithstanding 
other intensions of villagisation, the program supported the creation of contiguous 
uninhabited lands and a settlement pattern that provided the free overflow of wildlife. 
After one year of the program, the SGR was expanded towards almost all the 














5.2 Contemporary borders, development projects and transfrontier plans 
Even though the official borders for the SGR were adopted in 1975, the bioregional 
planning activities that focus on creating buffer zones and wildlife corridors are 
facilitated by the same conduct of pushing local communities further afield to create 
more areas for wildlife beyond the reserve borders. Details of how different actors 
converge to redefine borders to facilitate the establishment of buffer zones and the 
SNWC in the southern section of the SGR are provided later in this chapter. For the 
moment, I demonstrate that the SNWC is also linked to other development projects, 
leading to increasing the density of activities and network of actors in the corridor 
and its related Selous-Niassa TFCA. Essentially, the link between TFCAs and other 
development projects is not unique to Tanzania. Southern Africa provides ample 
examples of such links. The Open Africa Project is one of the development initiatives 
whose activities are aligned to the TFCAs. Open Africa establishes tourism routes 
and assists with the planning of these routes as a way of facilitating the use of 
African natural and cultural resources for economic development. The founding 
member and the Director of Open Africa, Noel De Villiers, acknowledged in an 
interview that these tourism routes have been used to promote cross-border 
conservation;  
 
…Open Africa seeks to link African splendid on a continuum network of tourism 
routes across the continent from Cape to Cairo as the best option to get African 
natural beauty and cultural values into the global market… but the success of this 
project will, ideally, depend on the conservation of cultural and natural resources 
in these tourism routes. Who buys into this vision is a complex issue, which 
explains diversity in programs that focus on the same vision…Anton Rupert was 
inspired by this vision and founded the Peace Parks Foundation to create trans-
boundary parks... (Interview, De Villiers, 22/6/2007).  
 
Apart from the projects of individual organizations, the link between tourism 
development and TFCAs has a regional institutional support from SADC. As such, 
SADC members signed, among others, the Charter of the Regional Tourism 
Organization of Southern Africa (RETOSA) in 1997, the Protocol on the 
Development of Tourism in 1998 and the Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law 
Enforcement in 2000 (Buzzard, 2001). This means that SADC not only promotes 
TFCAs as a conservation strategy but also for regional tourism development. 












tourism routes with potential and existing TFCAs in order to promote tourism at the 
regional level. The main approach for implementing this plan has been the use of 
road infrastructure which has supported the claim that TFCAs relate closely to the 
Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) (Wolmer, 2003a). The SDI is the brainchild of 
the South African government which was launched around the same time with 
TFCAs in the mid 1990s to attract export-led investments within the country and with 
its neighbours (Maleke, 2003). The SDI has particular emphasis on the 
establishment of development corridors to promote regional investments in tourism 
by encouraging public–private partnerships (Rogerson, 2001, Wolmer, 2003a, 
Draper et al., 2004, Smith, 2003). Like TFCAs, the SDI program has been integrated 
into regional development initiatives thus getting endorsement as an integral part of 
SADC (www.sadc-dfrc.org/). Currently, SDIs are a legitimate intervention to achieve 
regional economic integration and to attract cross-border investments (Zukula, 2003, 
Smith, 2003, Maleke, 2003, www.sadc-dfrc.org/, Katerere et al., 2001). The Maputo 
Development Corridor (MDC) became the first celebrated cross-border link between 
the Republic of South Africa and Mozambique (Smith, 2003).  
 
Although not all TFCAs are found in SDIs, there is a relationship which is embedded 
on their potential to expand the size of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) through 
increased flow of tourists, the building of new infrastructure, and the creation of 
complementary services (African Development Bank (AfDB), 2008). The Lubombo 
Transfrontier Conservation and Resource Area is, for example, part of the MDC and 
the two are connected to the GLTFP (Ramutsindela, 2007, Wolmer, 2003a). The 
Kavango-Zambezi TFCA where the Okavango-Upper Zambezi International Tourism 
Initiative (OUZIT) operates is also part of the Zambezi Valley SDI (Katerere et al., 
2001, Hanks, 2006, Hall-Martin and Modise, 2002, Smith, 2003). Alongside these 
initiatives, the northern Mozambique and southeastern Tanzania (where the Selous-
Niassa TFCA is located) is part of the SDI linked by the Mtwara Development 
Corridor (MtDC). In fact, this study establishes that the Selous-Niassa TFCA is 
facilitated within the regional framework of the SDI thus allowing the MtDC to set the 
scene for the transfrontier plans.  
 
The agreement for the implementation of the MtDC was signed in 2004 while the 












established under a multilateral Agreement signed by the Heads of State of Malawi, 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia at Lilongwe on 15 December 2004 (Graham, 
2005, Mkapa, 2004). The MtDC aims at opening up socio-economic links between 
southern Tanzania and Northern Mozambique, northern and central Malawi as well 
as eastern and northern Zambia. At the regional level, the MtDC is among the fifteen 
SDIs currently implemented within the SADC. Indeed, the MtDC is identified as one 
of the flagship projects for the SADC-Development Finance Resource Centre‟s 
(DFRC) Program (www.sadc-dfrc.org/). The World Bank funds and supervises the 
project through SADC-DFRC. As confirmed in an interview with the project technical 
advisor in Tanzania, Dr. P.M  Maheshwary, the Tanzania National Development 
Cooperation (NDC) monitors the project at the local level (Interview, 20/5/2006). The 
MtDC is expected to create an economic growth zone of trans-border trade and 
investment, linking the four countries through a transport corridor to be served by the 
seaport of Mtwara on the Indian Ocean as the gateway for international trade (Smith, 
2003, Graham, 2005). Accordingly, the GTZ and the South African Ministry of 
Industry and Trade facilitated the study in 2005, which acknowledged that tourism is 
an important business sector in the MtDC. As shown in Figure 5.2 the Selous-Niassa 
TFCA is a tourism hub and an anchor project for the MtDC (Graham, 2005). 
 
The conceptual plan for the MtDC indicates that the development of tourism through 
the establishment of the Selous-Niassa TFCA alongside the expansion and 
modernization of the Mtwara port will facilitate business connections between 
Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia and the region at large. Alongside these 
projects are also; the development of mining, construction of roads, bridges and 
heavy capacity ferries as well as oil pipeline and electricity networks across the 
borders (Simbakalila, 2002, Smith, 2003, Graham, 2005). At the national level, the 
MtDC activities are commensurate with the Tanzania tourism plans for the 
development of the Southern Tourism Circuit (STC). As such, the tourism master 
plan for 2002 envisages the development of the STC through the establishment of 
wild adventure trails (that includes the SGR and the surrounding protected areas) 
and linking these trails with coastal heritage trails (which are in the Mnazi Bay-












thus adopted these plans as stimulants for investments in the provision of hotel 
facilities, road networks and air transport (Simbakalila, 2002, Graham, 2005). 
  
Figure 5.2: The position of the Selous-Niassa TFCA in the MtDC project 
 
Source: Graham, (2005: 77) 
 
On 29 March 2007 the Regional Administrations and Local Governments of Mtwara 
and Ruvuma of Tanzania and the Provincial Governments of Cabo Delgado and 
Niassa of Mozambique signed a MoU on cross-border cooperation to promote 
regional economic growth, development, the traditions of good neighbourliness and 
a peaceful environment (www.selous-niassa-corridor.org/trans-frontier-cons.html, 
MoU, 2007). In practice, the two parties reinforced their commitment to promote the 
MtDC and, by implication, the Selous-Niassa TFCA. One observation is made on the 
MoU which is important to the analysis of scale in this thesis; that the MoU was 












MoU the two sub-national governments are bound to support both the MtDC and the 
Selous-Niassa TFCA. This translates that central organs of the state are being 
jumped while at the same time required to support project plans at all levels. In the 
context of TFCAs, the jumping/or remote involvement of central institutions have 
been understood as a strategy for holding national governments responsible for, 
among others, mishaps of TFCA process and silencing potential community 
resistance (Ramutsindela, 2007). 
 
Article 1 of the said MoU stipulates the urgent need for the establishment of Joint 
Working Groups in the areas of environment, conservation and tourism as well as 
economy, security and public administration. The environment, conservation and 
tourism issues include the „management of transfrontier natural resources‟.  
According to section 2.3 (ii) and annex 1:6 of the MoU, „the inland areas of Selous 
and Niassa Game Reserves will be managed as a vast new transfrontier 
conservation area’. Notably, the two parties agreed on the establishment of a „Joint 
Environment and Conservation Working Group’, which will oversee the development 
of the TFCA. The proceeding of the workshop which was held on 20 January 2007 in 
Veta, Mtwara (Tanzania) confirms the view that the Joint Environment and 
Conservation Working Group is mainly formed by a few representatives of local 
authorities, consultants and donors who are essentially the proponent of the Selous-
Niassa TFCA (InWent and GTZ, 2007). Echoing my earlier observations about scale 
jumping, the choice of working groups to oversee the establishment of the TFCA 
suggests that neither the state governments nor the local authorities that sig ned the 
MoU are entrusted with the management and functioning of the TFCA. Instead, the 
„working group’ is empowered to take charge of the TFCA process. In the overall 
context of this study, this confirms that the rescaling and border redefinition 
processes in southeastern Tanzania has facilitated the creation of space and new 
institutions which raises pertinent questions on the ownership of TFCAs, their 
impacts and, in a broad sense, national sovereignty.  
 
5.3 Actors and their roles in the redefinition of borders and the creation of 
the SNWC  
As Chapter Four demonstrates, different actors and their networks in Tanzania 












resulted in the establishment of WMAs as an important local scale for the 
implementation of bioregional projects of different conservation organisations. 
Proceeding from this view, this study identifies the German government (through its 
various implementing agencies such as GTZ/GTZ-IS, InWent, CIM and the KfW) as 
the main actor in using WMAs to create the corridor that is linked to the Selous-
Niassa TFCA. It should be emphasized that these institutions are not NGOs but 
federal agencies that receive funds directly from the German government. This 
observation coupled with the history of the German occupation of the southeastern 
Tanzania and the establishment of the SGR as the first protected area in the country 
are the basis for the assertion that the German government maintains interest in 
southeastern Tanzania and that its continued support has facilitated processes that 
have seen the overall rescaling of the government powers over local natural 
resources. I demonstrate further how other actors are networked to implement 
activities that ensure the expansion of the SGR and the subsequent establishment of 
the Selous-Niassa TFCA.  
 
The work of the GTZ/SCP as discussed earlier in this thesis formalised the view that 
the wildlife corridor between Selous and Niassa Game Reserves was important for 
the establishment of a vast cross-border protected area (Siege and Baldus, 2000, 
Hoebart, 2004). This study asserts that the GTZ/SCP which established buffer zone 
areas around the SGR was the first phase of the implementation of the envisaged 
cross-border protected area. Thus, the end of the GTZ/SCP was the beginning of the 
wildlife corridor project. As figure 5.3 indicates, buffer zones are central to the 
expansion of wildlife areas beyond the SGR borders and have reduced land 
available for other uses in the neighbouring villages and districts. Although it remains 
officially unacknowledged, changes in the size of areas available for wildlife have 
meant superimposition of wildlife land use over vi llages and district administrative 
borders. In practice, new wildlife areas in the vi llages are a form of land control and it 
remains the case hitherto that they are practically more commanding since they 












Figure 5.3: Buffer zone projects around SGR 
 
Source: Adopted from GTZ (1998: 1) 
 
Since the SNWC project is an important phase of the TFCA, different actors have 
come in to redefine borders to ensure the creation of the wildlife corridor in the 
southern section of the SGR in Tunduru and Namtumbo districts, which borders the 
NGR in Mozambique. The summary of the main actors and their roles in the creation 
of the SNWC as provided in Table 5.1 guides the analysis of the interests of different 












through the GTZ/SCP were instrumental in the conceptualization and design of the 
SNWC. Since the government of Tanzania is the authority with explicit mandate over 
land and wildlife in the SNWC area, the Wildlife Division and Districts Councils are 
the project executing agencies. As it has been discussed earlier in Chapter Four, the 
Wildlife Division plays a greater role in creating the policy environment for the 
implementation of the project. The Division has also been central to the negotiations 
between donors, private investors and local communities, the area that has been 
targeted by the allegations of inefficiency, bureaucracy and corruption (Baldus et al., 
2004, Brockington, 2003, Kideghesho, 2008a). At the village level, however, Village 
Councils in whose land the SNWC project is implemented should have been the 
government representatives in executing the project but their roles are taken over by 
the newly established CBOs that represent WMA governments. This confirms the 
argument about the scaling-up of local natural resources governance and that the 
WMAs are a preferred scale for the implementation of the SNWC project.  
 
Table 5.1 indicates further that different German government agencies are actively 
involved in financing and, at the same time, operate as consulting agencies paid to 
supply facilities, raise funds from other sources, engage in cross-border dialogue 
and in providing technical expertise for the SNWC and beyond13. In general, 
Germany is closely linked to many key actors in TFCAs, including Anton Rupert , one 
of the strongest advocates for and financier of TFCAs in Africa (Ramutsindela, 
2007). Further details of Rupert‟s work through the PPF and its links to Germany are  
well documented (see Dommisse and Esterhuyse, 2005, Ramutsindela, 2007) To 
start with, the GTZ led the research in 2003 that became instrumental in designing 
and securing funds for the development of the corridor (GEF/UNDP, 2004, Graham, 
2005).  
                                                 
13 It is important to note that the involvement of the German government in Tanzania is not only in wildlife protection but also in 
other development cooperation areas such as in education, health and w ater supply (for more details of this see 












Table 5.1: The main actors in the establishment of the SNWC  
Name of the 
Actor 










Design and conceptualization of the SNWC 
 
KfW 
Funding for the establishment of WMAs and 
infrastructure development in the SNWC  
InWent Local trainings and cross border dialogue  
CIM Placement of technical experts and top-up of 
their local salaries  
GTZ-IS Implementing agency/consultant for the 
GEF/UNDP funds for the SNWC 
GEF/UNDP Donor Funding for the establishment of WMAs and 








Consulting agencies  The coordination and implementation of the KfW 
fund–land use planning and border demarcation 
for WMAs, infrastructure development 




of Tanzania  




Policy support and rule enforcement for the 
establishment of WMAs and the SNWC 
 
External experts placed by GTZ and CIM to facilitate the SNWC14 
Time Name Position  
1987/1988 Rolf Baldus GTZ/SCP Program Coordinator 
David Kaggi GTZ/SCP Rural Development Officer 
Hubert Krischke GTZ/SCP Community Wildlife Advisor 
1993 Baldus leaves Tanzania - 
1993 David Kaggi replaces 
Baldus  
GTZ/SCP Program Coordinator 
1996 Krischke leaves Tanzania - 
1996 Rudolf Hahn replaces 
Krischke 
GTZ/SCP Community Wildlife Advisor  
1998 Baldus returns to Tanzania Community Wildlife Management (CWM) 
National Advisor (New post) 
2002 Hahn leaves Tanzania - 
2005 Baldus leaves Tanzania - 
2005 Hahn returns to Tanzania SNWC Technical Advisor 
 
                                                 












Precisely, the GEF offered USD 1 million on 27 April 2004 for the implementation of 
the SNWC project (GEF/UNDP, 2004, Schuerholz and Bossen, 2005). Since the 
project cost was estimated at USD 2 million, the GTZ/SCP committed about USD 0.5 
million (GTZ, 2003a) while the Institute for Zoo Biology and Wildlife Berline (IZW 15) 
committed USD 0.34 million (GEF/UNDP, 2004, www.tz.undp.org). The government 
of Tanzania committed USD 1.6 million, the amount to be paid in kind through 
personnel time in two districts of Namtumbo and Tunduru (URT, 2003a). It is 
envisaged that by the end of the project in 2010, about 15,000 hectares of land will 
be protected as WMAs in village lands that lie between SGR and NGR (GEF/UNDP, 
2004). 
 
In connection with the above, the German government recently provided separate 
financial support of about Euro 5 million for the „protection ’ of the SNWC (KfW, 
2006). The financial agreement was signed between the German Development Bank 
(KfW) and the government of Tanzania on 10 March 2006, with the later required to 
contribute Euro 1.5 in kind (KfW, 2006, KfW and URT, 2006). Like other agencies, 
the KfW aims to support the establishment of WMAs in order to create  the SNWC 
(Schuerholz and Bossen, 2005). As discussed in Chapter Four, the KfW funding 
facilitates training on land ownership, land use planning and border demarcations as 
part of creating WMAs and scaling-up the functions of village governments over 
natural resources (GTZ-IS, 2007). Other important activities under the KfW fund 
include infrastructure development and the facilitation of transfrontier collaboration 
between Tanzania and Mozambique (Begg et al., 2007, Bloesch and Mbago, 2006, 
KfW, 2006). The cross-border dialogue is facilitated by yet another German 
government agency InWent (GTZ and InWent, 2005). Apparently, InWent had in 
1999 started to assist policy development and capacity building targeting the  
southern and eastern Africa region which was then to encompass Tanzania and 
Mozambique (InWent, 2007b). Admittedly, InWent launched the capacity building 
program, called Trans-boundary and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources 
(TRANSNET) in 2005 to facilitate cross-border dialogue in the SADC and East 
African Community (EAC) regions (InWent, 2007b, www.wildlife-
baldus.com/selous_niassa.htm/). As a dialogue and training program TRANSNET 
                                                 












assists institutions in the two regions to foster regional cooperation in the 
management of shared ecosystems (Earle and Malzbender, 2007). Within Tanzania, 
InWent and GTZ jointly supports the College of African Wildlife Management as the 
regional convener for cross-border dialogues (www.selous-niassa-corridor.org/gtz-
inwent-dialogue). Through this network InWent continues to faci litate transfrontier 
collaboration as part of the SNWC project (InWent and GTZ, 2007).  
 
Due to the multiplicity of actors, the SNWC project activities are coordinated to 
ensure consistency in approaches, overall objectives and specific targets and goals, 
namely, the creation of the SNWC across local and international borders (KfW, 
2006). Effectively, the joint committee was agreed upon and signed on 17 November 
2006 between the Wildlife Division, the GEF/UNDP and the German Development 
Co-operation to coordinate funds and project activities (KfW, 2006). It is not 
surprising, therefore, that former GTZ/SCP experts play key roles in streamlining 
different project activities today. Specifically, Mr Rudolf Hahn - formerly placed by the 
German Centre for International Migration (CIM) as the GTZ/SCP expert - serves as 
the Technical Advisor and a consultant for SNWC. Unlike in the former project, Hahn 
is currently placed by the GTZ-International Services, the business arm of the GTZ 
which is currently contracted as an implementing agency for the GEF/UNDP fund for 
the SNWC project (Interview, Dorken, 19/2/2008). Against this background, the 
expansion of wildlife areas and the scaling-down and scaling-up of government 
regulatory functions over natural resources in southeastern Tanzania remains the 
brainchild of the German government. These rescaling processes are the force 
behind the successful creation of WMAs as a local scale which supports the 
establishment of the Selous-Niassa TFCA. Whereas WMAs are managed by supra-
village institutions, the Selous-Niassa TFCA is a supra-national scale supported by 
the regional body (i.e. SADC). Ramutsindela (2007) observes, however, that the 
tendency of jumping the state in the establishment of TFCAs leaves state 
governments and local communities with no direct role to play in the management 
and utilization of TFCAs.   
 
The foregoing discussion suggests also that the German government has been 
among the major partners of the PPF in the development of TFCAs in southern and 












regional platform in SADC which is used as a launch pad for TFCAs in southern 
Africa in which Tanzania retains membership (Ramutsindela, 2007). Through this 
platform, the PPF identified three transfrontier zones in SADC within which about 
twenty two TFCAs are envisaged (Hall-Martin and Modise, 2002). Among these 
zones are the Lake Malawi/Nyasa/Niassa ecosystem which transcends the borders 
of Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique. There are at least five individual TFCA 
projects planned in the Lake Malawi/Nyasa/Niassa zone, one of which is the Selous-
Niassa TFCA16. As in Tanzania, the German government through KfW facilitated the 
realignment of borders that culminated in the establishment of the Limpopo National 
Park (LNP) in 2001 in Mozambique and the development of the wildlife corridor 
between the LNP and the Banhine National Park (BNP), which were critical steps 
towards the creation of the Great Limpopo TFP (GLTFP). Specifically, the KfW 
granted 12 million Euros through the SADC secretariat and the PPF in 2001 
(www.limpopopn.gov.mz). So too, InWent facilitated the resettlement of about 6,500 
inhabitants of the LNP in Shingwedzi River Basin to give way for the GLTFP 
(www.limpopopn.gov.mz, Spierenburg et al., 2008, Spenceley, 2006, Ferreira, 2006) . 
 
5.4 Borders and the Selous-Niassa TFCA  
Practices in Tunduru and Namtumbo districts represent a scenario where particular 
types of borders are removed while others are erected. Figure 5.4 demonstrates how 
the SNWC is formed by the merger of five WMAs, which are literally village lands. As 
implied in the previous chapters, however, the CBOs, which are responsible for the 
management of individual WMAs, have powers to decide on the amalgamation of 
WMAs. The point worth stressing here is that once WMAs are merged to create a 
single unit, village borders that transcend them (which are mostly mountains, valleys 
and rivers) cease to function and new borders re-define the new space. Figure 5.4 
illustrates that WMAs are merged precisely on the border between the Namtumbo 
and Tunduru districts thereby forming the SNWC that transcends the district border. 
In the same ways that village borders cease to function, the district border is silenced 
to allow the re-definition of new borders for the wildlife corridor. Conceptually, local 
land uses and administrative borders are removed, only to be followed immediately 
by the drawing of new borders that re-define wildlife areas in the vi llages. The wildlife 
                                                 












corridor represents a supra-district space whose ownership and use can no longer 
be determined by Village or District Councils. The consequences of the wildlife 
corridor on local residents are discussed in Chapter Six. 
 
There is a perception that wildlife borders are political strategies that aim to restrict 
the use of natural resources by the local communities. For example, Mzee Cosmas 
implied that all borders are political and politics are for people and not animals;  
 
…there have never been borders to stop elephants from moving from one forest 
to another when they needed to, they do not understand these village or district 
borders and it doesn’t matter for them if they were Mozambicans or Tanzanians. 
Animals are many in these farms as we speak, they left their areas and no one 
punishes them for trespassing… it is surprising that when they come to our farms 
and destroy crops we are not allowed to kill them…To be sure, our muzzle loaders 
for scaring them were confiscated in 2006. Therefore, it is us who are restricted to 
go there… (Interview, 5/11/2007)  
 
Figure 5.4: The structural design for the SNWC 
 
 













The perception that wildlife borders are a political strategy is supported by the survey 
data, which reveals that even though the study villages are within the SNWC area, 
only 54% of respondents acknowledge knowing the existence of wildlife migration 
between Selous and Niassa Game Reserves. When these respondents were asked 
whether these routes have changed, about 55% did not know while 34% of them 
said the routes remain the same since they knew them. A closely related question 
asked was whether villagers knew the SNWC project and the actual borders of the 
corridor. Nearly 90% of respondents knew about the project but 70% said they did 
not know the borders of the corridor. These responses reflect the difference in border 
perceptions and use between the local communities and the proponents of the 
Selous-Niassa TFCA. As other sources of data support, WMAs that create the 
SNWC are in place and yet most villagers do not know the borders of the corridor. 
WMAs are set aside for wildlife but animals are obviously in farms and residential 
areas. This confusion confirms that borders between people and wildlife in Tanzania 
are drawn on maps with objectives similar to those of other political borders, namely, 
the territorialisation. Their non-existence on space gives wild animals freedom to 
cross them as part of the ecosystem while creating barriers for people. It is on this 
basis that vi llagers in southeastern Tanzania hold that there have not been wildlife 
borders in their area. 
 
5.5 The idiom of the border in TFCAs 
The analysis of the process that creates the SNWC challenges the TFCA claim of 
removing borders to re-unite local communities and re-establish ecological links. The 
previous section supports the claim that the Selous-Niassa TFCA process has 
created more borders in southeastern Tanzania. As such, there are wildlife land uses 
(such as WMAs) that have not been in communal areas before. The use of WMAs 
for the creation of the SNWC has meant the silencing of village and district borders. 
These borders reflect the emerging forms of control over nature beyond core 
protected areas. In fact, once WMAs are established they are declared „restricted 
zones’ for villagers. This means that these are borders for the SNWC and, for that 
matter, the Selous-Niassa TFCA. This confirms that the meaning of borders is 
selectively used to promote TFCAs (Ramutsindela, 2007, Singh and Houtum, 2002). 
The chosen meaning remains the state political borders whose removal relates 












political borders as remnants of colonialism to justify their removal for TFCAs ignores 
the fact that TFCAs have largely depended on the creation of local borders that 
facilitates the acquisition of private and communal lands. Obviously, once space is 
created it is not without borders. Hence, WMAs through which the SNWC is created 
is a bounded space. On the basis of this observation the TFCA claim for re-uniting 
cross-border communities becomes questionable. In my view, the communities that 
should have been re-united are displaced and even divided further by new borders. 
In fact, the Selous-Niassa TFCA has revived colonial expansionism plans for control 
and influence over space and wildlife resources in southern Tanzania and it is the 
ground on which local communities are currently removed from their ancestral lands.  
In other words, local community relocations and associated impacts are embedded 
on the scale and border redefinition processes that create the Selous-Niassa TFCA.  
 
It is important to emphasize that the removal of borders in TFCAs symbolized cutting 
off fences to re-establish ecological connectivity. However, this study challenges the 
TFCA border symbolism because neither state nor protected area borders are 
fences in southeastern Tanzania. Studies on wildlife movement in the area verify the 
existence of wildlife migration between SGR and NGR (Baldus and Hahn, 2004, 
Mpanduji and Ngomello, 2007). Therefore, as Figure 5.5 suggests, wildlife 
movements have not been disrupted by the river and the status of the river as the 
political border was not changed. The removal of borders as implied by proponents 
of the Selous-Niassa TFCA has thus meant the removal of sub-national borders and 
local communities to create space for the TFCA. The study establishes further that 
the Tanzania-Mozambique border is not only the colonial border of the state but is 
also a regional border for East Africa. However, proponents of TFCAs do not temper 
with it as a regional border because they do not advocate for trans-regional 
conservation areas. Against this background, borders in the study area are a tool for 
creating new space for wildlife and, by implication, new institutions for their 
management. 
 
The TFCA notion of borders as physical objects ignores the existence of non-
physical borders. Yet this study confirms that there are borders between different 
actors in Selous-Niassa TFCA. It should be noted that the PPF and the German 












between them and with other actors. For example, the PPF has not facilitated TFCAs 
in East Africa. The PPF remain dominant in southern Africa and the German 
government has a stronghold in eastern Africa. The SNWC expert acknowledges the 
existence of this institutional border alleging that;  
 
…SNWC project is not related to PPF…We do not work together…The SNWC 
and what PPF does are completely different things…PPF is a high profile 
organization with support from high profile individuals, organizations and country 
Presidents. SNWC is a different thing all together… (Interview, Hahn, 12/9/2007).  
 
Figure 5.5: Tanzania-Mozambique border and an elephant crossing the river   
 
Source: Main photo taken by the author (9/9/2007), the insert adopted from (Baldus 
et al., 2006: cover page) 
 
Mindful of the existence of institutional borders, the German government and the 
GEF/UNDP support for the Selous-Niassa TFCA does not extend beyond the 












facilitate activities in the NGR albeit with the same goal of establishing the Selous-
Niassa TFCA (GEF/UNDP, 2004). This translates into the fact that in the overall 
discussions about TFCAs and the notion of removing borders, the institutional 
borders that define areas of operation between different actors are maintained and 
considered unproblematic. These borders echo the colonial history and they serve 
the same purpose as borders that divided Africa among different colonial powers.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the process and the main actors in the creation of the 
SNWC which is the prism for understanding the Selous-Niassa TFCA. Through the 
analysis of the process that established the present borders of the SGR the chapter 
demonstrates that the creation of space necessitates the re-definition of borders and 
that the Selous-Niassa TFCA is not immune to this reality. The chapter confirms that 
the WMA scale is used by different actors as a ladder through which TFCAs and 
other bioregional projects will be created in Tanzania. In the case of the Selous-
Niassa TFCA, the German government uses WMAs as buffer zones to the SGR and 
the way through which the SNWC is created. The chapter demonstrates that the 
Selous-Niassa TFCA process has inevitably created borders thereby challenging the 
view that TFCAs are a tool for re-establishing ecological and cultural connections 
that were interrupted by colonial borders. The analysis presented in this chapter 
suggests further that land control is central to the establishment of TFCAs thus the 
quest for the removal of political borders only serves that purpose. As such, rather 
than borders per se, local communities were divided by colonial policies that 
continue to determine resource ownership and control. Yet, TFCAs are far from 
promoting local land administrations that could re-unify border communities. Instead, 
the emerging borders promote division and add to the displacement of local 
communities. In the next chapter, I elucidate how the newly created SNWC and its 
resources are connected to the neo-liberal projects of elite businesses rather than 












CHAPTER SIX: ECOLOGICAL INTERGRITY, DISPLACEMENT, THE 
REALLOCATION OF RIGHTS AND CONFLICTS  
 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter analyzes the impacts of the Selous-Niassa TFCA on the local 
communities on the Tanzanian side. In particular, the chapter focuses on how the 
establishment of WMAs and the Selous-Niassa Wildlife Corridor (SNWC) influence 
change in local land use and livelihood strategies. The main objective of the chapter 
is to demonstrate that the introduction of wildli fe conservation areas in the villages 
has meant loss of land, which is the base of community livelihood and identit y. 
Proceeding from this view, the chapter considers the cost of the foregone use of land 
(crop cultivation and settlements) as central to the debate about the impacts of 
wildlife to the local communities. It also highlights conflicts which emerged from 
WMAs and SNWC. The analysis of the land use plans for Mbarang‟andu WMA is 
used to elaborate these points. 
 
The chapter is organised in two main sections. The first section briefly reviews the 
discussion on conservation and people paradox with the focus on the recent trend on 
local communities‟ displacements in and around major conservation areas. This 
discussion provides the basis for the view that protected areas are not an end by 
themselves but the means through which nature is commoditised. In addition, the 
section highlights that commercial projects that replace indigenous activities could be 
more ecologically destructive thus the blame on local threats rather than external 
economic motives is misguided. The second section uses empirical data to 
demonstrate how WMAs and the SNWC that support the Selous-Niassa TFCA have 
imposed limitations on the use of land, wildlife and forest resources by local 
communities. This section indicates that increased wildlife population in communal 
land limit human activities while, at the same time, encouraging the expansion of 
wildlife areas to support commercial and tourist hunting. Relative to other studies 
that have shown benefits of wildlife commercialization in, for example, Botswana, 
Namibia and even in some parts of Tanzania, the promises of commercial benefits 
have been lost to the people of Mbarang‟andu who are left with significant economic 
opportunity costs. The chapter concludes, then, that since indigenous people have 












Selous-Niassa TFCA is potentially the source of further displacement and community 
marginalization in southeastern Tanzania. The third part discusses the conflicts, 
which emerged from institutional restructuring, and changes in governance 
structures at the local level. 
  
6.1 Conservation and people paradox  
The debate about conservation and human welfare (poverty or development) has 
attracted considerable research and international policy discussions following the 
growth in number and coverage of protected areas globally. It is estimated that by 
2005 protected areas covered over 12% of the earth's land surface (Chape et al., 
2005). Protected areas coverage has not only been adopted as an indicator for 
measuring the progress in biodiversity protection but also an indicator for success in 
achieving the Millennium Development Goal 7 (ensuring environmental 
sustainability), Target 9 (integrate the principles of sustainable development (United 
Nations, 2005b). In both cases, the indicator is defined in terms of areal extent 
(Chape et al., 2005). While the ecological ground for the expansion of protected 
areas is well found, concerns have emerged that the total extent of protected areas 
is not an effective measure of those aspects of environmental quality and 
accessibility relevant to poverty alleviation (Adams et al., 2004). Accordingly, the net 
local impacts have remained strongly negative with the rise in number and extent 
coverage of protected areas (Upton et al., 2008).  
 
Conservation in its broadest sense has ecological, social-economic, and by 
implication, political consequences. The typical ecological consequences of 
conservation revolve around improved biodiversity habitat and population thus the 
motivation for expansion of protected areas has remained the aspiration to increase 
wildlife abundance (Johannesen, 2007). The socio-economic impacts relate closely 
to the need for land to accommodate and manage increasing biodiversity. The 
outcomes of these ecological achievements are not necessarily beneficial to local 
communities, and where benefit occurs can seldom be generalised (Adams and 
Hutton, 2007, McDermott, 2009, Brockington, 2003). There are cases where 
conservation activities have benefited local community members as individuals and 
as a nation through the provision of basic needs, employment and foreign currency 












Bajracharya et al., (2007) studied cases in Mexico and Nepal where forest protection 
has been considered a model for sustainable development. Others have also 
reported benefits of conservation spin-offs in Botswana and South Africa where local 
communities have opportunities to negotiate benefits of wildlife commercialization 
(Arntzen, 2003, Fakir, 2003, Motlopi, 2006). Elsewhere, including in Nepal, Peru and 
Tanzania, communities receive limited conservation benefit in the form of 
improvements in access to basic infrastructure for water, health, education and other 
social services (Adhikari and Lovett, 2006, Bray et al., 2003, Kikoti, 2001, Barrow et 
al., 2000). Conceptually, however, the foregoing is among the examples where 
rhetoric around benefit sharing has generally remained contestable. As Wynberg and 
Laird (2007) argue, benefit sharing has, almost without exceptions, focused on 
bilateral and contractual agreements between commercial companies or institutions 
interested in resources and the state and the benefits are defined in terms of how 
much money is paid (Wynberg and Laird, 2007). This interpretation of benefits 
ignores the nature and distribution of such benefits between different actors, and 
more importantly, the local community‟s use of land and related resources for their 
livelihoods. Therefore, comparatively, communities have largely experienced 
negative impacts associated with wildlife protection, forest, water and fisheries to 
mention a few.  
 
Case studies that examine negative consequences of forest and wildlife protection 
are far from limited to one geographical area. A range of countries of different 
political orientations has experienced the removal of people during the establishment 
and expansion of protected areas in the form of involuntary and voluntary 
relocations. Whereas involuntary relocations involve use of force, the involuntary 
relocations involve community displacement through restricted access to important 
resources such as land, water, forest and wildlife. An overwhelming literature exists 
about forced relocations in Latin America (Bodmer and Puertas, 2007, Siurua, 2006), 
Asia (Rangarajan and Shahabuddin, 2006, McElwee, 2006, Ghate and Beazley, 
2007) and Africa (Spierenburg et al., 2008, Neumann, 1998, Brockington, 2005, 
Wynberg, 2000, Schmidt-Soltau and Brockington, 2007, Ramutsindela, 2004b). 
Drawing the example from Tanzania, the Maasai pastoralists were evicted from 
Serengeti National Park, Mkomazi Game Reserve and Ngorongoro Conservation 












were evicted from Arusha National Park (Neumann, 1998) while Wangindo, Wahyao 
and Wamakuwa were evicted from the SGR (Kjekshus, 1996, Rodgers, 1976, 
Neumann, 2002, Matzke, 1976). In all these cases, indigenous people have lost their 
sacred places, grazing and hunting areas as well as important water sources for 
domestic and livestock use. It is also known worldwide that when water has to be 
conserved through construction of large dams local communities experience social 
and economic costs resulting from relocations. These include, for instance, loss of 
fertile valleys and safe drinking water, the spread of waterborne diseases, the 
destruction of vital fisheries as well as increased disasters caused by the collapse of 
dams (Cernea, 2006, Phadke, 1999, Caspary, 2007). Similar instances are recorded 
in marine protected areas where communities experience restrictions on land-based 
activities adjacent to the marine parks and have limited access to marine resources 
such as coral mining and fish (Mascia and Claus, 2009, Micheli et al., 2004). 
 
There is a general agreement that the common problem in the relocations (voluntary 
or involuntary) is the displacement of human communities. Displacement is defined 
to include not only the impacts of physical removal (Geisler and De Sousa, 2001, 
Geisler, 2003, Ghate and Beazley, 2007, Adams and Hutton, 2007) but also the 
restricted access to natural resources (McElwee, 2006, Geisler, 2003). It seems, 
therefore, that although conservation does not always involve actions against local 
communities it has historically done so and it still does today. Accordingly, 
Brockington and Igoe (2007) suggest that the eviction trend explains the surge of 
recent publications on the debate about „ local people and conservation‟. Indeed, this 
debate is captured in published works with suggestive titles such as „Imposing 
Wilderness’ (Neumann, 1998), „Who Owns Paradise’ (Honey, 1999), „Whose 
Heritage is it ’ (Jalais, 2007, Bonner, 1993), ‘Your Park, my Poverty‟ (Geisler 2003), 
„Your Biosphere is my Backyard’ (Kaimowitz et al., 2003), so to mention a few. It also 
suffices to say that the wisdom of the Millennium Development Goals in using the 
extent of protected areas as an indicator of progress in achieving the livelihood 
dimensions of sustainability is questionable.  
 
The conservation and livelihood question is critiqued by Geisler and De Sousa, 
(2001) who use the trend of land conversion to analyze the significance of costs that 












two-thirds of the human population in Africa, which is still rural and characterised by 
poverty, occupies land eyed for expansion of protected areas thus making rural poor 
the most affected by conservation commitments (Geisler and De Sousa, 2001). It 
follows that, the land coverage for the IUCN strict protection categories I-V alone 
doubled from 423 million hectares in 1985 to 841 million hectares in 1997. During 
this period, Africa‟s protected areas grew in number from 443 (3% of the continent‟s 
land mass) to 746 (5.2% of total land mass) (Geisler and De Sousa, 2001:161). 
Comparatively, the United Nations Economic Programme‟s Human Development 
Index (1985 and 1999) indicate that African countries with the highest indices of 
poverty including Tanzania, Mozambique, Chad, Niger, Zambia, Mauritania, and the 
Central Republic of Africa have the greatest extent of protected areas in IUCN 
protected area categories I-V compared to richer African countries (Geisler and De 
Sousa, 2001, Geisler, 2003). In fact, the land designated as protected areas in these 
poor countries exceed croplands. During the 1990s, Chad‟s protected areas 
increased from 0.1% of the national land base to 9.1%, and Mozambique‟s grew 
from 0.01% to 6.1%. Tanzania, whose agricultural sector is the backbone of the 
economy and 80% of the production is carried out by peasants in the rural areas 
(URT, 2001a), had about 14% of the total land under protected areas by 1990 
(Geisler and Sousa, 2001). This amount doubled to 30% in 2008 (TANAPA, 2008). 
As such, the government of Tanzania spends more money per capita on wildlife 
protection than the United States (TANAPA, 2008).  
 
Geisler and De Sousa‟s analysis suggests further that the trend and extent of 
protected areas and national wealth in Africa are not correlated. Based on this view, 
victims of conservation projects are poor and made worse off  by the restriction of 
access to natural resources (Upton et al., 2008, Geisler, 2003, Cernea, 2003). 
Indeed, protected area coverage globally is equal to roughly half the earth‟s 
endowment of agricultural land, which is the source of livelihood and employment for 
almost half the world‟s labour force (ILO, 1997), (Geisler, 2003). More specifically, 
the progressive growth of protected area coverage signifies food insecurity and 
labour displacement. Often, victims experience forced removal from their homelands 
without notice, consultation or proper compensation causing them loss of many kinds 
of assets – shelter, social networks, identity, livelihood, rights and social security 












2005). Following criticisms from researchers and human right movements, the World 
Bank set out a resettlement policy in 1990. The policy goal was to improve the 
income and livelihood levels of people affected by resettlements. The policy 
specified that all resettlements should be conceived and executed as development 
programs and people resettled be provided with sufficient investment resources and 
opportunities to share in project benefits (World Bank, 1990).  
 
The review of the World Bank‟s resettlement policy suggests that the policy limits the 
cost of resettlement to direct economic and social impacts resulting from taking of 
land, relocation of shelter and loss of assets and income sources (Downing, 2002). 
Thus the policy ignores the fact that the displacement includes restricted access to 
resources. For example, where there are no physical removals proponents of 
protected areas could argue that there are no displacements. In fact, pro-
conservation arguments could be made for protected areas that still have people. In 
reality, however, people are not only restricted access in such areas but also their 
activities are limited and they remain under the constant threat of being at any 
moment physically relocated (Cernea, 2006). Eventually, the World Bank redefined 
its guidelines on resettlement in 2004 to extend the definition of involuntary 
resettlement to include the restriction of access to resources in protected areas 
(Adams and Hutton, 2007, Cernea, 2006). The revised policy recognises restricted 
access to certain natural resources as a form of involuntary displacement, even if the 
affected groups are not physically relocated (Cernea, 2006). This redefinition 
broadens the understanding of resettlement beyond its usual acceptance as 
geographic relocation, to include restricted access to basic needs as a form of 
displacement (Cernea, 2006).  
 
The conservation and people paradox remains unresolved and it is currently 
dominated by the question of whether human displacement for protected area 
establishment improves conservation. This question reflects the general debate 
about relocation and conservation performance, which is characterized by strong 
divisions of opinion. On the one hand, relocations are perceived as a solution to 
threats to protected areas while on the other, critiques have emerged that the blame 
on local pressure rather than external economic and political motives is misguided 












forms of displacement involve change in social relations of resource access and 
control and, by implication, reallocation of property rights (Mascia and Claus, 2009, 
Cernea, 2006, Schmidt-Soltau and Brockington, 2007, Adams and Mulligan, 2003, 
McDermott, 2009). This means that indigenous activities are replaced by new groups 
and the rights to natural resources are reallocated. Yet, the discussions about nature 
protection and local community displacements have predominantly focused on one 
side; the side excluded and deprived of resource use. It is important that critical 
analysis should consider the side of the empowered (who gain rights) in order to 
establish whether conservation empowers actors who are more marginal or the 
powerful actors are gaining additional rights through the loss of some rights by 
marginal actors (Mascia and Claus, 2009). Hence, the focus on rights reallocation 
rather than displacement per se should bring new insights and allow one to 
differentiate between the process through which protected area rights are reallocated 
and the impacts of this reallocation to different actors  (Mascia and Claus, 2009).  
 
6.1.1 Reallocation of rights 
In the context of this study, rights reallocation has been part and parcel of the 
process of constructing new scales. As discussed in the previous chapters, the 
reforms in the natural resource governance in Tanzania redefined powers and 
access to forest and wildlife resources in the village lands. As will be discussed 
further in the section below, the newly created WMAs and the Mbarang‟andu WMA 
in particular, are protected areas. This status does not only call for changes in 
traditional natural resource management but also restricts community access and 
control over land while at the same time giving the government and private sector 
actor‟s additional rights to the wildlife and forest resources in the WMAs. Put it in 
another way, the land that is acquired from displaced smallholder peasants is taken 
over by the state and leased to the private sector actors who provide capital for 
running protected areas on a commercial basis. However, local communities are not 
directly involved in these commercial activities and have no opportunities to 
negotiate conservation benefits in their village lands. Instead, the transaction is 
made between the Wildlife Division and commercial and tourist hunters. Admittedly, 
nature is commoditised, society-nature relations regulated while, at the same time, 












Mascia and Claus, 2009). As argued by many, human displacement, more than 
other aspects, has come to portend the relationship between protected area 
expansions and neo-liberal projects (Geisler, 2003, Igoe and Brockington, 2007, 
Logan and Wekerle, 2008, Mansfield, 2007, Adams and Hutton, 2007). This takes 
the expression of economic transformation, which does not necessarily put 
conservation at the forefront as private investments are driven by profit 
maximization. 
 
The growing trend in the replacement of local land uses with commercial private 
investments in Africa and elsewhere affirms to the importance of rescaling in 
facilitating the redefinition of rights and power over natural resources. The following 
examples elaborate this point. Recently in 2000 the private park management 
institution named Africa Parks Foundation (APF) took responsibility for the 
management of five protected areas covering a total area in excess of 2,500,000 
hectares in Ethiopia, Zambia, Malawi and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and 
set them up as secure businesses (www.african-parks.org). The APF was implicated 
in the eviction of residents, with the Nech Sar National Park in Ethiopia being the 
most contested case (Igoe and Brockington, 2007, Brockington and Igoe, 2006). 
Related to this is the case where the  AWF has taken over an area of about 17,807 
hectares of Manyara livestock ranch in Tanzania which was previously run by the 
National Ranching Company (NARCO) (Sumba et al., 2005) and is now run as a 
wildlife protected area (Igoe and Brockington, 2007). As it was hinted in Chapter 
Four, the ranch remained open for wildlife and pastoral activities of the Maasai, 
Mbugwe and Barbaig ethnic groups since its establishment in 1970s. To date, the 
Manyara ranch is a grazing ground for community livestock amounting to about 
26,500 and even the community primary school is still located within the ranch 
(Sumba et al., 2005). Whereas the main objective of the privatization was to acquire 
the ranch area which is considered critical for wildlife migration, livestock and human 
population around the ranch are considered the most significant challenges for the 
new ranch management (Sumba et al., 2005). Obviously, there are no prospects for 
human-wildlife-livestock co-existence especially because livestock will need to be 














Another case of indigenous replacement in Tanzania involves the company called 
Grumeti Reserves Ltd that took over the management of three state sponsored 
game reserves (Ikorongo, Grumeti and Fort Ikoma Open Area) covering an area of 
140,000 hectares in Western Serengeti (Igoe and Croucher, 2007). Funded by 
American business Paul Tudor Jones since 2004, the Grumeti Reserves Ltd took 
over the three reserves that had once been homes to thousands of indigenous 
people, grazing grounds and crop lands before evictions and the establishment of 
state run game reserves (Igoe and Croucher, 2007). Currently, the Grumeti 
Reserves Ltd partners with Singita, the southern African tourism and leisure 
operators, to run among others the seven star Sasakwa Hill Lodge (PR Newswire, 
2007). There has been a strong opposition for Grumeti Reserves Ltd from both 
lobbyists and local communities for two reasons; firstly, that the project is not only in 
ancestral land of thousands of evicted people but also its plans for expansion 
depend on village lands especially those already set aside as WMAs. Secondly, that 
the project proposes the construction of an international airport and a road across 
Serengeti National Park, which is considered much more ecologically destructive 
than the small scale activities of the evicted communities (The East African, 2007). 
The investor has been accused of harassing villagers, preventing them from 
pursuing their legal livelihood strategies and attempting to halt community 
conservation initiative that provides game meat at an affordable price (Kideghesho, 
2006). The  narrative below is worth quoting as it suggests that memories of 
relocation from Serengeti National Park are still fresh to the villagers around the park 
and the private investors are considered the agents of marginalisation and a 
backdoor through which colonial oppression has returned to Tanzania (Kideghesho, 
2006). 
 
…History has taught us a lot. We were forced out of Serengeti (National Park). 
The boundary was moved from Naabi Hill to Banagi River in 1950s. Then, in 
1960s Mochatongarori became the new boundary.  In 1970s we were pushed to 
Romoti River. In 1974 Ikorongo and Grumeti were set aside as Game Controlled 
Areas and we were promised to remain in and continue to enjoy resources critical 
to our households. In few weeks, we were relocated because of the so-called 
villagisation policy. Our attempt to go back and make living from our lands in 
Ikorongo and Grumeti after failure of villagisation policy was defeated by the 
government in 1994 by mere baptizing the areas as Game Reserves. We were 
then forced out of the reserve and we lost Manchira River, which was the source 
of water and salt for domestic use and livestock. Further to this, we lost our 












of employment to our youths. Today they want to baptize our land again as 
WMAs. As usual, WMAs will change the name and we will be forced out. Can’t 
these people (government officials) be advised that we are fed up? What is the 
difference between the WMA policy and several other government policies that we 
have had? Where is villagisation? Where is Arusha Declaration? (Cited in 
Kideghesho, 2006: 162) 
 
Conceptually, relocations for TFCAs have taken different forms in different areas. In 
Asia, for example, forest areas traditionally belonging to indigenous peoples of 
Borneo Island were included in a Trans-boundary Protected Area (TBPA) created 
along the Indonesian-Malaysian border which brought together three national parks; 
Betung Karihun, Kayan Mentarang and Danau Sentarum National Parks. Chai, 
(2005) and Brookfield et al., (1994), provide further details of this case.  In short, the 
project was initiated as a strategy to protect orangutan animal species following 
reported habitat fragmentation associated with human dependence on forest 
resources (McElwee, 2006, Chai, 2005, Brookfield et al., 1995). In 2005, the 
International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) created from Borneo island an 
area of 1.8 million hectares for oil palm plantation (McElwee, 2006). To date, the 
project‟s main objective remains to secure forestland that would ensure sustainable 
timber trade (www.itto.or.jp).  
 
In the famous GLTFP, approximately 6000 people living within the borders of 
Limpopo National Park in Mozambique were resettled and there are reports that the 
new status of the area currently constrains livelihoods of about 27,000 (Spierenburg 
and Wels, 2006, Draper et al., 2004, Dzingirai, 2004, Ferreira, 2006, Spierenburg et 
al., 2008). These people cannot clear new fields for cultivation or access pasture and 
fishing grounds because these are illegal activities in the national park. On the 
Zimbabwean side of the GLTFP, the land of the Sengwe community, which was 
relocated to create the Gonarezhou National Park in 1975 was fenced to give way to 
the wildlife corridor that links Kruger, Limpopo and Gonarezhou National Parks 
(Metcalfe, 2003, Dzingirai, 2004). The Sengwe community was promised the control 
over wildlife, revenue and other services generated from wildlife-based activities in 
their land. Recently, however, the government of Zimbabwe has been under 
pressure to find suitable land to resettle Sengwe residents as a pre -requisite for the 
procession of the GLTFP (Zim Standard, 2006). As it has been argued above, these 












importance of scale in manipulating local community rights. Redefinition of power 
and rights over natural resources remain a central issue and fuels the conflict 
between displaced people, state governments, the proponents of conservation and 
the private sector businesses (Adams and Hutton, 2007, Igoe and Croucher, 2007, 
Spierenburg et al., 2008, Kideghesho, 2006).  
 
Recalling the discussion in Chapter Five, the establishment of the Selous-Niassa 
TFCA depends entirely on the creation of the SNWC in the communal land which is 
currently under the administration of twenty-nine villages. Figure 6.1 shows the 
location of some of these villages within the wildlife corridor (GTZ/Selous 
Conservation Program, 2001). In view of that, the village lands targeted for the 
wildlife corridor will be under some sort of protection by 2010 (Hahn, 2004, GTZ and 
InWent, 2005, KfW and URT, 2006). Since the land and wildlife laws do not provide 
for restitution, the issue of community rights to access and use village areas 
becomes the basis for the analysis of the actual and potential impacts of the Selous-
Niassa TFCA to the indigenous people in Tanzanian side. The following section uses 
empirical data from the fifteen studied villages to elaborate on community rights. 














Figure 6.1 Villages in the area of the Selous-Niassa Wildlife Corridor  
 













6.1.2 Displacement from ancestral land  
The core of the loss of indigenous land rights in southeastern Tanzania was the 
relocation from well watered fertile lands and sacred places throughout the creation 
of the SGR. The consolidation of wildlife land use that culminated in the official 
reserve borders of 1975 curtailed any possibility of recovering lost land rights. As the 
previous chapters suggest, the relocated people established new settlements along 
the new reserve borders and were officially registered during the countrywide 
villagization program. Although loss of access to land in the reserve had significant 
livelihood impacts, there was still land available outside the reserve where greater 
demands were made on the fertile lands for the re-establishment of croplands 
(Ashley et al., 2002). Even though land is available, the impacts of relocation are not 
any less. The recent emphasis on protection of wildlife outside protected areas has, 
ironically, targeted the land occupied by the same people who had lost land during 
the creation of the reserve. This study reveals that the creation of buffer zones and 
the SNWC have, so far, formally demanded the relocation of settlements. More 
importantly, however, the village lands have become WMAs where neither crop 
cultivation nor collection of forest resources and hunting are allowed for villagers. 
Resettlement and land use restrictions in the newly established wildlife areas 
amounts to displacement, which has not been acknowledged even though they have 
as much impacts on the community livelihoods as the previous relocation schemes.  
 
This study establishes, for example, that in 2002 the government denounced the 
settlements of about 30 families with approximately 150 members in an area called 
Mwembenyani between Huria and Kilimasera vi llages. With the assistance of village 
guides, I visited Mwembenyani area and observed that this former settlement still 
has fruit trees such as mangoes and coconuts, which are a typical feature of other 
settlements in the study area (see Figure 6.2). The area is almost at the edge of the 
district border hence some families moved to Kilimasera village in Namtumbo district 














Figure 6.2: Former settlements in Mwembenyani area 
 
Source: Photo taken by the author, 11/9/2007 
 
My observations as well as interviews conducted with former Mwembenyani 
residents as captured in Figure 6.3 confirmed the said relocations. Most recently, the 
Mwembenyani area became part of the Nalika WMA, it was marked as the core of 
the wildlife corridor between Selous, and Niassa Game Reserves (see Figure 6.4). In 
addition to this new land use, the official communication from the Tunduru District 
Natural Resources office instructed the Huria vi llage in a letter dated 23 July 2008 to 
keep Mwembenyani area free from human activities (including crop cultivation and 
















Figure 6.3: A visit to the new settlements in Huria village 
 
Figure 6.4: Wildlife migration sign post between Huria and Kilimasera villages  
 













Other settlements similar to Mwembenyani have recently been put under relocation 
plans. On 29 June 2006 the SNWC technical advisor, Rudolf Hahn, proposed a 
resettlement plan to the government in a letter directed to the Namtumbo District 
Executive Director (Hahn, 2006). The letter proposes that ‘the government should 
facilitate the realization of the SNWC by relocating unplanned settlements and farms 
in the core areas of the project’. Among the settlements proposed for relocation, are 
Semeni and Jiungeni in Likusanguse village and Bwawa la Jiwe in Marumba village. 
According to the said letter, Semeni settlement has a population of around 15 
families and a total number of 100 inhabitants. The same letter estimates the 
population of Jiungeni settlement at 70 inhabitants 17. Like in Mwembenyani, reasons 
given to support the proposed scheme include that the settlements are located on 
the main elephant migration routes and that these settlements are not reachable by 
game rangers. As a result, vi llagers are allegedly hosts for poachers (Hahn, 2006). 
In addition, these areas are claimed to be prone to malaria and the soil is too poor to 
support human habitation. On 20 September 2007, I visited the Semeni settlement. 
Contrary to the arguments raised by the SNWC office, the observations and 
interviews revealed that there are 332 inhabitants (up from 100 provided by the 
SNWC office) (Interview, Anonymous Informant18, 20/9/2007). As Figure 6.5 
confirms, the settlement is well developed with fertile farms and, among others, a 
modern primary school which has been serviced by the government since 2002 
(Interview, Kimolo, 11/9/2007).  
 
Surprisingly, the  problem described for the Bwana la Jiwe case is that the 
settlement „is located in one of the world’s most magnificent and spectacular view, 
overlooking the entire corridor area deep into the Niassa reserve’ (Hahn, 2006). For 
this reason, the SNWC project office advised that the government should declare 
this area „unfit’ for settlements (Hahn, 2006). Based on my analysis, the status of 
being unfit actually means that the area is not for people but wildlife. Indeed, the 
Namtumbo District Commissioner confirmed in an interview that the said villages are 
within the core area of the SNWC and that the government will facilitate their 
relocation (Interview, Kimolo, 27/11/2007). The same source confirms also that, 
since the government owns the land compensations are only expected for perennial 
                                                 
17 The number of inhabitant for Bwawa la Jiw e was not readily available. 












crops and permanent building structures (if any). Villagers are at liberty to choose 
any other area, which is not earmarked for wildlife. At most, the government will 
provide social services such as water, schools and health facilities in the new 
settlements.  
 
Figure 6.5: Crop fields and the school at the Semeni settlement 
 
 












The discussion in this section testifies that the establishment of the SNWC has 
necessitated the redefinition of borders. Hence, the resettlement schemes in the 
SNWC area are a result of scale and border redefinition processes that focus on 
creating space while redefining powers and control over such space. Indeed, the  
completion of the SNWC (which is scheduled for 2010) will mark the major step 
towards the creation of the area devoid of humans, the Selous-Niassa TFCA (KfW, 
2007, GTZ-IS, 2007). It should be noted here that as wildlife overflowed from the 
SGR, they do so from the SNWC area and villages are on the verge of becoming 
enclosures thus ruling out possibilities for development of their livelihood activities. 
Local communities interpret the newly created wildlife areas and their borders as 
politics that seek to create barriers for indigenous people while giving wild animals 
the freedom of movement. Part of the story from Mwembenyani relocated villagers 
reaffirms that indigenous people and their acti vities are replaced by wildlife; 
  
...we settled there (Mwembenyani) because of the soil fertility and access to the 
Tunduru-Namtumbo road. We settled there when these animals were also 
there…The soil was fertile so we did not need fertilizers. We harvested anything 
we sowed and our children played with food all the time. After these things 
happened (relocations), our land was made a home for animals; east and west is 
reserved for elephant migration, on the south is a bee reserve and if you go north 
is the Selous reserve. Wildlife signposts are everywhere around us. The land here 
(new settlement) is small, dry and useless without fertilizers. We remain poor, 
hungry and our children are malnourished. We are not asking for food but our land 
to produce food… (Group discussion, 8/8/200819). 
 
As it is elsewhere in southern Africa, the introduction of wildlife land use in 
communal lands in southeastern Tanzania is presented as a means to foster social 
and economic development of the communities, particularly, through tourism 
(Baldus, 2008, Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004, Institute of Resource Assessment, 
2007). This claim does not consider the foregone land use alternatives such as 
agriculture even though wildlife replaces actual and potential agricultural land that 
forms the main source of local livelihoods. Based on this view, this research 
considers that the 15,000 hectares of community agricultural land, which is to 
become the wildlife corridor, is central to the debate about the impacts of the corridor 
to the local communities. As such, the study analyzes land use plans for 
Mbarang‟andu WMA to elaborate this view. In the meantime, the review of other 
                                                 












research works have revealed that restricted access to WMAs across the country 
have caused failures of local communities to sustain livelihood in their own village 
lands (Ashley et al., 2002, Neumann, 2001, Kideghesho, 2006, Igoe and Croucher, 
2007). Specifically, Ashley et al., (2002) reports that in the northern sections of the 
SGR, communities lost prime pasture and agricultural land that was set aside as 
JUKUMU WMA (which is now one of the hunting blocks under the Wildlife Division 
and already leased to the tourist hunting company). Contrary to the community 
expectations, the tourist company pays block fee to the Wildlife Division. Thus direct 
benefits from wildlife remained much lower compared to crop cultivation and 
livestock keeping thereby causing food insecurity. Besides loss of agricultural land, 
people suffer from losses on account of wildlife movements in the villages since 
WMA borders are only in the maps and do not block wild animals. Consequently, 
animals such as baboons, elephants, and vervet monkeys cause untold crop 
damage while leopards, lions and hyenas account for large number of livestock and 
human mortality (Rustagi, 2005, Kideghesho, 2006, Songorwa, 1999).  
 
6.1.3 Interrupted livelihoods and conflicts 
As it was pointed out in Chapter One, two of the seven GTZ/SCP project districts 
(Namtumbo and Tunduru) are the study area for this research. Four vi llages (two 
from each district) were included in the sample of the fifteen villages presented in 
Table 1.2. The Namtumbo and Tunduru districts share the southern section of the 
SGR and are part of the Rufiji basin discussed earlier in Chapter Three. As in other 
parts of the basin, the two districts are permanent sources of water, which lead to the 
concentration of different wildlife species and their spread over large areas of village 
lands during dry seasons. Indigenous people of the area are crop cultivators but they 
have a long tradition of game hunting as an alternative source of food and household 
income (Kaggi, 2006, Ashley et al., 2002). Thus, the subsistence hunters (locally 
called Warumba) use locally made weapons such as muzzle loaders, spears, arrows 
and other techniques such as snares and pits. Obviously, these tools and techniques 
differentiate subsistence hunting from commercial poaching. It is important to note 
that the GTZ/SCP brought changes that had direct impacts on these local hunting 
practices. As such, subsistence hunting was labelled as poaching and the GTZ/SCP 












time that poaching had raised concerns nationally and at the international level  
stringent rules were applied to both commercial poaching and subsistence hunting.  
 
Studies have confirmed that local communities had no influence over the changes 
brought about by the GTZ/SCP as these changes were generally part of the broader 
conservation objectives set by the donor (Songorwa, 1999, Ashley et al., 2002, 
Nelson, 2007). However, a few people in every village were literally hand-picked and 
trained by GTZ/SCP to work as community representatives in the project (Ashley et 
al., 2002). It is reported, for example, that in total the project had  300 village game 
scouts in addition to the five members of environmental committee in each village 
(Baldus, 2006b). This is to say that an average of ten people would represent the 
village in decisions made by the GTZ/SCP. Based on the vi llage populations 
presented in Table 1.3, ten people would be less than 1% of the total village 
population. All the same, the GTZ/SCP committees took primary responsibility for 
monitoring wildlife in village lands. Upon being instructed and equipped, village game 
scouts conducted patrols that led to the arrest of subsistence hunters/poachers and 
confiscation of hunting weapons. Methods used in confiscation varied from use of 
force, fearful surrender and incentives that were provided to community members 
who facilitated the identification of poachers/traditional hunters. Generally speaking, 
confiscation of subsistence hunting tools and monitoring of stringent rules posed 
threats on household economy and food security and became a source of conflict 
and division between those working for GTZ/SCP (considered to be project 
employees) and other civi lians (including vi llage government leaders). Although the 
GTZ/SCP was conceived from outside the community, the use of few village 
members assumed community involvement and the project used these members to 
influence desirable changes.  
 
The second livelihood change brought about by the GTZ/SCP was village land use 
planning which formed an important step towards setting aside specific village areas 
for wildlife protection. In this activity, the GTZ/SCP obtained much of the support 
from the government in that there had been a national land use plan initiative that 
aimed at granting single right of occupancy to the Village Councils since 1987 thus 
requiring demarcation, survey and registration of village lands (Ashley et al., 2002). 












and procedural problems (Interview, Tibasana and Shilungushela, 29/2/2008). 
Therefore, donor projects such as the GTZ/SCP were required to undertake village 
land use plans, which could later contribute to the government project. To this end, 
the GTZ/SCP land use plans were submitted to the Wildlife Division as the basis for 
the initial designation of village areas that became provisional wildlife reserves 
(GTZ/SCP, 1995, Ashley et al., 2002). In particular, the GTZ/SCP prepared village 
land use plans for 1991/2006 period. 
 
Ideally, wildlife land uses were established on a village-to-village basis but this was 
not the scale envisaged. Since wildlife moves over large areas, and many species 
range would inevitably stretch over many village lands, several vi llage wildlife areas 
were pulled together. Overtime, however, these areas were leased out as single 
hunting blocks (Ashley et al., 2002, Nelson, 2007). It should be emphasized that 
hunting blocks in Tanzania are leased to hunting tourists and administered by the 
Wildlife Division. Thus most of the village areas became inaccessible to villagers with 
the exception of few where the Wildlife Division considered granting limited rights of 
use by providing quotas through the arrangement designed by GTZ/SCP. Where the 
Wildlife Division provided quota, villages could choose to hunt or sell to the tourist 
hunting operators (Baldus et al., 2004, Nelson, 2007). In case the village chose to 
hunt, game scouts under the supervision of the District Game Officer could hunt. 
Even then, village meat would not be provided for free but at a cost slightly below the 
market price for other alternatives such as beef (GTZ, 1998).  
 
Conceptually, the GTZ/SCP influenced communal land use changes and 
transformed subsistence hunting from a livelihood activity to commercial lease 
holding. At the community level, the sale of game meat was considered the project‟s 
success story and the first attempt to provide communities with legal access of game 
meat, which was also intended to generate development funds. This is irrespective 
of the fact that not all villagers could afford the meat and that the funds generated in 
this scheme went back towards the recurring expenses for hunting, including the 
purchase of ammunition and food for hunters (Interviews, Alois and Mdoo, 
18/11/2007). Consequently, vi llages could neither manage to hunt the quota 
provided annually nor could the sale of meat support community development.   This 












wildlife numbers, which is supported by 65% of respondents  involved in this study. 
Of these, 38.5% sees no benefit at all of the increased wildlife numbers following the 
growing human-wildlife conflicts that constrains local livelihoods further. The 
remaining 26.5% of respondents appreciate the improved social services such as 
schools, dispensaries as well as milling machines. However, this response is based 
on the fact that since villages could not make substantial amounts of money from 
game sale the GTZ/SCP continued to support development activities directly from 
the project funds (GTZ/SCP, 1996; Interview, Mdoo, 21/11/2007). The 
consequences of this arrangement were that when the flow of direct funds ended 
with the project in 1998 village lands remained wildlife areas protected by law and 
hunting blocks leased to tourists. 
 
The study could not quantify all the livelihood impacts of the recently established 
WMAs in the study villages but the analysis of surveys, in-depth interviews and 
observations support the view that local livelihoods are generally constrained by the 
restrictions imposed on the use of land, wildlife and forest resources in the WMAs. 
As other chapters demonstrate, the conversion of village lands into protected areas 
of varying degrees (WMAs, wildlife corridor and the TFCA) has particularly focussed 
on increasing wildlife numbers to support commercial and tourist hunting activities. 
Nevertheless, surveys reveal that agriculture is still the main livelihood activity for 
communities in the SNWC area. As Table 6.1 indicates, about 97% of respondents 
have crop cultivation as their main household occupation while less than 3% are 
involved in petty businesses (on food grains, retail kiosks and tailoring). There is not 
one respondent for whom private sector or self-employment is a livelihood option.  
 
The survey revealed further that even though farmers are faced with a complex array 
of constrains resulting from wildlife crop damage, lack of farm inputs and market, 
almost all the respondents (99%) sti ll consider agriculture as the best use of their 
land since it serves immediate household needs (see Table 6.1). As such, only less 
than 1% considered other uses such as wildlife conservation as the better land use 
alternative. This data communicates that although study vi llages have been involved 
in conservation for the past two decades, wildlife land use has not played a major 












cultivation (80%) own small farm plots of between one and five acres but they are 
still considered more important for family cash and food security than wildlife. 
Despite the small sizes, family plots are kept separate as a strategy for risk 
management for crop damage (in case one plot is destroyed by wild animals the rest 
will serve the household from hunger) and also because different parts of the villages 
are suitable for different types of crops. Elderly people revealed in the interviews 
that, since they settled in the area after the relocation from the SGR in 1920s and 
1930s, their livelihoods have mainly depended on shifting cultivation between valleys 
for paddy (locally referred to as madimba) and flood plains for maize, beans, 
cassava, groundnuts and sesame as well as cashew nuts and tobacco as cash 
crops.  
 
Table 6.1: The current livelihood activities and the preferred future land uses  
Main activity Frequency Percentage  
Crop cultivation 642 96.7 
Livestock keeping 4 .6 
Fishing 1 .2 
Hunting 1 .2 
Carpentry/Tailoring 13 2.0 
Civil servant 3 .5 
Total 664 100.0 
Alternative future uses of land as preferred by villagers 
Land use option Frequency Percentage 
Agriculture 658 99.1 
Wildlife conservation 2 .3 
No response 4 .6 
Total 664 100.0 
Source: Author 
 
Local sentiments suggest that rather than benefits, wi ldlife protection has resulted in 
increased problem animals, and at the same time, crop and people protection have 
silently been withdrawn. In particular, wildlife-related revenues are considered too 
little, sporadic and are used for community development projects (such as schools 
and dispensaries) but do not serve immediate household needs for food and cash20. 
                                                 













As the following interview clips opine, wildlife has become a negative factor for 
household development, cultural practices and safety of village members.  
 
...Selous has come to our backyards. Wildlife feeds on our gardens and granaries. 
We no long have our traditional weapons, they were confiscated…we cannot 
scare elephants in the farms and granaries and nor can any of us kill a lion taking 
a child from the house. Our roles as village men are all reduced to shouting like 
women… Does shouting scare a lion that is about to feast or an elephant enjoying 
the cassava meal? (Interview, Matomola, 7/11/2007) 
 
...bringing elephants close to my home and farm? You want me to say I like that? 
No, it is for those who come to see these elephants for one day and go back to 
the cities. This is my home together with these elephants. Mine is a struggle for 
survival and theirs is leisure…This place is my cassava field, my children’s future; 
the graveyard…is everything to me and my children... (Interview, Chona, 
18/11/2007) 
 
As noted elsewhere in the country, the new legal framework for natural resource 
management that create wildlife areas in communal lands has not only disrupted 
livelihoods and increased human-wildlife conflicts but also destabilized local 
resource institutions. As discussed in Chapter Four, power struggles between the 
conventional and new institutions have widened the gap between local institutions 
and have also caused confusions and uncertainties among the leaders and 
members of their communities (Institute of Resource Assessment, 2007). This was 
indeed apparent in Kilimasera vi llage where a meeting was held with both the 
members of Village Council and the representatives of Mbarang‟andu CBO on the 21 
November 2007. At that meeting, each group blamed the other for infringing on 
areas of operation that had institutional and financial implications. On the one hand, 
representatives of the Village Council expressed their views that;  
 
…the Village Councils environmental committee supervised hunting and the 
money from the sale of meat came to the village office. We managed to build a 
primary school using village funds. When Mbarang’andu emerged in 2000, a new 
committee was formed that took all the village wildlife-related responsibilities. 
Since then, village wildlife funds are remitted to the Mbarang’andu office and the 
money no longer comes to the village office. Yet, the Village Council is required to 














On the other hand, the CBO committee complained that; 
   
 …the problem is that our responsibilities include overseeing activities of the 
Village Council environmental committee on issues related to wildlife…For us, this 
has become a burden because we don’t have an office in the village and we don’t 
own the land where wildlife are found. The Village Council have land rights and 
we work from the village office. So the allocation of hunting funds from the Wildlife 
Division comes to the Village Council and the village environmental committee 
gets the share of that money but not us…   
 
6.2 Insights from Mbarang’andu WMA 
The analysis of data for Mbarang‟andu WMA confirms that relocations and the 
increased wildlife numbers coupled with the restricted access and use of land have 
become the main push factor for indigenous people who are currently considering 
voluntary relocation to seek alternative livelihood strategies outside the villages. 
Indeed, land use data for Mbarang‟andu WMA support the villager‟s claim that 
wildlife has taken the best in their cultural and economic landscape. As described in 
the previous chapters, Mbarang‟andu WMA is a land contributed by seven villages 
for wildlife conservation. Until 2002, there were 28,526 people in the seven villages 
all of whom fully depended on agriculture (Mbarang'andu, 2003). Through the 
GTZ/SCP, villages were assisted in planning their land use, which was a pre-
requisite for the establishment of the WMA and its registration as a CBO. On 18 
February 2004, Mbarang‟andu was eventually registered as a CBO responsible for 
the management of the WMA on behalf of the seven villages. According to the 
official files, vi llage land use plans were carried out by villagers who endorsed that all 
areas five kilometres away from the village centre in all the directions should be 
given for other uses (including wildlife and forest conservation). Practically, the five-
kilometre radius would be an area for residence and farms and that was officially 
recorded as the border between communal land use and wildlife areas. Village 
elders who participated in the border discussions confirmed this during in-depth 
interviews. However, these elders lament that the aim of the land use plan was not 
made clear to them and that the five-kilometre radius is by no means enough for 
present and future human needs because the population is growing. Moreover, 
wildlife does not observe these borders; they use all the areas including those for 














...we did not know how that could soon affect us…Wahifadhi (GTZ conservationists) 
came and asked us indirectly. How many miles do you walk to your farm? Most of us said 
five without knowing why we were asked. The five miles
21
 are now set as borders for 
agriculture and wildlife in every direction…wildlife postings are everywhere around the 
village and that is already included in their maps. We remain a small island in an animal 
ocean. As we speak, animals are everywhere in these farms and the number is 
increasing fast. They (animals) do not know these borders and surprisingly, 
conservationists are not bothered about our safety and crops… (Interview, Chona, 
18/11/2007) 
 
The story above confirms two observations made earlier in this study. Firstly, that 
rather than removing borders, borders in southeastern Tanzania are a tool for 
acquiring communal land for wildlife protection. The second observation relates to 
the fact that these borders are not obstacles for wildlife movement but they set limits 
for people. Unlike people, wildlife crosses these borders. The border drawing 
process that limits people to a five-kilometre radius while allowing wildlife to overflow 
in the neighbouring areas is an indication of further constraints to human survival 
and a silent call for relocation. As discussed in Chapter Five, this has since the 
expansion of the SGR been a strategy to clear humans from areas earmarked for 
wildlife. Mzee Cosmas of Milonji village believes that vi llager‟s participation in land 
use planning and border demarcation is largely driven by politics of „community 
involvement‟ and it serves to block people from demanding compensation for the 
damages caused by wildlife. According to him, the government was part of the 
GTZ/SCP and it owns the land, forests, wildlife, and villagers were obliged to 
participate in drawing WMA borders. He narrates that;  
 
…After all, you can only have control over what you own. We own neither the land 
nor wildlife on it. The government does. So projects come, not because we are 
here, but because the land has wild animals. The government and 
conservationists come to protect animals against us, not the vice verse…We are 
responding to the government voice because ours cannot be head above the 
government’s. However, the government is listening to the foreigners (GTZ) and 
not us. In fact, it is selling our land to the foreigners through us... we are literally 
assisting in getting our land sold to whites and they will rule us again...Selous will 
rule us again. He initially acquired the Selous reserve and now his children are 
expanding it…But how can we let Selous expand the area up to our 
beds?...(Interview, 5/11/2007) 
 
                                                 












Land use plans for Mbarang‟andu WMA were prepared for a ten year period from 
2003-2013. As Table 6.2 and Figure 6.6 indicate, wildlife and forest conservation 
occupies most village areas with only small fractions of land set aside for agriculture 
and residents. Songambele village stands out as an exception with 49% of its land in 
agriculture while six villages have less than 10% of the total land for agriculture 22. 
Conceptually, areas set aside for wildlife and forest in each village are what forms 
Mbarang‟andu WMA. In fact, wildlife and forest areas combined occupies 385,469.5 
hectares (84.2% of the total area) while agriculture occupy only 43293.5 hectares 
(9.5% of the total area). Residents (which include institutional and public spaces) 
occupy 28569.3 hectares (6.3% of the total area).  As would be expected, human 
and wildlife populations are growing. Projections indicate that human population in 
the vi llages forming Mbarang‟andu WMA is increasing by 3.4% per annum (see 
Figure 6.7). Put other way, by 2015 the population will have increased 1.5 times that 
of 2002 when the land use plans were drawn.  
 





Residential % of 
total 












Kilimasera 75 0.47 1450 9.13 8875 55.91 5475 34.49 
Mchomoro 561 0.5 5789 5 29964 25.2 79991 68.8 
Nambeche 205.5 0.5 3571.5 7.9 28705.1  63.9 12476.25 27.7 
Songambele  2455 5.8 20836 49.1 1344 3.2 1779 41.9 
Kitanda 378.7 0.4 4275 4.4 55153.5  56.6 37535 38.6 
Likuyuseka 24251.6 27.3 2156 2.4 21919.4  24.7 40566.5 45.6 
Mtelawamwahi 642.5 1 5216 7.7 21685.75 32.1 40000 59.2 
Total 28569.3 6.3 43293.5 9.5 167646.75 36.6 217822.75 47.6 
Source: Mbarang‟andu, (2005) 
 
                                                 
22 This difference is a potential conflict over benefit sharing between those villages with more w ildlife areas and those with 
more land under agricultural since Article 7 of  the CBO constitution states that wildlife-related benefits w ill be shared equally 


































Residential Agriculture Willdife  and forest areas
 
Source: Source: Mbarang‟andu, (2005) 
 
Official records for wildlife population in the village lands are not yet established. 
However, villagers report that elephant population in their surroundings has grown 
substantially in the past few years. According to the village game scouts in 
Kilimasera (preferred anonymity), the increased wildlife numbers in the village is 
associated with their protection and restricted movement of people and farming 
activities. As one of the village game scouts tell informally ‘…It is a simple logic. 
Animals are protected, few dies while many are born. Villages are given six animals 
to hunt per year, which we cannot even hunt because of either this or that. 
Remember there are those animals like elephants which are never hunted but are 
the most destructive’ (Interview, Anonymous Informant, 19/11/2007). By villager‟s 
standards, one can meet a group of elephants in a less than a kilometre from the 
village centre compared to three or four in the past five years. This distance is far 
below the five kilometres set as the human-wildlife border. This implies then that 












the village including those set aside for agriculture and settlements. This has 
become the main concern for many villagers who watch as wildlife replaces their 
livelihood activities faster than they expected.   
 



















2002 Census 715 4826 827 6936 7133 1257 6832
2015 Projections 30694 216746 1235 201635 289784 56455 206839
Kilimasera Nambeche Songambele Kitanda Likuyuseka Mtelaw amw ahi Mchomoro
 
Source: Mbarang‟andu, (2005) 
 
While conservationist‟s focus is on wildlife protection to increase the numbers, 
people and crop protection is left for individuals and village councils that are known 
to be financially and technically incapable of doing so. For example, section 4.6 of 
the Mbarang‟andu WMA land use plan declares that since farms and residents are 
not part of WMA, the protection of people and their croplands is the responsibility of 
Village Councils (Mbarang'andu, 2003). As Neumann (2002) suggests, the 
withdrawing of crop and people protection has long been a conservationist‟s strategy 
for indisposing traditional land uses in favour of wildlife. An elderly villager of 
Likusanguse did not miss words for this injustice; 
 
…It is clear to me that conservation has nothing to do with us. When we report 
crop damage by elephants, district game officers respond after five days. When 












take everything (the report, meat and ivory). When a person is killed by an 
elephant that is not the game officer’s business, it is a police case… (Interview, 
Ambuje, 13/8/2008).  
 
The Mbarang‟andu WMA is typical of conservationist discourse that, in my view, has 
created paradise for wildlife while creating human enclosures that will suffocate the 
community that already has a long history of displacement. Apparently, not many 
community members have realised this future predicament as they still portray WMA 
land use as something they could legally break should they not benefit. However, the 
registration certificate for the Mbarang‟andu CBO is accompanied by the certificate 
of incorporation under the Trustee‟s Incorporation Ordinance (Chapter 375) which 
states that; Firstly, such body corporate (Mbarangandu CBO) shall not, without 
obtaining consent from the Administrator General of Trustees in writing acquire any 
estate or interest in land. Secondly, such body corporate shall not, without consent, 
use or permit use of any land vested in it otherwise than in direct fulfilment of the 
trust for which the body corporate was established. This section of the certificate 
confirms that, the land set aside as WMA shall not be influenced by village needs 
anymore and that it is a permanent and irrevocable change in land tenure.  
 
6.3 Commercialization and community hunting rights  
Contradictions have surrounded efforts that seek to balance between local 
subsistence needs and commercial investments in the growing demand for nature 
commodification. Wildlife and forests are no longer viewed merely as subsistence 
resources for rural households, nor as simply areas of rich biodiversity for the 
concern of conservationists but are seen as commercial assets on which enterprise, 
investment and growth should be built (Ashley and Wolmer, 2003). For Tanzania, 
wildlife is currently the key asset in the tourism industry worth an estimated USD 862 
million as of 2006, which makes it  a leading contributor to the national foreign 
exchange reserves (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum (TNRF), 2008). 
Nevertheless, tourism is considered a sector whose potentials for poverty alleviation 
have not been well exploited. While this concept is highly disputed, it is worth 
attention since it has become the essence of wildlife commercialization in Tanzania. 
The focus here is, however, the potential of wildlife commercialization as a vehicle 
for rural development. I use the case of Mbarang‟andu to demonstrate that WMAs 












protected areas in Tanzania are far from reaching the conditions that can enable 
these communities to negotiate conservation benefits. The possibilities of benefits 
from conservation which are seen in other countries such as Botswana and South 
Africa are supported by the fact that local communities have ownership of resources 
such as land and wildlife and they can work in partnership with private sector thereby 
controlling revenues derived from tourism. Botswana and South Africa have different 
resource ownership systems which can elaborate this point.  
 
Like in Tanzania, land in Botswana is administered under the State Land Act (1966) 
which empowers the President to make and execute grants of any land or of any 
interest therein (Mathuba, 2003). Nevertheless, Botswana‟s Wildlife Conservation 
Policy No.1 of 1986 and the Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act of 1992 
provides for the creation of Controlled Hunting Areas (CHAs) and WMAs in villages 
around major protected areas (Hachileka, 2003). The two land use categories are 
specifically designed to benefit local people and foster rural development. The 
CBNRM policy, which evolved around the same time as that of Tanzania, encourage 
villages in CHAs and WMAs to form Trusts which becomes legal entities qualified to 
get leases for CHAs thus allowing communities to enter into legal contracts with the 
private sector directly. Communities can also sublease their areas for joint ventures 
and receive grants directly from donors (Hachileka, 2003). In both CHAs and WMAs, 
traditional rights are recognised. In fact, the use of natural resources in the WMAs is 
subject to consultations between the residents, local authorities, government entities 
in the area concerned and the Department of Wildlife and National Parks. These 
consultations are guided by the Joint Venture Handbook of 1999 (Hachileka, 2003, 
Phuthego and Chanda, 2004, Mathuba, 2003).  
 
The Makuleke community of South Africa represent a different scenario. 
Ramutsindela, (2002) provides a detailed analysis of community land claims that 
resulted into the recognition of community rights to the land currently forming the 
Kruger National Park (KNP). Others have analysed how the community has 
exercised the land rights for the partnership with private investors in the GLTFP (see 
Buzzard, 2001; Fakir, 2003; Ferreira, 2006).  In 1969, the Makuleke people were 
relocated from the area called Pafuri, which became part of the KNP. The area had 












the park. There were also other conflicts of interest over the Pafuri area with 
individuals, private companies and government departments contending for different 
interests including mining, settlement, farming and wildlife conservation 
(Ramutsindela, 2002). As elsewhere, the Makuleke people were portrayed as hostile 
to nature that became the basis for their removal. However, in 1995 the Makuleke 
community laid claim to their land, which had already been incorporated and 
declared part of the KNP. The land claim was settled in 1998 where the community 
was given a Deed of Grant to their land, meaning that the Pafuri area became a 
contractual park managed jointly by the South African National Parks and the 
Makuleke community (Ramutsindela, 2002). Since then, and as the KNP became 
part of the GLPTFP, the Makuleke community retain rights to the economic benefits 
accruing from the use of land and the rural development initiatives have been 
incorporated as part of protected area projects (Fakir, 2003, Ferreira, 2006, Buzzard, 
2001). As such, the community negotiate directly with private investors over the 
commercial use of their land. This model is not applied throughout South Africa for 
reasons beyond the scope of this thesis (see Benjaminsen et al., 2008). 
 
The difference between Tanzania and the two examples above is the fact that the 
Tanzanian state retains the central ownership and control of resources, the 
management as well as the utilization, which blocks any attempt for fair benefit 
sharing between the government and local communities. Yet, the examples from 
South Africa suggest that resource ownership is an important condition for 
communities to benefit from commercialization of natural resources. This condition is 
therefore lacking in Tanzania despite the decade long process of governance 
reforms that aimed at devolving the ownership of resources to the local communities. 
As the data from Mbarang‟andu WMA will demonstrate later in the section, this 
implies that local communities are far from benefiting from wildlife commercialization. 
Besides, the ownership issue raises even more concerns as communities can 
neither be compensated for the loss of land and nor for the damages caused by 
wildlife. The analysis of laws regulating tourism activities coupled with the empirical 
data provide me with an argument and theoretical perspective that WMAs in 
Tanzania are not intended to empower local communities economically but are tools 
for expansion of protected areas and provision of revenue to the state and its 













Wildlife tourism (consumptive and non-consumptive) is the most viable and, so far, 
targeted investment in WMAs across the country. Through tourism, villages are 
expected to increase revenue and ultimately alleviate poverty. In particular, tourism 
revenues are to improve diet, availability of social services (roads, hospitals, 
schools) and employment opportunities (Baldus, 2008, Baldus et al., 1994, URT, 
2002c). Conceptually, emphasis on tourism expansion as a strategy for poverty 
alleviation has been used to conceal the need for relocation of people from targeted 
wildlife areas and instead advocating for co-existence. Notably, commercialization of 
wildlife is used as an incentive for the communities to set aside their land for wildlife 
conservation. It should be emphasized, however, that the central government 
through the Wildlife Division continues to regulate wildlife utilization in game reserves 
as well as in the WMAs. This means that tourist and resident hunting, game viewing, 
photographic as well as camping activities in communal lands are controlled and 
paid for in the Wildlife Division. By implication, the Wildlife Division can allocate to a 
tourist an area of the WMA as a hunting block without consultations with CBOs, 
which manage such areas. 
 
This study establishes that as long as the Wildlife Division controls wildlife utilization 
in communal lands, tourism is not a livelihood option for local people. Precisely, the 
commercialization of wildlife through hunting tourism has not demonstrated the 
support for development of specific geographical areas where wildlife exists. Instead, 
hunting has become a strategy for accumulation of revenues by the central 
government and institutions charged with wildlife management. It should be recalled 
that the Tanzania‟s wildlife policy of 1998 recognised community WMAs as a new 
category of protected areas in the village lands where communities would be given 
full mandate for wildlife management (URT, 1998b). However, the revised wildlife 
policy of 2007 describes such WMAs as a mechanism for securing wildlife habitat 
and halt degradation (URT, 2007c). The revised policy states further that ‘the 
government will ensure equitable distribution of costs and benefits that considers 
stakeholder roles in relation to categories of land and efforts invested by the 
institution in conservation‟ (URT, 2007c: 28). In practice, community WMAs are 












Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT) and not CBO or Village Councils 
(see Chapter Four).  
 
New set of regulations for wildlife utilization (non-consumptive tourism) were 
formulated alongside the new focus of the wildlife policy. The regulations were 
issued in September 2007. These regulations give powers to the Director of Wildlife 
to control wildlife use on village land and set out schedules for the payment of fees 
and other applicable charges at the Wildlife Division in Dar es Salaam (URT, 2007b). 
Since consumptive tourism (hunting) has always been regulated by the Wildlife 
Division (even when hunting blocks are located in the village lands) , both 
consumptive and non-consumptive tourism regulations leave communities with no 
role to play in tourism revenue collection. As a result, communities accrue minimum 
benefits from wildlife utilization in their land. For example, in 2006 the Wildlife 
Division earned TShs 15.3 billion (approximately USD 11.5 million) from sustainable 
wildlife utilisation and allocated 1.96 billion (12.8%) (approximately USD 1.4 million) 
back to 41 District Councils that neighbour the tourist hunting areas (URT, 2008). 
Likewise, TANAPA earned TShs 69 billion in 2007 of which it allocated 1.24 billion 
(1.8%) for communities around the fifteen national parks (Tanzania Natural 
Resource Forum (TNRF), 2008). 
 
The application of new wildlife utilization rules in southeastern Tanzania leave 
indigenous people with more challenges associated with not only the changing role 
of wildlife as a traditional source of livelihood but also the unjust nature of wildlife 
business. In Mbarang‟andu, as it is for other four WMAs in the Selous-Niassa area, 
consumptive wildlife utilization (tourist and resident hunting) is the main commercial 
investment option since non-consumptive wildlife activities such as photographic and 
game viewing are limited by the remoteness and accessibility of the area (Graham, 
2005). Details of resident hunting will be provided later in this section. As for 
commercial and tourist hunting, the Wildlife Division has allocated the five WMAs in 
the Selous-Niassa area (including Mbarang‟andu) as hunting blocks leased by 
different private companies. The blocks are namely Mbarang‟andu (which is by itself 
a name of the WMA), Mtungwe Central, Ruvuma Open Area and Mtungwe South. 
Game Frontiers of Tanzania Ltd (GFT) and Maasai Hunting  Company Ltd (MHC) 












leased by M.S.K Hunting safaris. The Ruvuma Open Area is leased by Bushmen 
safaris.  
 
As noted earlier, hunting concession holders pay for block fees at the Wildlife 
Division in Dar es Salaam and are granted five-year leases23. With this 
understanding, neither village governments and nor CBOs have access to funds 
generated from tourism hunting in their land. Private concessionaires are at most 
required to contribute to village developments and they do so in varying degrees 
because there are no legal obligations to that rule. In fact, Chachage, (2000) argues 
that the negotiable nature of this obligation is a locus of corruption in the allocation 
and hunting activities in the blocks. As a result, the proportion of hunting funds that 
reach vi llage councils is small, provided irregularly, and it ends up in the hands of 
few village officials. Village leaders have often confused the contributions made by 
hunting companies with the 25% allocation that comes from the Wildlife Division 
through the District Councils. For example, the Kilimasera village leaders 
acknowledged to have received in 2005 Tshs 700,000 from GFT, another 700,000 
from the District Council as part of 25% for 2006 and 300,000 again from GFT for 
2007 (Interview, Mdoo, 21/11/2007). Neither of the two sources is consistent on the 
amount and time of delivering the funds and, as a result, this research established 
that Village Councils have poor records of such funds and their uses. Overall, the 
proportion and sporadic nature of hunting revenues to the villages make it difficult to 
assess the contribution of wildlife to the local community development.  
 
Critical data for the analysis of the impacts of commercial hunting is also lacking 
from important sources including the Wildlife Division. However, the five hunting 
concessionaires in the WMAs in Selous-Niassa area support two main arguments; 
firstly, that commercial hunting can cause much more damage to wildlife than small-
scale farming activities of the local communities. This is more so since, unlike the 
Makuleke community, that has land and wildlife rights, the communities in the study 
area have no powers to monitor hunting activities and concessionaires are not 
responsible to either CBOs or Village Councils . The second argument relates to the 
fact that once an area of the WMA is leased as a hunting block it becomes a „no go 
                                                 












area’ for community members. In SGR, hunting blocks are utilised by foreign hunting 
tourists who are mainly from Europe (47.3%) and America (34.2%) (Cauldwell, 
2004). Indeed, communal land use is redefined and community rights are reallocated 
rendering the already marginalised communities powerless and powerful actors 
more powerful. 
 
Notwithstanding the restricted access to the WMAs, subsistence hunting remains a 
vital livelihood activity for local communities since game meat is the main source of 
protein. As observed by the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and 
World Conservation Monitoring Centre (WCMC) (2008), the present SGR bisects the 
traditional lands of the Wangindo tribe who have ever since lived by hunting. Unlike 
tourists who see wildlife as a world heritage for recreation, local communities see 
wild animals as a source of meat. For example, a wild animal is called ‘mnyama’ in 
Kiswahili but local people in the study area uses the word „nyama’ when referring to 
the same. Under normal circumstances, nyama is a Kiswahili word for meat. My 
interpretation of the use of the word nyama to connote both a wild animal and meat 
is that, for local people in southeastern Tanzania, a wild animal is meat. As it was for 
most other African societies living near wildlife areas, subsistence hunting in the 
southeastern Tanzania has been for the pot – to provide food for the families or to 
sell to other villagers in exchange of different types of food (Bonner, 1993). It is on 
this basis that  local communities in the Selous-Niassa area have high preference for 
game meat as compared to domestic meat sources (Ashley et al., 2002). The 
community preference for game meat could also explain the low number of livestock 
in the area. Surveys indicate, for example, that only 0.6% of respondents own less 
than ten livestock (particularly sheep and goats) in addition to crop cultivation. This 
data leads to a conclusion that, with limitations in subsistence hunting, the amount of 
animal protein available to the local population is overly low. However, subsistence 
hunting has not been fully acknowledged as an important livelihood activity. Instead, 
it is labelled as poaching. The conservation project GTZ/SCP formalised subsistence 
hunting - now known as legal wildlife utilization - to control poaching around the 
SGR. Nevertheless, the impact of this scheme to the community has remained 













Like tourist hunting, the Wildlife Division regulates subsistence hunting through the 
allocation of animal quota to the villages that have set aside their lands for wildlife 
conservation and have registered their land as WMAs. Recalling the different stages 
of the process of establishing WMAs in the study area, this means that the eleven 
study villages that form the proposed Kimbanda, Chingoli and Kisungule WMAs have 
never received quota allocations. In other words, these villages have no legal 
hunting rights. The analysis of the impact of community hunting is thus limited to the 
study villages that form Mbarang‟andu and Nalika WMAs  which are already 
registered as CBOs. Data from these villages support what Ashley et al. (2002) 
observed that community game meat might not appear of great significance in 
villages of many inhabitants but it remains a major livelihood issue which is complex 
and highly politicised. Two main reasons are associated with this observation; firstly, 
that the GTZ/SCP established claims that through quota allocation, the project 
achieved the provision of legal supply of game meat for which local people have high 
preference at lower prices (Baldus, 2008). This way, GTZ/SCP claim acceptability by 
local people who, in turn, supported ant-poaching and embraced wildlife protection in 
their village lands by giving in their subsistence hunting practices (GTZ, 1998, SCP, 
1990). As such, this became the basis for the confiscation of subsistence hunting 
weapons. The second reason for the observation made above is that quota hunting 
is claimed to have provided income to the village governments thereby presenting  
wildlife conservation as a practical means for poverty alleviation in southeastern 
Tanzania (Kibonde, 2006, Graham, 2005, Baldus, 2008) .  
 
Typical practices for quota utilization challenge the foregoing arguments. Ideally, the 
Wildlife Division dispatches quota for District Councils and from there the District 
Game Officer (DGO) distributes the quota among the WMA member villages. Village 
government organises for hunting with the support of village game scouts and 
traditional hunters locally called Warumba. As Table 6.3 indicates, the typical village 
quota is six to eight animals per year. After the animal is hunted the meat is sold 
either fresh, dried or smoked, depending on the distance to the vi llage. The price for 
game meat (as of November 2007) was Tshs 1000 per kilogram (approximately USD 
0.7), which is about half the price of the domestic meat sources. It is important to 
note that the money from meat sales is generated when villagers purchase the meat. 












individual income. In fact, villagers pay for wild meat taken from their own lands 
(GTZ/SCP, 1996). It is not surprising, then, that for local people access to quota 
meat is still restricted because not all have money to buy the meat (particularly the 
elderly and sick). The money accrued from meat sale is considered community 
income from wildlife. As Hahn and Kaggi (2002) acknowledges, however, over half of 
the revenues from community meat sales goes toward meeting the recurring costs of 
protecting wildlife. Typical expenditures include ammunition for patrols and the 
annual arms license fees. The small proportion of the revenues that remain covers 
costs for quota hunting (ammunition, food for hunters and transport costs) and in 
some cases where villages do not own hunting weapons they incur additional cost 
for hiring.  
  




Allocation for Mbarang’andu WMA member villages 
Species # Kitanda Nambeche Likuyuseka Songambele Mchomoro Kilimasera Mtelawamwahi  
Buffalo 18 1 3 3 3 3 2 3 
Eland 9 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bush pig 10 3 2 3 - 2   2 
Warthog 12 - - - - - - - 
Waterbuck 5 - - - - - - - 
Ostrich  5 - - - - - - - 
Reedbuck 6 - 1 - 1 1 1 - 
Bushbuck 3 1 - - 1 - 2 1 
Guinea 
Fowl 
10 - - - - - - - 
Bush 
Duiker 
10 - - - - - - - 
Total 88 8 7 7 6 7 6 7 
Source: Author Compilation from official files in Namtumbo District Natural 
Resources Office, (undated) 
 
The field visit made in November 2007 coincided with the hunting season. As Table 
6.3 indicates, vi llage quotas appear to be few animals per annum but most villages 
are unable to hunt due to a combination of reasons. Firstly, that the quota allocation 
does not depend on community needs. According to the letter dated 2 July 2007 
from the Wildlife Division to the Namtumbo-DGO, which authorised the quota in 
Table 6.2, the quota allocation is based on species abundance, habitat status, rarity 












hunting in reserved areas (Beinart, 1990). Hence, villagers lament that the most 
destructive species (such as elephants) are never in the quota and so too are the 
limits for the most palatable species such as eland and reedbuck. In contrary, 
species such as bush pig and warthog dominate the quota and yet they are 
preference of few community members due to the religious beliefs. Considering that 
the quota is utilized on communal lands, its allocation based on ecological aspects 
rather than community preferences and needs defeat its purposes as an alternative 
source of protein and income for such communities. Instead, soaring problems such 
as crop damage and the associated low income and food insecurity continues to 
grow.  
 
The second constraint for quota hunting relates to the low revenues accrued from 
quota sale. Lack of funds constrains the maintenance of hunting facilities such as 
guns and ammunition in addition to the charges for hunters. It is not surprising that 
some vi llages could have a gun but they lack funds for buying  ammunition (one-
bullet costs up to Tshs 20,000, which is equivalent of 20 kilograms of meat). This 
was the case in Kilimasera village. In other cases such as in Darajambili, the village 
does not own a gun but it arranges to buy ammunition and hire a gun from the 
neighbouring village. The third constraint involves a scenario where vi llages own 
guns and they have money for ammunition but the District Council runs out of supply 
for ammunition. Villages such as Mchomoro have experienced desperate times 
when they have fulfilled all the requirements and yet they cannot utilize the allocated 
quota. Conceptually, village failures to utilize quota for one or a combination of 
reasons above is directly related to the deliberate withdrawal of the Wildlife Division 
in supporting communities to achieve that goal. Notably, the Wildlife Division, which 
allocates quota, is the same that supplies limited ammunition. This leads one to 
advise that the existing constraints on quota utilization are created by the central 
government but are dealt with locally, the result of which, boosts wildlife population in 
the village lands.  
 
Table 6.4 presents an example of quota utilization for hunting season 2005/06 and 
2007/08 for Huria village (member of Nalika WMA), which is singled out by 
neighbouring vi llages as a role model in the utilization of the quota. The statistics 












village revenue for that hunting season was Tshs 817,000 (approximately USD 600). 
According to the village chairperson, the funds covered the cost of the next hunting 
season and other development activities. Until the time of the field visit in November 
2007 Huria vi llage had hunted two animals for the 2007/08 season (which was to 
end in December)24. 
 
Table 6.4 Huria Village quota allocation and hunting   
Species ‘05/06 Hunted Revenue  07/08 Hunted (by 
Nov. 2007) 
Revenue  
Buffalo 2 2 746,000 2 1 350,000 
Eland 1 0 - 1 1 180,000 
Bush pig 2 0 - 2 - - 
Warthog - - - - - - 
Waterbuck  - - - - - - 
Ostrich  1 1 71,000 3 - - 
Reedbuck - - - - - - 
Bushbuck  - - - - - - 
Guinea fowl - - - - - - 
Bush Duiker - - - - - - 
Total 6 3 817,000 8 2 530,000 
Source: Author Compilation from official files in Tunduru District Natural Resources 
Office and Huria Village Council, (undated) 
 
On 17 November 2007, I observed the selling of the second animal in the 2007/08 
quota, which happened to be a buffalo. Many villagers hoping to buy the meat 
surrounded the village office. However, two obstacles hindered access to meat. 
Firstly, the amount was not enough for every villager who had the money to buy the 
meat and, secondly, not every villager had money to buy the meat. As such, almost 
half of those with money did not get the meat. The visit to the households after meat 
sale revealed that villagers hated the quota system and they regard it as further 
imposition on the right to hunt, which they believe is part of their culture. This is an 
indication that even though subsistence hunting has never been fully acknowledged, 
it occurred and it served the community subsistence and cash needs. The present 
wildlife quota provides limited meat supply for better-off villagers and it has generally 
destroyed subsistence hunting practices. It is in view of this that the widely publicised 
acceptability and economic benefits derived from wildlife quota seems overrated. A 
comment of an elderly villager in Huria village suffices; 
 
                                                 












…you recorded that there was meat in this village yesterday, didn’t you? 
However, you found me eating grasses like zebra. This is a full cassava 
meal…cassava ugali (stiff porridge), accompanied by kisamvu (cassava leaves) 
and cooked by cassava stem. The forest is taken over by powerful hands… 
(Interview, Mnyandika, 18/11/2007) 
 
 
6.4 Community enclosures and the quest for voluntary surrender 
The analysis of tourist hunting and quota utilization practises as provided in the 
previous section and, as observed elsewhere in the country, shows that local 
communities in southeastern Tanzania believe that the government has not fulfilled 
its promises for better life because they incur more wildlife-related costs than 
benefits (Ashley et al., 2002, Kideghesho, 2006). Overall, community involvement in 
wildlife conservation has promoted wildlife welfare over that of the people. As one 
villager commented;  
 
…If you kill a person today, your case will be lesser than killing an animal 
(whether small or big, in defence or for a hungry child). We ourselves are turned 
into conservationist…in almost every household there is a village game scout or a 
member of environmental committee. Your own son can take you to task…  
(Interview, Rashidi, 18/11/2007). 
 
Improved wildlife welfare and a total absence of game officers in the study villages 
signifies a deliberate withdrawal of crop and people protection against wildlife. As 
noted earlier, the government does not provide compensation for loss of property, 
injury, or death resulting from wildlife. Particularly, the land and wildlife policies have 
no provisions for problems related to human-wildlife conflicts. This is particularly so 
because on the one hand, as intimated in the previous sections, individuals own farm 
plots but not the land. Thus in case of relocation, compensation is done for physical 
properties and perennial crops found on the plot (URT, 1999b). Even then, most 
people in the study area do not qualify for such compensations as they are not 
physically relocated. If anything, they are considered as models for community 
participation in wildlife protection. On the other hand, the wildlife policy states that 
problem animals, and elephants in particular, will be killed only in those cases where 
there is clear evidence of significant damage to human property or significant threat 
to human safety or life (URT, 1998b). But even where there is evidence of significant 












government does not intend to introduce a compensation scheme for wildlife 
damage’ (URT, 1998b:22). With this lack of compensation, people are enraged as 
the damage caused by wildlife is increasingly severe as the clip opines; 
 
…Last year no one harvest anything in this village and the government did not 
care about what we ate… In June 2007, my neighbour’s two acres of paddy were 
destroyed by elephants. The village game scouts who, like most of us do not have 
weapons to scare elephants, reported to the District Game Officer. The officer 
came after two days and killed one elephant. The meat was sold in the village, 
25% of the money was retained by the Village Council while 75% of the money 
and the ivory were taken to the district office. My neighbour was left with 
nothing...I think we have lost this game…I really hope elephants will vote in 
2010… (Interview, Tiriri, 11/11/2007)  
 
The current situation coupled with memories of previous relocation has provoked a 
sense of despair, disappointment and loss of trust for the government and 
conservationists. Some people have already abandoned their farm plots in the 
swampy and fertile soils and are considering relocation. The main reason why many 
would consider this option is the bleak future associated with living far into the 
interior of a protected area. Villagers are not convinced that the Selous-Niassa 
project, which is a brainchi ld of the GTZ/SCP that has been protecting wildlife 
against people for the past two decades, could stand for their interest. The 
discussion with Nicolus Ntatu during the transect walk in Lusewa village captured 
these concerns;  
 
...if I close my eyes and visualise this area in ten years to come, it will be a wildlife 
land (refer to Figure 6.8). We will have no farms, no freedom to walk in our land 
and we will have nobody to complain to because we are participating in the 
conservation project. Conservationists are animal advocates, our government 
alike. Am sure you (me) are also one of them...There will be very limited choices 
for us. I think we will eventually give up and leave these areas... (Interview, 
12/9/2007) 
 
The common end of many stories about displacement (whether voluntary or 
involuntary relocation) is that new land uses replace indigenous activities and deny 
them rights to access important natural resources. The case of this study fits well in 
this description. The fact that the government has leased all the five WMAs in the 












WMAs as a tool for empowering local people. In fact this raises more questions on 
whether commercial hunting and well-organised poaching linked with high level of 
corruption will really protect wildlife outside protected areas (McElwee, 2006, 
Rangarajan and Shahabuddin, 2006, Bonner, 1993).  
 
Figure 6.8 Transect walk and informal discussions with key informant 
 
Source: Photo taken on 12/9/2007 in Lusewa village 
 
Recently, the Tanzania‟s Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism declared that 
in spite of the great commitment in setting aside large proportions of land for wildlife 
protection, the sector faces growing management challenges, one of which is 
poaching that causes a loss of about 50,000 wild animals annually (The Guardian, 
2008). This outcry came in response to the claims laid by residents of the recently 
established Wami-Mbiki WMA in northern SGR who reported of the well organised 
poaching that comes from outside their community. As evidence to their claim, the 












carcasses of freshly killed wild animals in plea  to take serious action against 
poaching in their village areas (ThisDay, 2009). This rampart poaching in WMAs is 
allegedly supported by law enforcement departments whose officials facilitate 
commercial poachers (Baldus, 2006a, The Guardian, 2008). 
  
6.5 Conclusion 
Community displacement remains an underestimated cost of the development 
paradigm associated with protected area expansions and conservationists are still in 
denial about their contributions to the creation of  conservation refugees (Geisler, 
2003, Dowie, 2009). In comparison to the previous displacements that resulted from 
forced relocation from national parks and game reserves, local communities 
experience similar effects today on the accounts that their land has become critical 
for the expansion of such protected areas and their commercialization. This chapter 
has presented the challenges that indigenous people in southeastern Tanzania 
encounters as the Selous-Niassa TFCA evolves. These people are constrained by 
the restricted access to WMAs, which had once been the main source of fertile lands 
for agricultural production, forest and wildlife resources. Even though it goes 
unacknowledged, the option of continuing to reside within a well developed wildlife 
area without property rights and protection against wildlife seems inconceivable.  
 
Critical to the analysis of the impacts of current practices is the reallocation of 
resource rights, which empowers the government and private businesses while 
disempowering communities that have already been marginalised by the wildlife 
protection policies. Thus, displacement and inequality in rights reallocation should be 
a central issue in the research that questions the viability of TFCAs as a tool for local 
community development. Obviously, the continued blame on local threats to 
biodiversity rather than evident external economic pressures point to the inequality 
that exist between those struggling to meet basic needs for survival and those 
supporting nature commodification for capital accumulation. Until local communities 
have secure property rights to enter into partnerships and  enable them to fairly be 
integrated in the global market, the poor will be further impoverished since the 
conservation costs are highest for them and lowest for the global actors (Adams and 












CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 
7.0 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the main findings of this study. It reflects on the study aim, 
specific objectives and the research questions that have guided the study. The 
chapter is organised in three sections. The first section highlights the main 
conceptual insights from scale analysis and border studies which were used to 
facilitate the investigation of the process that creates the Selous-Niassa TFCA and 
the implications of that process on the state and local communities. Two insights are 
drawn from the scale literature to summarise the main findings of this study. These 
are, firstly, that scale construction alters the geometry of power and secondly, that 
the process that constructs scale is a fundamental part of the activities that produce 
space. Insights from border studies, as used in this study, points to how the creation 
of scale was accompanied by the reconfiguration of borders in southeastern 
Tanzania. Furthermore, the section shows how newly created spaces and borders 
have changed institutions and redefined their functions. This section affirms that 
scale and border analyses provide avenues for a nuanced understanding of the 
TFCA process and the consequent inequalities. The second section draws on 
lessons from Selous-Niassa TFCA process to make general observations about 
TFCAs. 
 
7.1 Conceptual insights, research findings and the contribution of the study 
This study has contributed to the research on TFCA by bring into light the 
importance of scale and border perspectives in the analysis of the process and the 
impacts of TFCAs. The purpose of the study is to use these geographic concepts to 
understand how bioregions become foundations for TFCAs, and the impacts that 
TFCAs have on the state and local communities. The creation of the SNWC in the 
Selous-Niassa TFCA in southeastern Tanzania is used as a case study to tease out 
these processes. The main claim of the study is that scale and border concepts are 
aspects central to the understanding of the bioregional process and ways in which 
that process supports the establishment of TFCAs. It is by understanding the 
process that research can explain inequalities in TFCAs.   
 
The use of scale in political ecology suggests that ecological and social changes 












interaction between political and economic processes at local, national, and 
international levels (Rangan and Kull, 2009). Large-scale bioregions have thus 
become the preferred scale at which global biodiversity can be protected effectively. 
As its proponents argue, bioregions have the potential to protect biodiversity in 
parks, farms, commercial forests, coastal zones, fishing areas as well as in people‟s 
backyards (Batisse, 1993, Breckwoldt, 1995, Brunckhorst, 2002). It is also argued 
that bioregional scale can promote biodiversity protection across political 
jurisdictions. This view supports cross-border protected areas such as TFCAs. In 
particular, TFCAs are advocated as having the potential to remove colonial borders 
by re-establishing ecological systems, and they can also re-unite local communities 
and foster political cooperation as well as economic development of states and local 
communities. Literature on TFCAs, however, challenges these assumptions on the 
basis that TFCAs have negative consequences on states and local communities 
such as economic inequalities, loss of communal lands and state sovereignty 
(Ramutsindela, 2007, Wolmer, 2003a, Dzingirai, 2004, Spierenburg et al., 2008). 
This study suggests that a deeper understanding of these consequences can be 
achieved through a careful investigation of the process by which TFCAs are created. 
One such process is the establishment of ecological corridors, which form the link 
between a mosaic of land required for the establishment of TFCAs. They also 
provide a platform on which different interest groups and individuals meet in their 
pursuit of the TFCA ideal. 
  
7.1.1 Scale construction and power implications 
Literature on scale asserts that scale construction alters the geometry of power 
hence power disequilibrium. In fact, McCarthy (2005) and Paasi (2004) verify that the 
construction of scale is an act of power. More than others, conservation NGOs have 
variously defined scales and have often engaged with existing scalar fixes and 
projects (Kurtz, 2003, Masson, 2006) to claim bioregions as the scale at which 
biodiversity can best be protected. As this study demonstrates, scalar fixes for 
bioregions have involved multiplicity of actors with diverse interests and ideologies 
which coincide and diverge from time to time (McShane, 2003, Masson, 2006) but 
with traces of compromises (Delaney and Leitner, 1997). Other recent studies have 












effect of networked practices of ecology, economy and politics (Engel-Di Mauro, 
2009, Legg, 2009, Rangan and Kull, 2009). 
 
This study demonstrates that there are two sides of scaling processes in bioregional 
processes in Tanzania, namely scaling up and scaling down. Scaling up relates 
closely to the fact that conservationists have used ecology as the object of politics, 
policy making and political actions to negotiate the meaning and spatial extent of 
environmental justice, both among themselves and with government decision 
makers and global financial institutions (Rangan and Kull, 2009, Kurtz, 2003, 
McAfee, 1999, Levine, 2002). Specifically, this thesis has confirmed that the creation 
of bioregional scale is the brainchild of IUCN and UNESCO, which have, in different 
times, developed multiple approaches and practices that have been aligned to the 
bioregional planning model. Accordingly, the IUCN protected area categories and 
UNESCO MAB and World Heritage Site programs were the basis for placing national 
protected areas and their management at the global level and also provided ground 
for the model for bioregional planning. The model envisages core protected areas 
that are surrounded by buffer zones/ecological corridors and cooperation zones thus 
institutionalising the harmonisation of natural protected areas (IUCN categories and 
UNESCO MAB) and cultural landscapes (World Heritage Sites).  
 
The CBD consolidated the bioregional ideas of international NGOs since it made 
environmental conservation a global agenda. Essentially, CBD stands as a general 
framework for the implementation of large-scale conservation projects and 
bioregional projects of different conservation NGOs have been linked to the GEF 
portfolio that encompasses representative ecosystems of global biodiversity 
significance and criteria such as levels of endemism and presence in global lists. It is 
particularly emphasised that these environmental criteria had been developed by 
IUCN and UNESCO programs (Boyle, 2003, Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, 2004). Connections are drawn, however, that international 
conservation NGOs such as IUCN, WWF, The Nature Conservancy, WRI, 
Biodiversity Action Network (BioNET) to mention a few, were insiders in the 
formation of GEF (Levine, 2002, McAfee, 1999, McShane, 2003). As Harvey (1996) 
remarks, the environmental economics has come to be a pragmatic tool for getting 












commodification is currently part of neo-liberal projects and a topic of political and 
intellectual debate (Castree, 2008, Mansfield, 2007, Igoe and Croucher, 2007). This 
study concludes, then, that by focussing on efforts to establish nature protected 
areas across state borders, international conservation institutions are in essence 
promoting a form of bioregionalism which favours cross-border bioregions as 
opposed to sub-national bioregions and, by doing so, these actors create a trans-
national niche area for private investments. 
 
The analysis of the bioregional processes in general and Tanzania in particular has 
confirmed that TFCAs are firmly founded on the bioregional planning model. This 
observation explains why TFCAs extend far beyond designated protected areas to 
include private and communal lands. As evidence of their basis, the majority of the 
TFCAs around the world are both in IUCN categories I and II and a number of them 
are Biosphere Reserves and World Cultural Heritage Sites (Brunckhorst, 2000, 
Lamb, 2006). In Tanzania, most protected areas which are designated as World 
Heritage Sites and Biosphere Reserves correspond sharply with bioregional projects 
of different conservation NGOs, most of which are implemented as cross-border 
projects such as African heartlands, ecoregions and TFCAs. In fact, there is not one 
exception for the World Heritage Site or a Biosphere Reserve in Tanzania, which is 
not part of cross-border projects of one or more international conservation 
institutions. This trend supports the claims about the scaling up processes in 
Tanzania and elsewhere. That is, the cross-border nature of bioregions means that 
nature conservation is no longer limited to the state and its sovereignty but 
transcends the territory of the state, resulting in nature becoming an international 
rather than national asset.  
 
Essentially, almost all large-scale conservation areas established so far in Tanzania 
have used World Heritage Sites and Biosphere Reserves as their pillars. 
Comparatively, Tanzania hosts the highest number of global ecoregions more than 
any other country in Africa and its islands (Burgess et al., 2004). The country hosts 
two African Heartlands in Maasai Stepples and Kilimanjaro (African Wildlife 
Foundation (AWF), 2000)  in addition to TFPs/TFCAs such as Mnazi Bay-Quirimbas 
Marine TFP (WWF, 2004) and the Selous-Niassa TFCA (Graham, 2005). In relation 












cross-border regions. For example, the Maasai Stepple Heartland across Tanzania-
Kenya border is also part of the East African Acacia ecoregion (Burgess et al., 
2004). Both the heartland and ecoregion projects use Ngorongoro Conservation 
Area and Serengeti National Park (which are both World Heritage Sites and 
Biosphere Reserves) as core protected areas. Likewise, the Kilimanjaro Heartland 
across Kenya-Tanzania border forms part of the East African moorland ecoregion 
(Burgess et al., 2004). The heartland and ecoregion projects use Kilimanjaro and 
Amboseli National Parks as core protected areas. The former is a World Heritage 
Site while the later is a Biosphere Reserve (Muruthi and Frohardt, 2006). 
Furthermore, the Selous-Niassa TFCA across the Tanzania-Mozambique border is 
within the Central and Eastern Miombo woodland ecoregion, which covers much of 
southern Tanzania and stretches down through Zambia and Mozambique into 
Zimbabwe and Angola (Burgess et al., 2004). These projects use SGR and NGR as 
core protected areas. 
 
Up-scaling processes involve actors and agencies external to the state and their 
influence on what was considered exclusive national asserts. As this study shows, 
external influence can be traced from changes in the relevant legislations to the 
actual design and plans for land required for the establishment of the SNWC as part 
of the Selous-Niassa TFCA. Indeed, the designation of national protected areas as 
global properties implied scaling up state regulatory functions over such areas thus 
surrendering the management powers to the global actors . This observation 
corresponds sharply with other studies which claim that international conservation 
actors present African natural resources as the world heritage thus making the 
external expertise and financial assistance as an option agreed upon by scientists 
and African governments (see Bonner, 1993; Singh and Houtum, 2002; 
Ramutsindela, 2008; Muthake, 2008).  
 
Scaling down processes in support of bioregions in Tanzania and elsewhere 
emanate from the fact that the practical implementation of the bioregional planning 
model necessitates the establishment of a local scale and, for that matter, the re-
organisation of local institutions (Ramutsindela, 2007, Chester, 2006). Consequently, 
the IUCN‟s Community Conservation Areas program (IUCN-CCA) was used to 












bioregions. Today land use categories that permit the establishment of buffer zones 
and wildlife corridors in communal lands are established within the framework of the 
IUCN-CCA and are currently considered as structural solutions for the complex 
problem of maintaining ecological connectivity (Goldman, 2009). This study confirms 
that, in the case of Tanzania, WMAs are a local scale established for this purpose. 
As such, WMAs are so far the main vehicle by which land is acquired from local 
communities for the establishment of buffer zones and wildlife corridors around 
protected areas throughout the country. Due to the importance of WMAs in 
facilitating bioregional processes, a great deal of effort was placed at the local scale 
making WMAs in Tanzania a point of intersection at which different actors contest 
power over natural resources. Specifically, the role of international conservation and 
development organisations such as AWF, WWF, Africare, GTZ and USAID has been 
imperative to the creation of the WMA as a new conservation scale. The collective 
efforts of these and other actors facilitated the creation of WMAs through the 
rearrangement of existing institutions and the creation of new ones. By doing so, 
village lands have been obtained for the establishment of wildlife buffer zones and 
ecological corridors.  
 
The study further demonstrates that WMAs and their governance structures are 
integrated into the creation of the Selous-Niassa TFCA and that the TFCA, in turn, 
forms part of the global goals for creating cross-border bioregions. This means that 
WMAs occur at the local level but they are part of a network of scales that promote 
biodiversity protection. WMAs have not only been important for the acquisition of 
communal land for the expansion and establishment of protected area networks but 
also constitute a niche area for investors and have provided central government with 
opportunities for deriving income at the cost of the locals. It is on this basis that this 
study concludes that scaling processes have empowered the central government 
and private sector actors while disempowering local communities.  
 
Whereas WMAs remain the main strategy for implementing bioregional planning in 
Tanzania, the process that created them opened further opportunities for the 
establishment of private land trusts. In particular, the current laws provide for private 
trusts to acquire land for wildlife protection and commercialization. The Tanzania 












such as GEF, FFI, AWF, Nature Conservancy, USAID and WWF, was the first such 
trusts to acquire the Manyara national ranch which is now run as a protected area. 
Supported by the observation made by Gallo et al., (2009) that private land 
properties are currently an important strategy for acquiring land for TFCAs in 
southern Africa, this study asserts that the TCLT has set grounds for this strategy in 
Tanzania. The study takes the discussion further to argue that both WMAs and 
private land trusts that emerge in countries such as Tanzania where there is no land 
restitution will add to the marginalisation of local communities as opposed to the 
economic development arguments used to promote TFCAs.  
 
7.1.2 Space and the setting of borders  
Insights from border studies verify that the production of scale is a fundamental part 
of the activities that produce space and space creation, in turn, necessitates the 
setting of new borders (Newman, 2006, Ramutsindela, 2007, Rangan and Kull, 
2009, Fall, 2005). The setting of borders cannot be reduced to drawing lines on the 
map or erecting fences on the ground but serves as an act of power (Fall, 2003, 
Newman, 2003, Agnew, 1994). Conceptually, this implies that changing of scale, as 
the bioregional process does, reconfigures spatial borders and the governance 
functions associated with them thereby reorganizing border institutions and border 
communities. Thus, when space and borders are created across frontiers, issues of 
power, control and access to that space and related resources become central to the 
research seeking to explain inequalities in such areas. This locates concepts of scale 
and borders at the core of methodological questions pertaining to the explanation of 
people-environment relations (Engel-Di Mauro, 2009). Hence, by focussing on scale 
and border concepts, this study has shed light on how the bioregional process in 
Tanzania has involved institutional re-organisation and re-definition of powers. The 
study has also provided evidence to confirm that the scaling processes have resulted 
in new forms of protected areas, borders and institutions charged with their 
management.  
 
Specifically, the creation of the Selous-Niassa TFCA has produced three border 
outcomes, namely, the removal of some borders, the creation of new borders while 












made by Paasi (2004); Fall, (2005); Newman, (2006) and Ramutsindela, (2007).  
The removal of borders in TFCAs is symbolised by cutting off fences; making 
colonial borders a physical object while ignoring its non-physical aspects. This way 
of thinking neglects the fact that borders are only one aspect of Africa's inherited 
political geography (Griffiths, 1986) and a narrow view of borders as physical lines of 
separation limits the understanding of African problems (Ramutsidela, 1999). In the 
case of the southeastern Tanzania where neither the state nor the protected area 
borders are physically erected fences, the removal of borders has meant different 
things to the proponents of the Selous-Niassa TFCA. What have changed are the 
functions of sub-national borders (village and districts) in order to create the wildlife 
corridor that supports the establishment of the TFCA. Once WMAs are established in 
the village lands, village borders are rendered immaterial by those of WMAs. 
Similarly, when WMAs are merged to create the SNWC across the two districts, the 
district border is played down. This is to say that the TFCA symbolism of the fence is 
used to promote TFCA even where there are no fences as is the case in 
southeastern Tanzania.  
 
This study confirms the emergence of new borders as demonstrated by new maps 
that describe the extent of wildlife land uses in areas that had not had such land 
uses before. Specifically, WMAs and SNWC in communal lands represent new areas 
and borders for nature conservation. Evidently, there has been the redefinition of 
powers over wildlife in these areas that necessitated the reallocation of rights. 
Consequently, the central government and actors from the private sector retain 
influence over natural resources while the local communities are denied access and 
use of land and wildlife resources. Other forms of borders that have emerged as the 
Selous-Niassa TFCA reflect territorialisation with the German government 
predominantly facilitating the Selous-Niassa TFCA on Tanzanian side and, for that 
matter the East African region, the FFI in Mozambique while the PPF remains the 
overall TFCA facilitator in southern African region. 
 
The position of Tanzania and the Selous-Niassa TFCA offers a new perspective on 
borders in TFCA research. The country is geographically in East Africa but it has 
political attachments with southern Africa countries. Thus, Tanzania holds a 












drawn from this observation; firstly, that in practice the Tanzania-Mozambique border 
is not only a colonial border set during the Berlin Conference but also is also a 
regional border for East Africa, which was set in the 1960s when the EAC was first,  
established. What this observation implies is that the Selous-Niassa TFCA does 
cross not only state colonial borders but it also does so to the East African regional 
border. As such, the Selous-Niassa is placed as the first terrestrial TFCA in East 
Africa, which makes Tanzania the point of departure for other TFCAs in the region. 
The second conclusion relates to the fact that the proponents of TFCAs advocate for 
the removal of state political borders but they do not temper with the Tanzania-
Mozambique as a border for the East African region because they do not promote  
TFCAs, which are trans-regional. The study goes further to question the cross-
border nature of bioregions in general. The question is; why are most bioregions 
found in cross-border areas even though the idea of having the core areas 
surrounded by buffer zones/ecological corridors and cooperation zones does not 
necessarily require the creation of cross-border zones? Whereas this question is 
pertinent to the analysis of the interests of the proponents of bioregional planning 
model in cross-border areas, the scope of a site-specific case as it was for this study 
limits such analysis.  
 
7.2 The impacts of the Selous-Niassa TFCA on the state and local 
communities 
Different phases in the conversion of communal land to conservation were 
accompanied by a series of impacts on the local community‟s livelihoods and natural 
resource institutions. This study affirms therefore that the impacts of TFCAs are felt 
long before the TFCAs are in place. The Selous-Niassa TFCA is not yet operational 
but its design, which is fully dependant on WMAs, challenges the TFCA claims for 
community development. As an anonymous source holds, the communal land is a 
critical component of the TFCA project and its acquisition requires careful planning 
and indoctrination of ideas through community participation (Interview, Anonymous 
Informant, 4/8/2008). The source confirms further that the SNWC project uses 
WMAs but it does not mean that it is a community-based project; ‘… the design and 
implementation of the project is almost 100% top-down…Large percentage of the 
project funds are controlled from Frankfurt, executed through the Wildlife Division 











Tunduru districts...’. While the top-down cash flow is the nature of most donor-funded 
projects, both cash and ideas are derived from personal and corporate interests. 
These interests ranges from bank charge, salaries for external expatriates, 
consultancy fees for implementing agencies and per diems for project officials to 
investment opportunities in equipment supplies, hunting and other related activities. 
Thus, the substantial amount of project funds circulates among key project actors 
while a small fraction is spent on training a few community representatives who are 
specifically prepared to facilitate the smooth implementation of the project. 
Therefore, the community involvement in the SNWC comes indirectly through the 
WMA process. However, since communities are not within the circles that generate 
ideas and funds, their understanding of the scope of the project and the future 
impacts is limited.  
 
Conceptually, the overall process of creating bioregions and TFCAs in particular, 
entails redefinition and reallocation of rights and access to the natural resources. 
Hence, the discussion on the impacts of the Selous-Niassa TFCA on the local 
communities is based on the issue of land and wildlife ownership. As examples of 
communities in Botswana and South Africa as well as the experiences in other 
TFCAs in southern Africa indicate (see Ramutsindela, 2007, Wolmer, 2003a, 
Dzingirai, 2004, Spierenburg et al., 2008), land ownership is the pre-requisite that 
local communities in Tanzania will need to engage in a meaningful negotiation of 
their rights in the wake of bioregional projects. Thus wherever local communities lack 
property rights as is for the case of Tanzania, the TFCA process is likely to 
disempower such communities while empowering other actors. Indeed, rather than 
the increasing commercial activities, local communities and their subsistence life in 
the Selous-Niassa area are still targeted as major threats to biodiversity thus their 
relocations cannot be ruled out; 
 
 …Serious bottleneck for biodiversity protection in Selous-Niassa wildlife corridor is 
the obstruction of wildlife migration routes by agricultural activities, settlements along 
Songea-Tunduru road as well as poaching for local market. The MtDC will stimulate 
economic activities but it will not as such be a serious threat to the ecological 














The analysis of the process that creates the Selous-Niassa TFCA supports the 
conclusion that scale construction and reordering of space in southeastern Tanzania 
has economic and political motives that have historically marginalised local 
communities. This thesis has presented challenges that local communities encounter 
as WMAs evolve as part of protected areas and an important component of the 
Selous-Niassa TFCA. As in the past, local people are currently relocated and have 
restricted access to WMAs, which are the main source of fertile lands for agricultural 
production, forest and wildlife resources. Recent accounts of indigenous relocations 
from areas considered core for wildlife migration and leasing of the same areas as 
hunting blocks for tourists implies that the government not only retains powers over 
resources but it does reallocate indigenous rights as wildlife commercialization 
becomes the economic use of such areas. The case of the private land trust (TCLT) 
reinforces that further displacements of local communities for nature protection in 
Tanzania are yet to come. Since the land ownership system leaves local 
communities without secure property rights while supporting private investments, the 
possible future scenario is that local communities in areas identified as important for 
nature conservation will continuously be displaced and their rights reallocated to 
private sector actors on the basis that communities can neither afford to acquire 
such properties through trusts and nor can the land laws provide for their 
compensations. This implies, then, that unlike others such as the Makuleke 
community of South Africa who owns the land and wildlife and can negotiate benefits 
in the GLTFP, communities in Selous-Niassa and elsewhere in Tanzania have no 
constitutional grounds for negotiating benefits in TFCAs and other bioregional 
projects.  
 
This study concludes that since the process of creating bioregions and TFCAs in 
particular involves the redefinition and reallocation of rights and access to natural 
resources, local communities that lack property rights as in Tanzania are likely to be 
incapacitated by the TFCA process. As argued by others, nature as defined and 
valued by its local dependents will continue to undergo transformation to satisfy the 
preferences of its distant well-meaning consumers (Dowie, 2009, Ficklin, 2008). The 
evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the broader political and economic 
perspective of the Selous-Niassa TFCA will foster the neo-liberalization of nature, 












2008). Therefore, this study calls for a radical change in land and wildlife laws, 
especially in communal areas, if nature protection and TFCAs in particular are to 
foster local community development in Tanzania. These changes should focus on 
enabling local communities to negotiate the benefits of nature conservation and 
utilization in their communal lands. 
    
The scaling processes that seek to re-organize the local to create new spaces of 
conservation and new institutions for natural resource management have created an 
environment for conflict. Since these processes are not limited to the local level, 
conflicts of power have emerged at different levels. At the village level, conflicts 
prevail as processes advance to transfer natural resource management 
responsibilities from Village Councils to the supra-village institutions. At the higher 
levels, there are indications that the facilitators of the SNWC have concerns that the 
Wildlife Division has not fully supported the project in acquiring the land necessary 
for the development of the wildlife corridor. Some sections of the SNWC reports 
opine, for example, that; 
 
 ...the entire area of the SNWC project was divided into hunting blocks and 
allocated to four hunting companies in March 2005 despite the fact that the project 
plans were available at the Wildlife Division…Alien hunting investors in village 
areas have led to unrest and definitely to a negative attitude towards conservation 
and the SNWC project (Hahn, 2005).  
  
…what we see is a complete negation of both the spirit and the wording of the 
Wildlife Policy of 1998. GEF/UNDP is aware of pressures exerted by hunting 
concessions…Wildlife in village lands continue to be controlled by the Wildlife 
Division in Dar es Salaam and district and village institutions are by-passed, which 
is in contravention of the policy. GEF/UNDP investment may be compromised if 
the beneficiaries continue to be tourist hunting entrepreneurs from the Wildlife 
Division. The current conflict and policy dilemma in SNWC area is but one 
symptom of a wider problem (Lyaruu and Rodgers, 2006). 
 
7.3 Questions arising from the study 
Having presented how and why bioregions are constructed, the main actors and the 
implication of the bioregional process in southeastern Tanzania, more questions 
arise from the study. These questions relate to, firstly, the various interests that are 
embedded in bioregional planning and the methodological approaches required to 












actors in the Selous-Niassa area. However, the interest in biodiversity opens up 
opportunities for people who want to pursue other interests such as hunting. These 
additional interests have led to the concentration of actors in the area. The 
consequence has been the marginalization of local people whose interests are at 
variance with powerful actors including the Wildlife Division in Tanzania. Secondly, 
the ways in which research on TFCAs can investigate the various ways in which 
nature conservation becomes a platform on which various goals can be pursued by 
different actors with different backgrounds. More importantly, the study points to the 
need to understand the root of inequalities associated with TFCAs. I argue that 
investigating these inequalities after the establishment of TFCAs miss the 
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Appendix 1: Transfrontier Conservation Areas in conceptual phase 
No. Name Countries involved 
1 Ndumo Tembe-Futi Transfrontier 
Conservation and resource area 
Mozambique and South Africa 
2 Songimvelo-Malolotja South Africa and Swaziland 
3 Kagera TFCA Rwanda and Tanzania 
4 Vwaza-Lundazi Malawi and Zambia 
5 Nyika Malawi and Zambia 
6 Kasungu-Lukusuzi Malawi and Zambia 
7 Lichinga-Liwonde Malawi and Mozambique 
8 Zimoza transborder natural resource 
management project  
Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
9 Zimoza TFCA Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
10 Maiombe forest Angola and Democratic  
Republic of Congo 













Appendix 2: List of informants and their institutional affiliation  
Study 
Phase 
# Name  Institution & position 
held 
Date and Place of 
interview 
 1 Dr. P.M 
Maheshwary  
Technical Advisor – 
National Development 
Cooperation 
20 May 2006 in 
Dar es Salaam  
2 Mr. Rudolf 
Hahn  
GTZ - SNWC Technical 
Advisor 
20 June 2006 in 
Namtumbo  
3 Mr. Andrew 
Mhelela  
District Natural 
Resources Officer - 
Tunduru 
20 June 2006  in 
Tunduru 
4 Mr. Samwel 
Mgela  
District Natural 
Resources Officer - 
Namtumbo 
20 June 2006 in 
Namtumbo 
5 Dr. John 
Hanks  
Conservation 
International - Director  
11 May 2007 in 
Cape Town 
6 Ms. Melissa de 
Kock  





 June 2007 in  
Stellenbosch   
7 Mr. Noel de 
Velliers  
Open Africa  - Chief 
Executive   






































8 Mr. Lota 
Melamari  
CEO – Wildlife 
Conservation Society of 




Sept. 2007 in 
Dar es Salaam  
9* Mr. Gabriel 
Kimolo  




 Sept. and 27 
Nov. 2007 in 
Namtumbo 
* Mr. Rudolf 
Hahn  
GTZ - SNWC Technical 
Advisor 
10 Sept. in 
Songea and 27 
Nov.  2007 in 
Namtumbo 
10 Mr. Nalimi  
Madata 
District Game Officer - 
Namtumbo 
27 Nov. 2007 in 
Namtumbo 




Protected Areas (ADAP) 
- CEO  
27 Nov. 2007 in 
Namtumbo 
* Mr. Samwel 
Mgela  
District Natural 
Resources Officer - 
Namtumbo 
12 and  19 Sept.  
2007 in 
Namtumbo  
* Mr. Andrew 
Mhelela  
District Natural 
Resources Officer - 
Tunduru  
13 Sept. 2007 in 
Tunduru 
12 Mr. Brown 
Kanjenje  
Agricultural officer – 
Tunduru District 
13 Sept. 2007 in 
Tunduru 
13 Mr. Eberhard 
Hallar  
Bee Keeping Officer – 
Tunduru district 
13 Sept. 2007 in 
Tunduru 
14 Mr. Charles 
Shawa   
Assistant Game officer - 
Tunduru 
14 Sept. 2007 in 
Tunduru 
15 Mr. Dicson 
Koishwa  
District Game Officer - 
Tunduru  

































16* Mr. Ngomelo  Project Manager - 
SNWC 
25 Sept. and 27 
Nov. 2007 in 
Namtumbo 
17* Mzee Swedi 
Sanangula 
Historian - Songea 
Museum  
5 and 10  Sept.  
2007 in Songea 
Museum 
18 Mr. Famimu 
Ntatu  





Villager - Milonji  5 Nov. 2007 in 
Milonji village  
20 Mzee Abraham 
Cosmas  
Villager - Milonji  5 Nov. 2007 in 
Milonji village 
21 Mzee Said 
Mohammed 
Kwizombe  
Villager - Lusewa 6 Nov. 2007 in 
Lusewa village 
22 Mzee Issa 
Mbarak  
Villager - Lusewa 6 Nov. 2007 in 
Lusewa village 
23 Mzee Abas 
matomora   
Villager - Matepwende 7 Nov. 2007 in 
Matepwende 
village 
24 Mzee Shaibu 
Zuberi Azizi  
Villager - Matepwende 7 Nov. 2007 in 
Lusewa village 
25 Mzee Rashid 
Said Kajela  




Ilali Mikonga  
Villager - Msisima 8 Nov. 2007 in 
Msisima village 
26 Mzee Bernat 
Nyanguru  
Villager - Ligunga 10 Nov. 2007 in 
Ligunga village  
27 Mzee Fundi 
Omari Tolela  
Villager - Amani 11 Nov. 2007in  
Amani village 
28 Mzee Kasmiri 
Tiriri  
Villager - Ligunga 11 Nov 2007 in 
Ligunga village 
29 Mzee Pangisi 
Nyanguru  
Villager - Ligunga 11 Nov. 2007 in 
Ligunga village 
30 Mzee Yazidu 
Mtuma 
Villager - Likunsanguse 13 Nov. 2007 in 
Likusanguse 
village 
31 Mzee Ali Musa  Villager - Marumba 14 Nov. 2007 in  
Marumba village 
32 Mzee Zuberi 
Ali Ndendeuke  
Villager - Marumba 14 Nov. 2007 in  
Marumba village 
33 Mzee Said Ali 
Likokwa  
Villager - Misiaji 15 Nov. 2007 in 
Misiaji village 
34 Mzee Isa 
Kitowelo  
Villager - Huria 18 Nov. 2007 in 
Huria village 
































Villager game scout - 
Kilimasera 
21 Nov. 2007 in 
Kilimasera village 
38** Mr. Rajabu 
Mtiko 














































39 Mzee Issa 
Hussein Mpoto 
Villager - Mchomoro 20 Nov. 2007 in 
Mchomoro village 
40 Dr. Alan 
Rodgers  
UNDP/GEF 
representative - Eastern 
Africa  
25 Jan. 2008 in 
Dar es Salaam 
41 Mr. Inyasi 
Lejora  
Ecological Monitoring  
Manager - TANAPA 
30 Jan. 2008 in 
Arusha  
42 Mr. Emmanuel 
Severe  
Former Director of 
Wildlife/Currently 
Principle, College of 
African Wildlife 
Management - Mweka 
31 Jan. 2008 in 
Kilimanjaro 
43* Mr. Paul 
Sarakikya  
Former Secretary – 
Tanzania Wildli fe 
Protection Fund 
(TWPF)/Currently in 
Policy and Planning Unit  
4 and 19 Feb.  
2008 in Dar es  
Salaam 
44* Dr. Axel 
Dorken  
GTZ Tanzania Country 
Director 
19 Feb. and 18 
Sept. 2008 in Dar 
es Salaam  
45 Mr. Leornad 
Mayeta  
Eastern Selous 
Conservation Project - 
Project Manager  
21
st
 Feb. 2008 in  
Dar es Salaam 
46 Mr. Zakaria 
Bongola  
Geologist – Ministry of 
Energy and Minerals 
21 Feb. 2008 in  
Dar es Salaam 
47 Mr. Peter 
Sumbi  
WWF  Forest Program 
Officer 
25 Feb. 2008 in 
Dar es Salaam 
48 Mr. Cryspin 
Malima  
WWF Executive Officer - 
Ruvuma Wilderness – 
Selous-Niassa Eastern 
Corridor project 
26 Feb. 2008 in 
Dar es Salaam 
49 Mr. Joh Salehe  WWF - East African 
Ecoregional Project 
Coordinator 
28 Feb. 2008 in 
Dar es Salaam 
50 Mrs. Tibasana  National Land Use 
Planning Commission 
29 Feb. 2008 in  












51 Mr. Julius 
Shilungushela   
National Land Use 
Planning Commission 
29 Feb. 2008 in  
Dar es Salaam 




and Local Government  
3 March 2008 in 
Dodoma 
53* Ms. Miriam 
Zakari  
Assistant Director of 
Wildlife -  Wildlife 
Division 
10  and 15   March 
2008 in Dar es  
Salaam 
54* Captain W. 
Minja  
Senior Game Officer  - 
Wildlife Division 
10 and 17 March 
2008 in Dar es  
Salaam 
55 Mr. Abdallah 
Mwanalusa  
Project Coordination 
Unit - Wildlife Division 
11 March 2008 in 
Dar es Salaam 
56 Mr. Wayner 
Lotter 
Representative of Gauff 
Ingenieure GmbH, the 
consulting agency for 
the SNWC-KfW funds  
4 Aug.2008 in 
Songea 
* Mzee Kasmiri 
Tiriri  
Villager - Ligunga 5 Aug. 2008 in 
Ligunga village 
* Mzee Abraham 
Cosmas  




Ilali Mikonga  
Villager - Msisima 5 Aug. 2008 in 
Msisima village 
* Famimu Ntatu  Villager - Lusewa  4 Aug. 2008 in 
Lusewa village 
* Mzee Issa 
Mbarak  
Villager - Lusewa 4 Aug. 2008 in 
Lusewa village 





Villager - Likusanguse 13 Aug. 2008 








Villagers - Huria 8 Aug. 2008 in 
Huria village 
* Mr. Eberhard 
Hallar  
Bee Keeping Officer – 
Tunduru district 
7 Aug. 2008 in 
Tunduru 
59 Dr. Steven 
Kiruswa 
AWF - Maasai Stepples 
Heartland Director 
12 Sept. 2008 in 
Arusha 
60 Dr. Hussein 
Sosovele 
WWF-Dar es Salaam 22 Sept. 2008 in 
Dar es Salaam 
* Multiple interviews that are registered once in this list 













Appendix 3: Guiding questions for qualitative interviews and the questionnaire 
Semi-structure guiding questions for government officials 
Set 1: Ministry level 
 
What are the overall responsibilities of the government in nature 
conservation? 
What are the specific roles of the Wildli fe Division? 
What are the specific roles of the district council?  
What progress has been made with governance reforms?  
How do these reforms affect natural resources management?  
How is the WMA project progressing so far?  
Could I get a map of WMAs in the country? 
What are the long term management plans for Selous game reserve?  
Would you help me to understand the S-N wildli fe corridor project? 
Where did the idea come from? 
What are the main objectives of the project? 
How does the government support/facilitate the project?  
Who else supports the project and how?  
What plans/agreements are there between the government of Tanzania and 
Mozambique for the management of cross-border resources? (Could I get a 
copy?) 
In your opinion, what will be the future of the people living in the Selous -
Niassa area? 
Set 2: District and 
village  levels  
 
What are the specific roles of the district/village council in nature 
conservation? 
What are the future land use plans for the district/village? 
How would you describe the progress of WMA projects in the 
district/village? 
How are these WMAs linked with the neighboring areas?  
How would you describe the SNWC project? (where does the idea come 
from?) 
What are the main objectives of the project? 
How does the project fit into the district land use plans?  
How does the district council support/facilitate the project? 
Who are the other facilitators of the project and at what capacity? 
What plans/agreements are there between the government of Tanzania 
 and Mozambique for the management of cross-border resources? Could I 
get the copy of agreements (if any?) 
What are the expected impacts associated with the implementation of the 
SNWC project?  
How are the local communities involved in the project implementation?    
Semi-structure guiding questions for donors, experts and consultants 
Set 1: Informants in 
South Africa 
Based on your experience/perspective, where did the idea of TFCAs come 
from? 
Why didn‟t this idea come before? 
How did your experience on nature conservation helped to shape the idea 
of TFCAs? 
How does your institution participate in the establishment of the TFCAs?  












Where is your institution involved in facilitating TFCAs and where is it not  
involved? Why? 
How are the TFCAs in southern Africa linked? 
Which other institutions do you cooperate with in facilitating TFCAs?  
Which specific activities do they facilitate?  
What remarks can you make on the relevance/viability/future of TFCAs in 
Africa? 
Set 2: Informants in 
Tanzania 
 
Based on your experience/perspective, where did the idea of SNWC project 
come from? 
Why didn‟t this idea come before?  
What are the main motives for you/your institution‟s involvement in 
facilitating the SNWC project? 
What specific activities do you facilitate/sponsor? Why?  
Which other sponsors do you work with on the project?  
Are there sponsors that you would not like to work with on the same 
project? Why? 
How would you describe the progress of the project so far?  
What are the expected impacts associated with the implementation of the 
project? 
What other projects are you/your institution facilitate in Tanzania and other 
East African countries?  
Why did you choose to sponsor these projects? 
How are these projects linked? 
How is your institution involved in nature conservation activities globally?  
These projects are very expensive, how do you raise the funds?  
Why all this trouble?  
What are your expectations from the government of Tanzania? 
Stimulant questions for narratives 
Key narrators 
 
Could you give me a sense of what boundaries have been there?  
What did these boundaries mean? 
Who participates in the border making/changing? 
How have these boundaries changes over the years? 
What changes have there been in boundaries? (river, village and wildli fe 
migration routes) 
How would you compare the past with the present boundaries?  
Where/How far have you been using your land? 
Could you share with me what you remember about wild animal 
movements in the area? 
What changes have there been in the animal routes since then?  













Introduction and consent: This questionnaire is one of the research tools for collecting data for the 
research on the creation and consequences of Selous-Niassa wildlife corridor. The researcher is a 
student and the information collected will only be used for academic purposes. Your participation will 
be optional and your name will only be used in this research when necessary on your consent. Are 
you willing to participate in answering this questionnaire?  
 a) Yes  (  )   (Continue) b) No  (   )  (Don‟t continue)  
 
Section A: Socio-economic information 
1. District ………………………….Village…………………………  
2. Main livelihood activities  
Activity √ Elaborate (what, where) 
a. Crop cultivation   
b. Livestock keeping   
c. Mining   
d. Fishing   
e. Hunting   
d. Any other (specify)   
 
Section B: Land ownership and use  
3. Do you have land?  (a) Yes   (  ) (b) No      (      ) 
4. Do you own the land you use?  (a) Yes   (  ) (b) No      (      ) 
Explain …………………………………………………………………………………………………………  
5. If yes, how did you get the land you use?  
Method of 
acquisition 
√ Size Main uses of the land 
Inheritance    
Bought    
Given by the 
government 
   
Cleared the forest    
Any other (specify)    
 
6. What do you use the land for now? a)…………………………………………… 
b)……………………………………………c) ……………………………………... 
7. What would you use the land for in future? 
a)…………………………………………… b)……………………………………  
c) …………………………………………... 
 
Section C: Selous-Niassa wildlife corridor and livelihood issues 
8. Do you know the animal migration routes from Selous to Niassa?  
    a) Yes     (   )   b) No  (   ) c) I don‟t know   (   ) 
9. If no/ I don‟t know, explain 
why……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
10. If yes, explain how many routes you know and where they are?  
...................................................................………………..…………………………………………….  
11. Have the wildli fe routes changed from when you first knew them?  
a) Yes  (   )  b) No  (   ) c) I don‟t know   (   ) 
12. If yes, what changes have you noticed? 
a)……………………………………. b)………………………………………………  
13. In your opinion, what do you think influenced the changes? 
a)……………………………………….b)………………………………… 
c)……………………………………………  
14. Are you aware of Selous Conservation Program (SCP)? 
a) Yes  (   )  b) No (    ) c) Don‟t know      (      ) 
15. If yes, what are your views about the project?  
………………………………………………………………………………………………………  
16. What impacts did the project make on the wildli fe in the area?  
a)……………………………………b)………………………………………  













18. Are you aware of Selous-Niassa wildli fe corridor project? 
a) Yes   (     ) b) No  (    ) c) Don‟t know    (      ) 
19. Do you know the boundaries of the proposed wildli fe corridor? 
a) Yes   (   )  b) No  (    )   c) Don‟t know             (      ) 
20. If no/I don‟t know, why? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………  
21. If yes, could you describe it? 
……………………………………………………………………………………  
22. How far is your land from the propose wildli fe corridor? ____________(kms)  
23. In your opinion, do you think the corridor is necessary?  
a) Yes  (   ) b) No  (   ) c) I don‟t know (   ) 
Explain……………………………………………………………………………………  
















Appendix 4: Examples of SPSS output 
Study Villages 





Valid Milonji  37 5.6 5.6 5.6 
  Matepwende 48 7.2 7.2 12.8 
  Msisima 46 6.9 6.9 19.7 
  Lusewa 51 7.7 7.7 27.4 
  Ligunga 51 7.7 7.7 35.1 
  Amani 38 5.7 5.7 40.8 
  Magazini  63 9.5 9.5 50.3 
  Likusanguse 50 7.5 7.5 57.8 
  Marumba 51 7.7 7.7 65.5 
  Molandi 31 4.7 4.7 70.2 
  Misyage 50 7.5 7.5 77.7 
  Hulia 51 7.7 7.7 85.4 
  Darajambili  37 5.6 5.6 91.0 
  Mchomolo 32 4.8 4.8 95.8 
  Kilimasela 28 4.2 4.2 100.0 
  Total 664 100.0 100.0   
How did you get the land you own/have? 





Valid Inheritance 197 29.7 29.7 29.7 
  Bought 6 .9 .9 30.6 
  Given by 
government 
42 6.3 6.3 36.9 
  Self 
clearance 
415 62.5 62.5 99.4 
  No response 4 .6 .6 100.0 
  Total 664 100.0 100.0   
What are the major uses of your land since you got it?  
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Agriculture 661 99.5 99.5 99.5 
  No response 3 .5 .5 100.0 
  Total 664 100.0 100.0   
Do you know the animal migration routes from Selous to Niassa?  
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 363 54.7 54.7 54.7 
  No, I don't know 297 44.7 44.7 99.4 
  No response 4 .6 .6 100.0 
   
Total 

















Have the wildlife routes changed from when you first knew them? 





Valid Yes 73 11.0 11.0 11.0 
No 229 34.5 34.5 45.5 
I don't 
know 
86 13.0 13.0 58.4 
No 
response 
276 41.6 41.6 100.0 
Total 664 100.0 100.0   
What changes in wildlife routes have you noticed? 






of animals in 
our farms 
68 10.2 10.2 10.2 
No response 11 1.7 1.7 11.9 
Depopulation of 
animals  
2 .3 .3 12.2 
Not applicable 583 87.8 87.8 100.0 
Total 664 100.0 100.0   
Do you know the boundaries of the proposed wildlife corridor?  
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 184 27.7 27.7 27.7 
No, I don't 
know 
465 70.0 70.0 97.7 
No 
response 
15 2.3 2.3 100.0 
Total 664 100.0 100.0   
How far is your land from the proposed wildlife corridor? 





Valid Within (no 
distance) 
27 4.1 4.1 4.1 
1-5 km 224 33.7 33.7 37.8 
6-10 km 125 18.8 18.8 56.6 
11-15 km 65 9.8 9.8 66.4 
16-20 km 55 8.3 8.3 74.7 
21-25 km 11 1.7 1.7 76.4 
Above 25 km 85 12.8 12.8 89.2 
Don't know 45 6.8 6.8 95.9 
No response 27 4.1 4.1 100.0 
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Appendix 6: Summary of the Arusha Declaration and Tanganyika African 
National Union’s Policy on Socialism and Self-reliance  
 
Source: Nyerere, (1967) 
PART ONE  
 
The TANU Creed  
The policy of TANU is to build a socialist state. The principles of socialism are laid 
down in the TANU Constitution and they are as follows:  
WHEREAS TANU believes:  
(a) That all human beings are equal;  
(b) That every individual has a right to dignity and respect;  
(c) That every citizen is an integral part of the nation and has the right to take an 
equal part in Government at local, regional and national level;  
(d) That every citizen has the right to freedom of expression, of movement, of 
religious belief and of association within the context of the law;  
(e) That every individual has the right to receive from society protection of his life and 
of property held according to law;  
(f) That every individual has the right to receive a just return for his labour;  
(g) That all citizens together possess all the natural resources of the country in trust 
for their descendants;  
(h) That in order to ensure economic justice the state must have effective control 
over the principal means of production; and  
(i) That it is the responsibility of the state to intervene actively in the economic life of 
the nation so as to ensure the well-being of all citizens, and so as to prevent the 
exploitation of one person by another or one group by another, and so as to prevent 
the accumulation of wealth to an extent which is inconsistent with the existence of a 
classless society.  
NOW, THEREFORE, the principal aims and objects of TANU shall be as follows:  
(a) To consolidate and maintain the independence of this country and the freedom of 
its people;  
(b) To safeguard the inherent dignity of the individual in accordance with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights;  
(c) To ensure that this country shall be governed by a democratic socialist 
government of the people;  
(d) To co-operate with all political parties in Africa engaged in the liberation of all 
Africa;  
(e) To see that the Government mobilizes all the resources of this country towards 
the elimination of poverty, ignorance and disease;  
(f) To see that the Government actively assists in the formation and maintenance of 
co-operative organizations;  
(g) to see that wherever possible the Government itself directly participates in the 












(h) To see that the Government gives equal opportunity to all men and women 
irrespective of race, religion or status;  
(i) To see that the Government eradicates all types of exploitation, intimidation, 
discrimination, bribery and corruption;  
(j) To see that the Government exercises effective control over the principal means 
of production and pursues policies which facilitate the way to collective ownership of 
the resources of this country;  
(k) To see that the Government co-operates with other states in Africa in bringing 
about African unity;  
(l) To see that Government works tirelessly towards world peace and security 
through the United Nations Organization.  
 
PART TWO  
The Policy of Socialism  
(a) Absence of Exploitation  
A truly socialist state is one in which all people are workers and in which neither 
capitalism nor feudalism exists. It does not have two classes of people, a lower class 
composed of people who work for their living, and an upper class of people who live 
on the work of others. In a really socialist country no person exploits another; 
everyone who is physically able to work does so; every worker obtains a just return 
for the labour he performs; and the incomes derived from different types of work are 
not grossly divergent. In a socialist country, the only people who live on the work of 
others, and who have the right to be dependent upon their fellows, are small 
children, people who are too old to support themselves, the crippled, and those 
whom the state at any one time cannot provide with an opportunity to work for their 
living.  
Tanzania is a nation of peasants but is not yet a socialist society. It still contains 
elements of feudalism and capitalism--with their temptations. These feudalistic and 
capitalistic features of our society could spread and entrench themselves.  
(b) The Major Means of Production and Exchange are under the Control of the 
Peasants and Workers.  
To Build and maintain socialism it is essential that all the major means of production 
and exchange in the nation are controlled and owned by the peasants through the 
machinery of their Government and their co-operatives. Further, it is essential that 
the ruling Party should be a Party of peasants and workers.  
The major means of production and exchange are such things as: land; forests; 
minerals; water; oil and electricity; news media; communications; banks, insurance, 
import ;and export trade, wholesale trade ; iron and steel, machine tool, arms, motor-
car, cement, fertilizer, and textile industries; and any big factory on which a large 












of other industries; large plantations, and especially those which provide raw 
materials essential to important industries.  
Some of the instruments of production and exchange which have been listed here 
are already owned or controlled by the people‟s Government of Tanzania.  
(c) The Existence of Democracy  
A state is not socialist simply because its means of production and exchange are 
controlled or owned by the government, either wholly or in large part. If a country to 
be socialist, it is essential that its government is chosen and led by the peasants and 
workers themsclvcs. If the minority governments of Rhodesia or South Africa 
controlled or owned the entire economies of these respective countries, the result 
would be a strengthening of oppression, not the building of socialism. True socialism 
cannot exist without democracy also existing in the society.  
 
(d) Socialism is a Belief  
Socialism is a way of life, and a socialist society cannot simply come into existence. 
A socialist society can only be built by those who believe in, and who themselves 
practice, the principles of socialism. A committed member of TANU will be a 
socialist, and his fellow socialist – that is, his fellow believers in this political and 
economic system – are all those in Africa or elsewhere in the world who fight for the 
rights of peasants and workers. The first duty of a TANU member, and especially of 
a TANU leader, is to accept these socialist principles, and to live his own life in 
accordance with them. In particular, a genuine TANU leader will not live off the sweat 
of another man, nor commit any feudalistic or capitalistic actions.  
The successful implementation of .socialist objectives depends very much up the 
leaders, because socialism is a belief in a particular system of living, and it is difficult 
for leaders to promote its growth if they do not themselves accept it.  
PART THREE  
The Policy of Self-Reliance  
 
We are at War  
TANU is involved in a war against poverty and oppression in our country; the 
struggle is aimed at moving the people of Tanzania (and the people of Africa as a 
whole) from a state of poverty to a State of prosperity.  
We have been oppressed a great deal, we have been exploited a great deal and we 
have been disregarded a great deal. It is our weakness that has led to our being 
oppressed, exploited and disregarded. Now we want a revolution – a revolution 
which brings an end to our weakness, so that we are never again exploited, 












A Poor Man does not use Money as a Weapon  
But it is obvious that in the past we have chosen the wrong weapon for our struggle, 
because we chose money as our weapon. We are trying to overcome our economic 
weakness by using the weapons or the economically strong – weapons which in fact 
we do not possess. By our thoughts, words and actions it appears as if we have 
come to the conclusion that without money we cannot bring about the revolution we 
are aiming at. It is as if we have said, „Money is the basis of development. Without 
money there can be no development.‟  
That is what we believe at present. TANU leaders, and Government leaders and 
officials, all put great emphasis and dependence on money. The people‟s leaders, 
and the people themselves, in TANU, NUTA, Parliament, UWT, the co-operatives, 
TAPA, and in other national institutions think, hope and pray for MONEY. It is as if 
we had all agreed to speak with one voice, saying, „ If we get money we shall 
develop, without money we cannot develop.  
In brief, our Five-Year Development Plan aims at more food, more education, and 
better health; but the weapon we have put emphasis upon is money. It is as if we 
said, „In the next five years we want to have more food, more education, and better 
health, and in order to achieve these things we shall spend £250,000,000‟. We think 
and speak as i f the most important thing to depend upon is MONEY and anything 
else we intend to use in our struggle is of minor importance.  
When a Member of Parliament says that there is a shortage of water in his 
constituency; and he asks the Government how it intends to deal with the problem, 
he expects the Government to reply that it is planning to remove the shortage of 
water in his constituency – with MONEY.  
When another Member of Parliament asks what the Government is doing about the 
shortage of roads, schools or hospitals in his constituency, he also expects the 
Government to tell him that it has specific plans to bui ld roads, schools and hospitals 
in his constituency – with MONEY.  
When a NUTA official asks the Government about its plans to deal with the low 
wages and poor housing of the workers, he expects the Government to inform him 
that the minimum wage will be increased and that better houses will be provided for 
the workers – WITH MONEY.  
When a TAPA official asks the Government what plans it has to give assistance to 
the many TAPA schools which do not get Government aid, he expects the 
Government to state that it is ready the following morning to give the required 












When an official of the co-operative movement mentions any problem facing the 
farmer, he expects to hear that the Government will solve the farmer‟s problems – 
WITH MONEY in short, for every problem facing our nation, the solution that is in 
everybody‟s mind is MONEY.  
Each year, each Ministry of Government makes its estimates of expenditure, i.e. the 
amount of money it will require in the coming year to meet recurrent and 
development expenses. Only one Minister and his Ministry make estimates of 
revenue. This is the Minister for Finance.  
Every Ministry puts forward very good development plans. When the Ministry 
presents its estimates, it believes that the money is there for the asking but that the 
Minister for Finance are being obstructive. And regularly each year the Minister of 
Finance has to tell his fellow Ministers that there is no money. And each year the 
Ministers complain about the Ministry of Finance when it trims down their estimates.  
Similarly, when Members of Parliament and other leaders demand that the 
Government should carry out a certain development, they believe that there is a lot 
of money to spend on such projects, but that the Government is the stumbling block. 
Yet such belief on the part of Ministries, Members of Parliament and other leaders 
does not alter the stark truth, which is that Government has no money.  
When it is said that Government has no money, what does this mean? It means that 
the people of Tanzania have insufficient money. The people pay taxes out of the 
very little wealth they have; it is from these taxes that the Government meets its 
recurrent and development expenditure. When we call on the Government to spend 
more money on development projects, we are asking the Government to use more 
money and if the Government does not have any more, the only way it can do this is 
to increase its revenue through extra taxation.  
If one calls on the Government to spend more, one is in effect calling on the 
Government to increase taxes. Calling on the Government to spend more without 
raising taxes is like demanding that the Government should perform miracles; it is 
equivalent to asking for more milk from a cow while insisting that the cow should not 
be milked again. But our refusal to admit the calling on the Government to spend 
more is the same as calling on the Government to raise taxes shows that we fully 
realize the difficulties of increasing taxes. We realize that the cow has no more milk – 
that is, that the people find it difficult to pay more taxes. We know that the cow would 
like to have more milk herself, so that her calves could drink it, or that she would like 
more milk which could be sold to provide more comfort for herself or her calves. But 
knowing all the things which could be done with more milk does not alter the fact that 














EXTERNAL AID  
One method we use to try and avoid recognition of the need to increase taxes if we 
want to have more money for development is to think in terms of getting the extra 
money from outside Tanzania. Such external finance falls into three main categories.  
(a) Gifts: This means that another government gives our Government a sum of 
money as a free gift for a particular development scheme. Sometimes it may be that 
an institution in another country gives our Government, or an institution in our 
country, financial help for development programmes.  
(b) Loans: The greater portion of financial help we expect to get from outside is not in 
the form of gifts or charity, but in the form of loans. A foreign government or a foreign 
institution, such as a bank, lends our Government money for the purposes of 
development. Such a loan has repayment conditions attached to it, covering such 
factors as the time period for which it is available and the rate of interest.  
(c) Private Investment: The third category of financial help is also greater than the 
first. This takes the form of investment in our country by individuals or companies 
from outside. The important condition which such private investors have in mind is 
that the enterprise into which they put their money should bring them profit and that 
our Government should permit them to repatriate these profits. They also prefer to 
invest in a country whose policies they agree with and which will safeguard their 
economic interests.  
These three are the main categories of external finance. And there is in Tanzania a 
fantastic amount of talk about getting money from outside. Our Government, and 
different groups of our leaders, never stop thinking about methods of getting finance 
from abroad. And if we get some money or even if we just get a promise of it, our 
newspapers, our radio, and our leaders, all advertise the fact i n order that every 
person shall know that salvation is coming, or is on the way. If we receive a girt we 
announce it, if we receive a loan we announce it, if we get a new factory we 
announce it – and always loudly. In the same way, when we get a promise of a gift, a 
loan, or a new industry, we make an announcement of the promise. Even when we 
have merely started discussions with a foreign government or institution for a gift, a 
loan, or a new industry, we make an announcement – even though we do not know 
the outcome of the discussions. Why do we do all this? Because we want people to 
know that we have started discussions which will bring prosperity.  
DO NOT LET US DEPEND UPON MONEY FOR DEVELOPMENT  
It is stupid to rely on money as the major instrument of development when we know 
only too well that our country is poor. It is equally stupid, indeed it is even more 












financial assistance rather than our own financial resources. It  is stupid for two 
reasons.  
Firstly, we shall not get the money. It is true that there are countries which can, and 
which would like to, help us. But there is no country in the world which is prepared to 
give us gifts or loans, or establish industries, to the extent that we would be able to 
achieve all our development targets. There are many needy countries in the world. 
And even if all the prosperous nations were willing to help the needy countries, the 
assistance would sti ll not suffice. But in any case the prosperous nations have not 
accepted a responsibility to fight world poverty. Even within their own borders 
poverty sti ll exists, and the rich individuals do not willingly give money to the 
government to help their poor fellow citizens.  
It is only through taxation, which people have to pay whether they want to or not, that 
money can be extracted from the rich in order to help the masses. Even then there 
would not be enough money. However heavi ly we taxed the citizens of Tanzania and 
the aliens living here, the resulting revenue would not be enough to meet the costs of 
the development we want. And there is no World Government which can tax the 
prosperous nations in order to help the poor nations; nor if one did exist could it raise 
enough revenue to do all that is needed in the world. But in fact, such a World 
Government does not exist. Such money as the rich nations offer to the poor nations 
is given voluntarily, either through their own goodness, or for their own benefit. All 
this means that it is impossible for Tanzania to obtain from overseas enough money 
to develop our economy.  
GIFTS AND LOANS WILL ENDANGER OUR INDEPENDENCE  
Secondly, even if it were possible for us to get enough money for our needs from 
external sources, is this what we really want? Independence means self-reliance. 
Independence cannot be real if a nation depends upon gifts and loans from another 
for Its development. Even if there was a nation, or nations, prepared to give us all the 
money we need for our development, it would be improper for us to accept such 
assistance without asking ourselves how this would effect our independence and our 
very survival as a nation. Gifts which increase, or act as a catalyst, to our own efforts 
are valuable. Gifts which could have the effect of weakening or distorting our own 
efforts should not be accepted until we have asked ourselves a number of questions.  
The same applies to loans. It is true that loans are better than „free‟ gifts. A loan is 
intended to increase our efforts or make those fruitful. One condition of a loan is that 
you show how you are going to repay it. This means you have to show that you 
intend to use the loan profitably and will therefore be able to repay it.  
But even loans have their limitations. You have to give consideration to the ability to 
repay. When we borrow money from other countries it is the Tanzanian who pays it 












people with big loans, the repayment of which will be beyond their means, is not to 
help them but to make them suffer. It is even worse when the loans they are asked 
to repay have not benefited the majority of the people but have only benefited a 
small minority.  
How about the enterprises of foreign investors? It is true we need these enterprises. 
We have even passed an Act of Parliament protecting foreign investments in this 
country. Our aim is to make foreign investors feel that Tanzania is a good place in 
which to invest because investments would be safe and profitable, and the profits 
can be taken out of the country without difficulty. We expect to get money through 
this method. But we cannot get enough. And even if we were able to convince 
foreign investors and foreign firms to undertake all the projects and programmes of 
economic development that we need, is that what we actually want to happen?  
Had we been able to attract investors from America and Europe to come and start all 
the industries and all the projects of economic development that we need in this 
country, could we do so without questioning ourselves?  
Could we agree to leave the economy of our country in the hands of foreigners who 
would take the profits back to their countries? Or supposing they did not insist upon 
taking their profits away, but decided to reinvest them in Tanzania; could we really 
accept this situation without asking ourselves what disadvantages our nation would 
suffer? Would this allow the socialism we have said it is our objective to build?  
How can we depend upon gifts, loans, and investments from foreign countries and 
foreign companies without endangering our independence? The English people have 
a proverb which says, „He who pays the piper calls the tune‟. How can we depend 
upon foreign governments and companies for the major part of our development 
without giving to those governments and countries a great part of our freedom to act 
as we please? The truth is that we cannot.  
Let us repeat. We made a mistake in choosing money – something we do not have – 
to be the big instrument of our development. We are making a mistake to think that 
we shall get the money from other countries; first, because in fact we shall not be 
able to get sufficient money for our economic development; and secondly, because 
even if we could get all that we need, such dependence upon others would endanger 
our independence and our ability to choose our own political policies.  
WE HAVE PUT TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON INDUSTRIES  
Because of our emphasis on money, we have made another big mistake. We have 
put too much emphasis on industries. Just as we have said, „Without money there 
can be no development‟, we also seem to say, „Industries arc the basis of 
development, without industries there is no development‟. This is true the day when 












be able to say, when we began our development plans we did not have enough 
money and this situation made it difficult for us to develop as fast as we wanted. 
Today we are developed and we have enough money. That is to say, our money has 
been brought by development. Similarly, the day we become industrialized we shall 
be able to say we are developed. Development would have us to have industries. 
The mistake we are making is to think that development begins with industries. It is a 
mistake because we do not have the means to establish many modern industries in 
our country. We do not have either the necessary finances or the technical know-
how. It is not enough to say that we shall borrow the finances and the technicians 
from other countries to come and start the industries. The answer to this is the same 
one we gave earlier, that we cannot get enough money and borrow enough 
technicians to start all the industries we need. And even if we could get the 
necessary assistance, dependence on it could interfere with our policy on socialism. 
The policy of inviting a chain of capitalists to come and establish industries in our 
country might succeed in giving us all the industries we need but it would also 
succeed in preventing the establishment of socialism unless we believe that without 
first building capitalism, we cannot build socialism.  
 
LET US PRAY AND HEED TO THE PEASANT  
Our emphasis on money and industries has made us concentrate on urban 
development. We recognize that we do not have enough money to bring the kind of 
development to each village which would benefit everybody. We also know that we 
cannot establish an industry in each village and through this means erect a rise in 
the real incomes of the people. For these reasons we spend most of our money in 
the urban areas and our industries are established in the towns.  
Yet the greater part of this money that we spend in the towns comes from loans. 
Whether it is use it to build schools, hospitals, houses or factories, etc., it still has to 
be repaid. But it is obvious that it cannot be repaid just out of money obtained from 
urban and industrial development. To repay the loans we have to use foreign 
currency which is obtained from the sale of our exports. But we do not now sell our 
industrial products in foreign markets, and indeed it is likely to be a long time before 
our industries produce for export. The main aim of our new industries is „import 
substitution‟ – that is, to produce things which up to now we have had to import from 
foreign countries.  
It is therefore obvious that the foreign currency we shall use to pay back the loans 
used in the development or the urban areas will not come from the towns or the 
industries. Where, then, shall we get it from? We shall get it from the villages and 
from agriculture. What does this mean? It means that the people who benefit directly 
from development which is brought about by borrowed money are not the ones who 
will repay the loans. The largest proportion of the loans will be spent in, or for, the 
urban areas, but the largest proportion of the repayment will be made through the 












This fact should always be borne in mind, for there are various forms of exploitation. 
We must not forget that people who live in towns can possibly become the exploiters 
of those who live in the rural areas. All our big hospitals are in towns and they benefit 
only a small section of the people of Tanzania. Yet if we had built them with loans 
from outside Tanzania, it is the overseas sale of the peasants‟ produce which 
provides the foreign exchanges for repayment. Those who do not get the benefit of 
the hospital thus carry the major responsibility for paying for them. Tarmac roads, 
too, are mostly found in towns and are of especial value to the motor-car owners. Yet 
if we have built those roads with loans, it is again the farmer who produces the 
goods which will pay for them. What is more, the foreign exchange with which the 
car was bought also came from the sale of the farmers‟ produce. Again, e lectric 
lights, water pipes, hotels and other aspects of modern development are mostly 
found in towns. Most of them have been built with loans, and most of them do not 
benefit the farmer directly, although they will be paid for by the foreign exchange 
earned by the sale of his produce. We should always bear this in mind.  
Although when we talk of exploitation we usually think of capitalists, we should not 
forget that there are many fish in the sea. They eat each other. The large ones eat 
the small ones, and small ones eat those who are even smaller. There are two 
possible ways of dividing the people in our country. We can put the capitalists and 
feudalists on one side, and the farmers and workers on the other. But we can also 
divide the people into urban dwellers on one side and those who live in the rural 
areas on the other. If we are not careful we might get to the position where the real 
exploitation in Tanzania is that of the town dwellers exploiting the peasants.  
THE PEOPLE AND AGRICULTURE  
The development of a country is brought about by people, not by money. Money, 
and the wealth it represents, is the result and not the basis of development. The four 
prerequisites of development are different; they are (i) People; (ii) Land; (iii) Good 
Policies; (iv) Good Leadership. Our country has more than ten million people1 and is 
are; is more than 362,000 square miles.  
 
AGRICULTURE AS THE BASIS OF DEVELOPMENT  
A great part of Tanzania‟s land is fertile and gets sufficient rain. Our country can 
produce various crops for home consumption and for export.  
 
We can produce food crops (which can be exported if we produce in large quantities) 
such as maize, rice, wheat, beans, groundnuts, etc. And we can produce such cash 
crops as sisal, cotton, coffee, tobacco, pyrethrum, tea, etc. Our land is also good for 
grazing cattle, goats, sheep, and for raising chickens, etc.; we can get plenty of fish 
from our rivers, lakes, and from the sea. All of our farmers are in areas which can 
produce two or three or even more of the food and cash crops enumerated above, 
and each farmer could increase his production so as to get more food or more 












money for our other needs our purpose must be to increase production of these 
agricultural crops. This is in fact the only road through which we can develop our 
country – in other words, only by increasing our production of these things can we 
get more food and more money for every Tanzanian.  
 
THE CONDITIONS OF DEVELOPMENT  
(a) Hard Work  
Everybody wants development; but not everybody understands and accepts the 
basic requirements for development. The biggest requirement is hard work. Let us 
go to the villages and talk to our people and see whether or not it is possible for them 
to work harder.  
In towns, for example, wage-earners normally work for seven and a half or eight 
hours a day, and for six or six and a half days a week. This is about 45 hours a week 
for the whole year, except for two or three weeks leave. In other words, a wage-
earner works for 45 hours a week for 48 or 50 weeks of the year.  
In or a country like ours these are really quite short working hours. In other countries, 
even those which are more developed than we are, people work for more than 45 
hours a week. It is not normal for a young country to start with such a short working 
week. The normal thing is to begin with long working hours and decrease them as 
the country becomes more and more prosperous. By starting with such short working 
hours and asking for even shorter hours, we are in fact imitating the more developed 
countries. And we shall regret this imitation. Nevertheless, wage earners do work for 
45 hours per week and their annual vacation does not exceed four weeks.  
It would be appropriate to ask our farmers, especially the men, how many hours a 
week and how many weeks a year they work. Many do not even work for half as 
many hours as the wage-earner does. The truth is that in the villages the women 
work very hard. At times they work for 12 or 14 hours a day. They even work on 
Sundays and public holidays. Women who live in the villages work harder than 
anybody else in Tanzania. But the men who live in vi llages (and some of the women 
in towns) are on leave for half of their lire. The energies of the millions of men in the 
villages and thousands of women in the towns which are at present wasted in 
gossip, dancing and drinking, are a great treasure which could contribute more 
towards the development of our country than anything we could get from rich 
nations.  
We would be doing something very beneficial to our country if we went to the villages 
and told our people that they hold this treasure and that it is up to them to use it for 













(b) Intelligence  
The second condition of development is the use of intelligence. Unintelligent hard 
work would not bring the same good results as the two combined. Using a big hoe 
instead of a small one; using a plough pulled by oxen instead of an ordinary hoe; the 
use of fertilizers; the use of insecticides; knowing the right crop for a particular 
season or soil; choosing good seeds for planting; knowing the right time for planting, 
weeding, etc.; all these things show the use of knowledge and intelligence. And all of 
them combine with hard work to produce more and better results.  
The money and time we spend on passing this knowledge to the peasants are better 
spent and bring more benefits to our country than the money and great amount of 
time we spend on other things which we call development.  
These facts are well known to all of us. The parts of our Five-Year Development Plan 
which are on target, or where the target has been exceeded, are those parts which 
depend solely upon the people‟s own hard work. The production of cotton, coffee, 
cashew nuts, tobacco and pyrethrum has increased enormously for the past three 
years. But these are things which are produced by hard work and the good 
leadership of the people, not by the use of great amounts of money.  
Furthermore the people, through their own hard work and with a little help and 
leadership, have finished many development projects in the villages. They have bui lt 
schools, dispensaries, community centres, and roads; they have dug wells, water 
channels, animal dips, small dams, and completed various other development 
projects. Had they waited for money, they would not now have the use of these 
things.  
HARD WORK IS THE ROOT OF DEVELOPMENT  
Some Plan projects which depend on money are going on well, but there are many 
which have stopped and others which might never be fulfilled because of lack of 
money. Yet still we talk about money and our search for money increases and take 
nearly all our energies. We should not lessen our efforts to get the money we really 
need, but it would be more appropriate for us to spend time in the villages showing 
the people how to bring about development through their own efforts rather than 
going on so many long and expensive journeys abroad in search of development 
money. This is the real way to bring development to everybody in the country.  
None of this means that from now on we will not need money or that we will not start 
industries or embarks upon development projects which require money. 
Furthermore, we are not saying that we will not accept, or even that we shall not look 
for, money from other countries for our development. This is not what we are saying. 
We will continue to use money; and each year we will use more money for the 
various development projects than we used the previous year because this will be 












What we are saying, however, is that from now on we shall know what the 
foundation is and what the fruit of development is. Between money and people it is 
obvious that the people and their hard work are the foundation of development, and 
money is one of the fruits of that hard work.  
From now on we shall stand upright and walk forward on our feet rather than look at 
this problem upside down. Industries will come and money will come but their 
foundation is the people and their hard work, especially in AGRICULTURE. This is 
the meaning of self-reliance.  
Our emphasis should therefore be on:  
(a) The Land and Agriculture  
(b) The People  
(c) The Policy of Socialism and Self-Reliance, and  
(d) Good Leadership. 
  
(a) The Land  
Because the economy of Tanzania depends and will continue to depend on 
agriculture and animal husbandry, Tanzanians can live well without depending on 
help from outside if they use their land properly. Land is the basis of human life and 
all Tanzanians should use it as a valuable investment for future development. 
Because the land belongs to the nation, the Government has to see to it that it is 
being used for the benefit of the whole nation and not for the benefit of one individual 
or just a few people.  
 
It is the responsibility of TANU to see that the country produces enough food and 
enough cash crops for export. It is the responsibility of the Government and the co-
operative societies to see to it that our people get the necessary tools, training and 
leadership in modern methods of agriculture.  
 
(b) The People  
In order properly to implement the policy of self-reliance, the people have to be 
taught the meaning of self-reliance and its practice. They must become self-sufficient 
in food, serviceable clothes and good housing.  
In our country work should be something to be proud of, and laziness, drunkenness 
and idleness should be things to be ashamed of. And for the defense of our nation, it 
is necessary for us to be on guard against internal stooges who could be used by 
external enemies who aim to destroy us. The people should always be ready to 
defend their nation when they are called upon to do so.  
(c) Good Policies  
The principles of our policy of self-reliance go hand in hand with our policy of 












to live on his own labour. And in order to distribute the national wealth rairly, it is 
necessary for everybody to work to the maximum of his ability. Nobody should go 
and stay for a long time with his relative, doing no work, because in doing so he will 
be exploiting his relative. Likewise, nobody should be allowed to loiter in towns or 
villages without doing work which would enable him to be self-reliant without 
exploiting his relatives.  
TANU believes that everybody who loves his nation has a duty to serve it by co-
operating with his fellows in building the country for the benefit of all the people of 
Tanzania. In order to maintain our independence and our pcople‟s freedom we ought 
to be self-reliant in every possible way and avoid depending upon other countries for 
assistance. If every individual is self-reliant ten-house cell will be self-reliant; if all the 
cells are self-reliant the whole ward will be self-reliant; and if the wards are self-
reliant the District will be self-reliant. If the Districts arc self-reliant, then the Region is 
self-reliant, and if the Regions are self-reliant, then the whole nation is self-reliant 
and this our aim.  
(d) Good Leadership  
TANU recognizes the urgency and importance of good leadership. But we have not 
yet produced systematic training for our leaders; it is necessary that TANU 
Headquarters should now prepare a programme of training for all leaders – from the 
national level to the ten-house cell level – so that every one of them understands our 
political and economic policies. Leaders must set a good example to the rest of the 
people in their lives and in all their activities.  
 
PART FOUR  
TANU Membership  
Since the Party was founded we have put great emphasis on getting as many 
members as possible. This was the right policy during the independence struggle. 
But now the National Executive feels that the time has come when we should put 
more emphasis on the beliefs of our Party and its policies of socialism.  
That part of the TANU Constitution which relates to the admission of a member 
should be adhered to, and if it is discovered that a man does not appear to accept 
the faith, the objects, and the rules and regulations of the Party, then he should not 
be accepted as a member. In particular, it should not be forgotten that TANU is a 

















PART FIVE  
THE ARUSHA RESOLUTION  
 
Therefore, the National Executive Committee, meeting in the Community Ce ntre at 
Arusha from 26.1.67 to 29.1.67 resolves:  
 
(a) The Leadership  
1. Every TANU and Government leader must be either a peasant or a worker, and 
should in no way be associated with the practices or capitalism or feudalism.  
2. No TANU or Government leader should hold shares in any company.  
3. No TAN U or Government leader should hold directorships in any privately owned 
enterprise.  
4. No TANU or Government leader should receive two or more salaries.  
5. No TANU or Government leader should own houses which he rents to others.  
6. For the purposes of this Resolution the term „ leader‟ should comprise the 
following:  
 
Members of the TANU National Executive Committee; Ministers; Members of 
Parliament; senior officials of organizations affi liated to TANU; senior officers of par-
statal organizations; all those appointed or elected under any clause of the TANU 
Constitution; councilors; and civil servants in the high and middle cadres. (In this 
context „leader‟ means a man, or a man and his wife; a woman, or a woman and her 
husband.)  
 
(b) The Government and other Institutions  
1. Congratulates the Government for the steps it has taken so far in the 
implementation of the policy of socialism  
2. Calls upon the Government to take further steps in the implementation of our 
policy of socialism as described in Part Two of this document without waiting for a 
Commission on Socialism.  
3. Calls upon the Government to put emphasis, when preparing its development 
plans, on the ability of this country to implement the plans rather than depending on 
foreign loans and grants as has been done in the current Five-Year Development 
Plan. The National Executive Committee also resolves that the Plan should be 
amended so as to make it fit in with the policy of self-reliance.  
4. Calls upon the Government to take action designed to ensure that the incomes of 
workers in the private sector are not very different from the incomes of workers in the 
public sector.  
5. Calls upon the Government to put great emphasis on actions which will raise the 












6. Calls upon NUTA, the co-operatives, TAPA, UWT, TYL, and other Government 
institutions to take steps to implement the policy of socialism and self-reliance.  
(c) Membership  
Members should get thorough teaching on Party ideology so that they may 
understand it, and they should always be reminded of the importance of living up to 
its principles.   
 
Summarised by (Madyibi, www.marxists.org/subject/africa/nyerere) 
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